FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY
1957

COLLEGE LIBRARY

VOL·35 NO·2 $1·50 A COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1957

Reconstruction of an Alliance . . . . . *Geoffrey Crowther* 173
The West in Disarray . . . . . *Paul-Henri Spaak* 184
The Crisis in the Soviet Empire . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 191
Western Communists on the Defensive . . . . . *A. Rossi* 201
Foreign Policy in Presidential Campaigns . . . *Dexter Perkins* 213
Britain and the Common Market . . . . . *Roy Harrod* 225
Nuclear Plenty and Limited War . . . . . *James E. King, Jr.* 238
The Economic Cold War:
Soviet Economic Growth . . . . . *Calvin B. Hoover* 257
American Policy and the Soviet Economic Offensive
Willard L. Thorp 271
South Viet Nam Finds Itself . . . . . *William Henderson* 283
Too Slow or Too Fast? Political Change
in African Trust Territories . . . . . *Vernon McKay* 295
The Socialist Alternative in Italy . . . . . *Ugo La Malfa* 311
"The Unanimous Revolution"—Russia, February 1917
Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart 320
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb . . . . *Louis Morton* 334
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 354
Source Material . . . . . *Ruth Savord* 370

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

PHILIP W. QUIGG
Assistant Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ALLEN W. DULLES — WILLIAM L. LANGER — PHILIP E. MOSELY
GEORGE F. KENNAN — JOHN J. McCLOY — HENRY M. WRISTON
CHARLES H. McILWAIN

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 35, No. 2.

Copyright 1956, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

GEOFFREY CROWTHER, former Editor of *The Economist,* London; author of "Ways and Means of War," "An Outline of Money" and other works * * * *PAUL-HENRI SPAAK,* Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium; previously three times Prime Minister and four times Minister of Foreign Affairs; President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 * * * *HENRY L. ROBERTS,* Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; author of "Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects" and editor of "Foreign Affairs Bibliography" * * * *A. ROSSI,* a student of Communist politics, member of the Communist International in the 1920s; author of "Les Communistes Français pendant la Drôle de Guerre," "Deux Ans d'Alliance Germano-Soviétique" and other works * * * *DEXTER PERKINS,* Professor of History, Emeritus, University of Rochester, and Professor of American Civilization at Cornell University; Chairman of the Harvard Foundation for Advanced Study and Research; author of "The Monroe Doctrine," "The Evolution of American Foreign Policy" and other works * * * *ROY HARROD,* Joint Editor of *The Economic Journal,* London; formerly University Lecturer in Economics at Oxford; author of "The Life of John Maynard Keynes" and other works * * * *JAMES E. KING, JR.,* of The Johns Hopkins University; Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1949–52 * * * *CALVIN B. HOOVER,* Chairman, Department of Economics, Duke University, former President of the American Economic Association; recently in Soviet Russia in connection with a study which he is making for the Twentieth Century Fund; author of "TheEconomic Life of Soviet Russia" and other works * * * *WILLARD L. THORP,* Professor of Economics, Amherst College, and Director of the Merrill Center for Economics; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and member of U.S. delegations at many international conferences, 1946–52; author of "Trade, Aid or What?" and other books on economic topics * * * *WILLIAM HENDERSON,* Director of Meetings, Council on Foreign Relations; recently on leave in Southeast Asia in connection with a study of Indochina * * * *VERNON McKAY,* Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University; formerly Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State * * * *UGO LA MALFA,* member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies; Minister for Foreign Trade in 1946 and again 1951–53 * * * *SIR ROBERT BRUCE LOCKHART,* Acting Consul-General in Moscow, 1915–17, and head of a Special Mission to the Soviet Government, January 1918; British Representative with the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in London, 1940–41; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1941–45; author of "Memoirs of a British Agent," "Jan Masaryk" and other works * * * *LOUIS MORTON,* Deputy Chief Historian, Department of the Army.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 35 JANUARY 1957 No. 2

RECONSTRUCTION OF AN ALLIANCE

By Geoffrey Crowther

THE lines that follow are all based on the assumption that a lasting and effective working alliance between the United States and the nations of Western Europe, primarily Great Britain, is not only a desirable thing in itself but also, in the present state of the world, by far the strongest and perhaps the only guarantor of freedom from all-out war. That assumption is perhaps arguable; but it will not be argued here. Nor shall I make any attempt here to analyze, explain or excuse the events of this past autumn, still less to enter upon any recrimination. My concern is solely with how the alliance, now so grievously weakened, can be rebuilt. But one preliminary remark, it seems to me, is necessary. If there is to be any reconstruction at all, it can only be on a basis of mutual trust. Yet there are in office on either side of the Atlantic, at the moment when I write, men who are not trusted on the other side. So long as this remains true, the progress of reconstruction must, at the best, be halting and partial.

II

In the theory of these matters, the United States and its European allies, from the United Kingdom to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, are all equal sovereign states—equal in status, in strength and in independence of action. Everyone knows that this is not so. But the false hypothesis nevertheless plagues the working of the alliance and leads to untenable positions being taken up on both sides of the North Atlantic. The first requirement for any reconstruction of the alliance is that it should be based on a recognition of the hard facts.

The hardest of the facts is that the United States is not only by far the strongest and richest member of the alliance—everybody always knew that—but the only member that has any substantial freedom to choose its course of action for itself. In the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strict sense of the word, it is the only independent member of the alliance. That, surely, has been demonstrated beyond doubt by the sad events of October and November. Britain and France thought they could successfully act by themselves, and discovered that they could not. Some will say that the Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt would have been successful if it had received the support from America that should have been given, or that was expected. But that is only part of the truth; there was also the opposition of the United Nations, of world opinion, of many of the Commonwealth countries and of a sizeable portion of the British public itself. Moreover, even if it were wholly true that the Anglo-French intervention would have succeeded but for Washington's attitude, that surely proves my point, that Britain and France cannot by themselves carry any independent action to fruition. Such a state of affairs is, of course, highly distasteful to many people in London and Paris. But it is a fact and should be recognized as such.

It should not, however, be carried too far. For one thing, although America's allies may have lost their freedom of independent accomplishment, they have not lost their freedom of initiative. They can still get themselves, and the world, into trouble, even if they cannot get out of it by themselves. That also has been most painfully demonstrated. And for another thing, they still have an almost complete freedom not to act when they should act, which could on occasion be almost as troublesome.

What is needed, then, is recognition of a relationship too subtle to fit into any of the usual categories of diplomacy, a partnership in which only one member is wholly master of its own fate (and even that only within the limits of weak humanity) and the other members are neither wholly independent nor wholly dependent, neither amenable to instructions from the stronger member nor able to sustain any major policy without its help or concurrence.

Such a relationship is not, however, wholly without precedent. Given the inescapable prior assumption of mutual trust, I suggest that a valid precedent can be found in the relations that existed for many years—and to a large extent still exist—between the United Kingdom and what used to be called the English-speaking Dominions. British-Canadian relations long ago escaped from the particular pattern that I have in mind, and relations with the new Asiatic members of the Commonwealth never ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quired it. But the British-Australian relationship illustrates almost exactly what seems to me to be needed in the wider sphere of the North Atlantic Alliance. That relationship has never been formally defined, but it can be described with some precision. The weaker member has the right to state its essential minimum national rights and to expect the stronger partner to respect and preserve them. That having been done, leadership should normally come from the stronger member and be loyally followed by the weaker. And the whole relationship should be seasoned by complete freedom and blasphemous candor in comment—the flow of criticism being, as is natural in such a relationship, mainly from the weaker to the stronger.

To many people in London, the acceptance of such a relationship would seem intolerably humiliating. But why should it be so regarded? Have the Australians been humiliated all these years? One remembers occasions when they have been very irritated, and when their national sense of reticence has been unable to restrain some vigor of expression. But I do not offhand recall ever having met a humiliated Australian. Yet the ratio of Australia to Britain, in the realities of population, wealth and potential military strength, is pretty much the same as the ratio of Britain to America. The British are justly proud of the strength and subtlety of the Commonwealth relationship. Is it sauce only for the goose?

If this could be taken as an accurate expression of the new relationship and as a model of how it would work in practice, quite far-reaching psychological adjustments will be needed on both sides of the Atlantic. I shall turn to the American side of the case very shortly, but first I must deal with some aspects of the British collective attitude. In writing mainly of Britain, I do not wish to imply that there should, or can, be anything exclusive about the British-American relationship. Much the same could be written, *mutatis mutandis,* of the French attitude, but my personal knowledge is mainly of Britain.

III

The major mistake of British policy ever since the end of World War II, as is now becoming clearer every day, has been to attempt a bigger rôle than could in fact be sustained. There is plenty of excuse for this, and it should not be written off simply as impotent nostalgia for the golden age. For the rôle that Brit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ain has essayed to play has not been beyond what the nation's resources could have been made to support. The decisive fact has been that there are limits on the effort that the British people will make to deploy their resources. For this also there is plenty of excuse. It has often occurred to me that much in modern Britain can be explained by the fact that the British are the only nation that fought hard from the first day to the last of both the great wars without being defeated. They have all the exhaustion and all the complacency of victory too. They have never had the therapeutic stimuli of defeat or even of occupation. Whatever the cause, it seems to be a fact that the British people in the 1950s put peace, quiet and leisure above the strenuous virtues of effort and striving.

This can be seen most clearly in the economic sphere, where, for all that has been achieved, there has been a steady reluctance to provide, either by added production or by refraining from consumption, quite enough resources to succeed in the double program of overtaking the arrears of capital equipment and also of selling enough abroad to pay for the necessary imports. The country has never quite earned the income it has insisted on enjoying.

Much the same thing has been true in the political sphere. It has taken the form of straining after a position and prestige in the world that the actual strength of postwar Britain has been insufficient to sustain. Whether the people of Great Britain are quite sure they want to bear all the burdens of being a Great Power is a question that they have never been clearly asked. But certainly in the official circles of Whitehall there has been a determination to admit no abatement of the status that was once Britain's and an unwillingness to admit that the limitations on her strength can be anything but temporary. Particularly among some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office, the preoccupation with status and prestige has been almost a mania. It has lain behind many of the facets of British policy in the postwar years that would otherwise be difficult to explain—for example, the long reluctance to join in any project of European integration, which would seem like an admission that Britain is simply another European nation.

This, surely, is the psychology of the fading actress who will not admit to herself that she can no longer play Saint Joan, and who publicly resents anyone else attempting the rôle.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Miracles do, of course, sometimes occur. Sarah Bernhardt played Napoleon's young son in *L'Aiglon,* and did it in a wheel chair. Conceivably Sir Winston Churchill could do the same—but no one else in present-day British politics. Prestige is not something that exists by itself, or that can be secured by demanding it. It is an honor conferred by others, and cannot be created or sustained by any means other than by deserving it. Indeed, it is best attained by not being sought. Like a piece of string, the more you push it, it won't. At many times in these recent years, one has had the feeling that the Foreign Office, and those Conservative politicians who are attached to it by ties of family or training, have been more concerned with the emotional overtones of world affairs than with their real content. But professional diplomats are paid to know the facts, and to face them realistically; it is supposed to be the public that sometimes gets silly and emotional. It is a dangerous state of affairs when the rôles are reversed, leading to such total misjudgments of the probabilities as occurred in London this autumn.

Another manifestation of this strange divorce from the real world in which British policy has been conducted is the firm belief, which you can hear expressed in every London club, that the world has a great thirst for British leadership. Weak we may be for the moment, the argument goes, but the world still rates our wisdom, experience and disinterested objectives above those of any other government. This belief is sometimes fostered by a particularly limited type of foreign visitor to London, who passes through the clubs on his way to his tailor in Savile Row. But anyone who moves about the world can, I believe, readily observe that it simply does not correspond to the facts. To be quite specific, my own observations in third countries have not disclosed any belief that British policy since the war has, on balance, been better than American. On the contrary, I am more often called upon to explain its puzzling inconsistencies than to listen to eulogies of it.

What must be asked of Britain, if the alliance is to be based on a firmer foundation, is therefore, it seems to me, chiefly a willingness to face facts. Britain is no longer a super-Power. She is perhaps in a class by herself, but it is not the highest class, nor is it one that permits her the luxury of fully independent action. She is no stronger than the resources she has available and is able and willing to bring to bear. She is no more respected than her

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions warrant—and it is other nations' judgments on her policies and actions that count for prestige, not her own.

It sounds easy to face the facts. But it is in fact a most difficult psychological operation, and I should like to couple to my severities a plea to Britain's friends to exercise patience. There are men still alive and active in Britain today whose ideas on the world were formed and fixed at the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. The men now in control grew up just before, during and immediately after the Kaiser's war. One of the great difficulties of this fast-moving world is that men are always prescribing for the yesterday they understand rather than for the today they do not. Moreover, it takes much longer to adjust to unpleasant realities than to rising prosperity. It can perhaps proceed only through a series of shocks, and it may be that the events of this tragic autumn will turn out to have had a galvanic effect on the process of mental adjustment in London.

Perhaps also the British people would find the process became easier if they cultivated the art of frankness in criticism. It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that there has not been a great deal of anti-Americanism in Britain. But it has been disconnected, unsystematic and irresponsible. It is my belief that much of it would disappear if there were a greater willingness in the Government and the Foreign Office to state the British case in the open, with all relevant facts, whenever there is a disagreement with Washington. The Suez dispute provides a clear demonstration of what I mean. After the explosion, it became apparent that the British and French Governments had, as they conceived, been driven to desperation by the weakness and instability of American policy. Had the rôles been reversed, long and authoritative articles would have appeared in the American press, setting out the case at length with names and dates. In Britain, all that happened was that a generalized sense of irritation spread through informed circles, leaking out into cartoons and sly references, without anyone having a chance to know what the rights and wrongs were. Even up to the time I write, three weeks after the disaster, the only reasonable and argued statements of the British case against Mr. Dulles that I have seen have been by American reporters in the American press. This strange and harmful reticence is due partly to the long Foreign Office tradition of "covering up," and partly to a belief that "publicity won't get you anywhere"—which may be true in other capitals of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world, but is certainly not true of Washington. The technique of frank diplomacy, in this modern age, requires frankness between public opinions as well as candor of the diplomats among themselves.

IV

I turn to the psychological adjustments that seem to me to be required in the United States if the alliance is to be effectively reconstructed. And if, in doing so, I write more severely than a foreigner should, I hope that my long record as an explainer, and often as a defender, of American policies to the British public will be allowed to me as an excuse.

I should like to take as my text two extracts from a dispatch in *The New York Times* of November 12, 1956, by that paper's chief Washington correspondent, Mr. James Reston. Let me make it clear that I am in no way taking issue with Mr. Reston, who was reporting the attitude of official Washington with the accuracy and perception that have won him his high reputation. "As seen from here," Mr. Reston wrote, "there has always been a certain degree of condescension in the official attitude of London and Paris towards Washington. Nobody said so outright, of course, but it was felt here that London and Paris regarded the United States as the big, powerful and idealistic, but somewhat naïve partner, who did not quite understand the facts of international life. . . ." It follows from what I have written above that there is, in my opinion, some truth in this charge. Certainly I would not try to dispute it—though I would add that every Englishman who comes to America gets used to being accused of condescension when nothing of the sort was intended. But even if it is completely true, I still find it very alarming to have this seriously put forward among the four or five factors that will govern the United States Government's attitude to the alliance of the free peoples. If the State Department is also governed by emotions, I find the fact more alarming, and even less excusable, than it is in the Foreign Office. Surely the United States is strong enough, and sure enough of its strength, to bear with the British and French while they make their painful adjustments. If we are to be plagued not only by a new British inferiority complex, but also by the remnants of the nineteenth-century American inferiority complex, then the task will be difficult indeed. If the prescription for the Foreign Office is to make an unemotional assess-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of the realities, surely it is the same for the State Department.

A little later in the same dispatch, Mr. Reston wrote: "While it is willing and even eager to rebuild the alliance, [the United States] Government feels that the alliance will have to be rebuilt on the assumption that there are some questions in some areas of the world where Washington's vital interests are not always precisely the same as those of London and Paris. In short, the feeling here is that the alliance can be rebuilt on a more realistic basis if the events of the last few days have demonstrated (1) that the Soviet menace is as great as ever in Europe and even greater in the Middle East, (2) that the United States, Britain and France have a common interest in banding together to meet that threat, but (3) that this common interest does not include the assumption that the United States will back Britain and France in any or all action in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia."

Again, there can be no quarrel with the accuracy of this statement. But if that is all there is to be said, does it not amount to saying that the alliance will be expected to work in matters that the United States deems important, but not in matters that Britain and France deem important, and even perhaps vital to their existence? If that is the American attitude, there is plenty of justification for it. He who pays the piper is entitled to say what shall not be played, as well as what shall. But if this is the attitude, then it is hard to see how there can be an effective alliance.

Here we come up against the other limit that defines the possibility of alliance. If the urgent need for Britain and France is to realize the extent to which they have become dependent on the United States, and to accommodate themselves to this fact, the urgent need for the United States is to realize that its allies are not totally dependent. No one can dictate to another what he shall regard as vitally important. Washington may not like some of the things that Britain and France regard as important, but it cannot stop them doing so. Nor can it escape from the fact that, if they do not get American help, or at least American sympathy, in matters that they regard as vital, they are not going to be good allies in the matters that Washington regards as important. Litvinoff used to say that "Peace is Indivisible." In the same sense (and to about the same extent) alliance is indivisible.

This must not be pushed too far. I am not trying to say that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the State Department must always dance to a Franco-British tune. It is obvious that the strongest member of the alliance must have the biggest say in determining its policies, and the State Department has much more freedom in disregarding or overriding the day-to-day wishes of the Foreign Office or the Quai d'Orsay than any that they will in future feel they have in going against Washington. All that is implicit in the alliance of unequals. But it is also in the logic of alliance that the permanent and vital national interests of the weaker partners become permanent and vital interests of the United States. It may be possible to have defined and agreed exceptions to this—matters on which a member of the alliance is put upon notice from the start that it is on its own—though I am doubtful about the possibility of this, so interdependent are the problems of the Western world. But when any vital national interest of a member of the alliance has not been excluded from its purview, then it can be disregarded only at the peril of the alliance. The troubles of this autumn have been caused by the fact that the British and French Governments came to believe that one of their most vital interests was neither understood nor supported by the United States Government, whose policy seemed rather to be calculated to persuade them into surrender. Whether they were right or wrong in so thinking, I do not know. But I do venture the criticism of American diplomacy in the Suez affair that, to an extent that proved to be dangerous, it gave the impression of being concerned with the interests of the United States alone. There are some Americans who would say that, if so, this was just as it should have been. That may be; but it is not a possible attitude for the leader of an alliance.

The psychological adjustment that is required of the United States is often described as being a willingness to assume the responsibility of leadership. That seems to me to be an oversimplification. I find among Americans plenty of willingness to lead, sometimes too much impatience to do so. I would say rather that what is needed is a realization that a leader cannot always define or limit the commitments that he enters into by the fact of his leadership. He cannot simply give a lead when he feels like it. He must give a lead when he would far rather dodge the issue altogether. And he must give a lead that can be, and will be, followed. The professional politicians of the United States recognize these ground rules in their domestic activities. They know

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that a political leader cannot keep his party together unless he is on the job all the time, and unless he can keep his followers reasonably content with his leadership. The facts of human nature are exactly the same on the international plane.

V

Psychological attitudes are, I believe, fundamental, and I make no excuse for having devoted so much space to them. But they are important, of course, only because they condition and determine actions and policies. Lest I give the impression of remaining wholly in the air, let me conclude with a very brief indication of the areas in which, once the attitudes are adjusted, a reconstructed alliance could reconstruct its policies.

There are three main trouble areas in the world—Europe, the Far East and the Middle East. It would be my judgment that in Europe the United States has, over the postwar decade, given its allies a strong and intelligible lead which on the whole they have gladly followed, and on the whole with success. In the Far East the United States has given a lead, but one which, from time to time, its allies could neither understand nor follow. In the Middle East, no perceptible lead at all has been given.

In Europe, therefore, no major task of reconstruction is called for. I am not denying that the policy, and its application, should be under daily review. But I do not believe that there is any crisis in the alliance.

In the Far East, perhaps the time is approaching when at last an agreed and comprehensive policy could be worked out. I would not wish to acquit American policy in that area of many inconsistencies and errors. But there is also one cardinal error of British policy there which has never, to my mind, had the attention it deserves. This is the British Government's assumption that its liabilities in the Far East can be limited and that it need not take sides. This is absurd not only for the general reasons that have been developed above, but also for the quite specific reason that Britain has a commitment in that area, in the shape of Hong Kong. There is a conspiracy of silence round Hong Kong. But the facts are, first, that the Chinese Communists are sure to lay a claim to it some day and, secondly, that when they do, it can neither be lamely surrendered nor could it be defended without American assistance. At present, America shows an ostentatious lack of interest in keeping Hong Kong out of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hands of the Communists, and Britain exhibits the same attitude toward Formosa. Yet both countries must know that they would, in fact, both be involved in the fate of either. Is it really beyond the powers of diplomatic good sense to fashion a policy out of these materials?

The biggest need for policy, however, is clearly in the Middle East. One obvious result of the November disaster is to leave the United States as the only effective defender of the interests of the whole Western alliance in that area. I have written more than once in recent years that, if only the United States would enunciate a comprehensive and intelligible policy for the Middle East, Britain and France ought to follow it, whatever it may be. Now they have no option—and neither has America.

The questions are very awkward, but they have to be answered. Is it, or is it not, absolutely vital to the free nations of the West that their influence in the Middle East should be at least equal to Russia's? Could they hope to stand up to the Soviet Union in some future crisis, if the Russians could at any moment cut off the oil of the Middle East and close the Suez Canal? If the answers to those questions are what they obviously are, at what point does the West consider its vital interests to be unacceptably damaged? Would a Soviet alliance with Syria be too dangerous to be borne? Once the minimum requirements of the West have been defined, how can they be secured? Can it be done by kindness alone? Are there any contingencies that would justify the use of force? Is it possible for policy in all circumstances to be conducted within the framework of the United Nations alone? These questions should have been answered long ago. They will not wait any longer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WEST IN DISARRAY

By Paul-Henri Spaak

ONLY yesterday we were living more or less at ease in an atmosphere of relaxed international tension, enthusiastically practising the principle of peaceful coexistence set forth by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. This happy state of affairs had lasted for some months. As a result, even the most skeptical among us had gained a certain degree of confidence. The prevailing tone was one of optimism.

On July 26, in defiance of international obligations, Colonel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, thereby setting off a whole chain of reactions. Just when the crisis was most acute, a revolution broke out in Hungary and the Soviet Union stepped in with unparalleled brutality to repress it. Within a few weeks the international horizon was darkened by heavier clouds than at any other time in the last ten years. The effect was that of falling from a high place. Illusions faded as we found ourselves face to face with stark reality.

As I write these lines, nothing is settled. There is a general strike in Budapest, and the Russian tanks are still there. In Egypt, an international contingent is about to relieve the Anglo-French forces, but we wonder anxiously how the two related conflicts can be resolved, one concerning the Canal, the other between Israel and the Arab nations.

Yet although nothing is settled, it is possible to measure some of the consequences of these events. All international institutions have been shaken by this double crisis. It has directly affected the United Nations, NATO and the whole attempt to achieve unity in Europe. In this welter of events, resolutions and decisions, not to mention feelings, we find food for somber thought. Already we can reach certain conclusions.

First of all, let us look at the United Nations. I note, with mingled surprise and satisfaction, that in world opinion its prestige still is high. I say with surprise, because from the start I had excessively great hopes for this organization. Too often they have been dashed. Those who do not know the inner workings of the United Nations, its ponderousness, the time it wastes, the hypocrisy which frequently marks its debates, its oft-demonstrated inefficiency—in short, those who are acquainted with it only from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the outside and hark back to its generous principles and noble ideals—all these have held fast to their original confidence and faith.

There is something profoundly touching about this widespread reaction. Facing any case of international injustice or threat of war, people in large numbers turn to the United Nations for redress. I only wish that I could still number myself among the faithful. And yet I honestly cannot. On the contrary, it seems to me that never before has the insufficiency of the United Nations as at present constituted stood out so clearly. In spite of its apparent success, I believe that it has never come so near to the brink of failure—that is, unless it proceeds promptly to reestablish its strength.

It looks as if the United Nations had been able to prevent the extension of the war in Egypt but were powerless to block or end the Soviet aggression against Hungary. This difference fosters the fear that in an organization where impartiality was supposed to be the rule, power or cynicism actually has carried the day. This is a fundamental fault, but there is another still worse. The Charter signed at San Francisco aspired to be all-embracing. Of course the main aim was to outlaw war, to condemn and prevent recourse to violence. But there was also the constructive idea of establishing law and assuring the triumph of justice. Although the United Nations has, to a certain extent, prevented war, I fear—much as I should like to be mistaken—that it is quite incapable of making the right prevail.

The San Francisco Charter seems to me dangerously incomplete and so ineffectual that I do not see how, in its present form, it can long endure. To eliminate war as a political weapon is certainly a great moral step forward. But if no alternative recourse is provided, then the system is handicapped from the start and can lead only to chaos.

Let me put it in a different way. In the present United Nations setup, which is not what its founders wished and hoped it would be, everything short of war is allowed. Treaties may be violated, promises can be broken, a nation is licensed to menace its neighbor or to perpetrate any sort of trick on it, just as long as there is no actual war. The attitude of Egypt during the last few months is a case in point. While Egypt denied transit through the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, sent death commandos onto Israeli soil, violated the Treaty of Constantinople, sent arms to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

used against the French in Algeria and made preparations to attack its neighbor, the United Nations was powerless to intervene. Such intervention would not come within the scope of the Charter as at present interpreted. But let Israel in desperation send troops into the Sinai peninsula and let Anglo-French forces land at Port Said, and they are sure to be condemned. Meanwhile, those who were looking on impassively at the brutal repression of the revolt in Hungary could not find words harsh enough to damn them.

This brand of justice, I repeat, is nothing but a caricature. Such an interpretation of principles amounts to rewarding any nation which is audacious enough to accomplish the most reprehensible act but which very cleverly stops short, not of violence, but of open war. This state of things cannot endure. It is high time to modify the Charter, to abolish the veto, to make for responsible voting, to decree that violators of international law shall be excluded, ipso facto, from the organization, and to set up a real international army.

Obviously, all this is very difficult to bring about. That the veto has rendered the Security Council powerless does not need to be demonstrated further. Thus, as was foreseen at San Francisco by a good many delegations, the system established there has proved to be inapplicable. Yet there is hope, perhaps, in the fact that the General Assembly seems to be more and more aware of its possibilities and anxious to make up for the too-evident bankruptcy of the Security Council. Is the Assembly strong enough to set up an order of things which could, to a certain extent, compensate for these shortcomings? In any event the question is being asked.

My optimism, I admit, is limited, principally because of the attitude of Soviet Russia and the satellite countries. The spectacle which they have presented in the course of debate in the present Assembly is indeed profoundly shocking. They become passionate defenders of the General Assembly's recommendations every time that Egypt is in question, but they treat all resolutions concerning Hungary like dead letters. This attitude is so immoral that the very authority of the Assembly becomes deeply affected by it. Under such conditions it is impossible to believe that peace can be maintained and international justice assured.

But perhaps the very depth of the evil will force people to open their eyes. During the early days of the United Nations reform of the Charter was often discussed, but these efforts came up

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against fierce opposition from the Soviet Union, and they have been progressively abandoned. Today the subject is again the order of the day; those who believe in the need for the United Nations are once more demanding its adaptation to new circumstances. If this trend could grow and assert itself, it would undoubtedly represent the best hope of the moment.

Secondly, let us look at the Atlantic Alliance. In this moment of major crisis it failed to function. Ironically enough, just when at the instance of all the partner nations three "wise men" were studying ways of strengthening NATO, particularly by means of periodic consultations, the great Western Powers suddenly revealed their fundamental disagreement. Let us not inquire who is to blame. Are not all the Great Powers equally guilty for letting themselves get into this situation?

Today when the aims of Soviet policy are again dangerously clear the Atlantic Alliance is more necessary than ever. It is urgent to repair the damage done to it, and this requires an effort of will. First, all the parties must arrive at the same interpretation of the facts, and then they must consent, once for all, to sacrifice the unimportant to the essential. And what may the essential be? The essential is this: that although both before and after the Twentieth Communist Party Congress there were changes in the Soviet Union's domestic policy, its foreign policy has remained exactly the same. Its aim is still what it was under Stalin: to weaken the Western nations, to create difficulties for them by complicating and poisoning the problems with which they are faced, and yet to refrain from overstepping certain limits beyond which they inevitably would find themselves involved in a world war.

This policy is determined by two imperatives. The Soviet Union remains completely Communist, it seeks the victory of Communism, but at the same time it wishes to avoid a war. For even if it were victorious, its economic and social ideals would be retarded and perhaps the achievement of them would be jeopardized. Strange to say, the real face and the essential nature of Communism are still little known and badly understood, particularly, perhaps, in the United States.

Too many people continue to think of Communism as an extreme left-wing movement, opposed to capitalism and favoring collective ownership. But Communism is much more than this. It is a new form of civilization trying to impose itself from the top,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and its fundamental principles are diametrically opposed to those from which the moral, political, economic and social evolution of both Europe and America has proceeded and on which it today is based. Our civilization is shaped to the measure of man. Its chief characteristic is respect for the human person. From that, all the rest stems. Communism, on the other hand, denies and ignores man, takes no interest in him as an individual and certainly does not respect him.

With such different points of departure, no purpose common to the two systems can be found. One of the two must triumph over the other, and if it is to be ours we must stick together. Europe can no longer do without the United States; that is a fact which calls for no further demonstration. And the United States would be deeply mistaken to imagine that it can get along without Europe. In spite of the difficulties which sometimes make the coördination of policy difficult, in spite of the regrettable events of these last months, where are America's best friends? In Asia or Africa? No, in Europe.

In what parts of the globe are the misery of the people and inexperienced leadership opening the way to Communist infiltration? Where, on the contrary, is Communism held in check or forced to recede? The answer to these questions is not difficult to find. The essential thing is the defense of our civilization. All the rest, no matter how important it may seem, is secondary.

So little is needed to make the Atlantic Alliance what it should be. The principal partners need only to have a little more trust in one another, to be more deeply aware of their fundamental unity. As I write, the three "wise men" are about to turn in the report which was requested of them. Its general content is not hard to guess. It will call for more frequent and regular consultations among the signatories of the Atlantic Pact; it will ask each to abstain from any single-handed action capable of disrupting the policy of the others; and it will suggest fuller exchange of information regarding each one's aims and objectives.

Everyone is going to agree with these recommendations. But this does not reassure me completely. What is needed is an active will to press forward along these lines rather than a mere verbal acquiescence in them. Have the perils through which we have recently passed and are still passing opened our eyes?

Fortunately, the Soviet Union committed a serious diplomatic error by asking the United States to join it in opposing the Anglo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French enterprise in Egypt. This was too much. It pointed up unmistakably the low estate into which the Atlantic Alliance had fallen. It will be, I believe, the indirect cause of an effort to rebuild it. This alliance is the tool for making a joint policy. It is inconceivable that we shall not employ it.

Although the present crisis presents dangers for both the United Nations and NATO, it may well be beneficial to the cause of European unity. Ever since the nationalization of the Suez Canal there has been a strong current of opinion in that direction. Colonel Nasser's bold move showed what a definite lack of esteem for the great European nations exists in certain quarters. And the failure of the United States to support the Anglo-French cause has underlined the same theme. The European nations are somewhat like scattered chicks. When they see a hawk hovering above them—whether in the form of Stalin or Nasser—they tend to come together.

Chancellor Adenauer and Premier Guy Mollet have restated forcefully their desire to pursue European unity. They have done even more. They have devised constructive solutions for various technical problems, proving once again that when a political will exists technicalities can easily be swept away. In this field things are evolving favorably, and there is a chance that within a few weeks we shall see agreement on a common European market and on Euratom, the European project for atomic energy development. Once again the goal seems within reach. But this was equally true in the period of the European Defense Community; and having lived through this experience, I cannot allow myself to be carried away by premature enthusiasm. Those of us who work for European unity are fated to be constantly on the verge of either triumph or disaster. It is an incontrovertible fact, however, that the idea of a third force, a united Europe, has made great progress in the course of recent months. For the United States this should be a cause of rejoicing. The third force is not an attempt to neutralize Europe and place her at an equal distance between America and Russia. On the contrary, it expresses the European will to cease being a dead weight upon America and to become a genuine ally, ready to assume a full share of responsibilities.

I have said—and there is no use trying to hide it—that things seem to me to have been going badly. I am not entirely pessimistic; I do not look for a third world war. But I do fear (I must ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mit) that a more and more confused situation is developing in which the Western world risks losing much. It can gain only by showing unexpected courage and unity.

A sense of fatality seems to smother us. We know what must be done. We even succeed in expressing it quite clearly. But for one reason or another we are not able to translate our will into action. We were right to create the United Nations, we were right to make the Atlantic Alliance, we are right to dream of a united Europe. But once the policy has been agreed upon and the instruments forged we are not able to make them operate efficiently. Little by little the instrumentalities lose their force and scope and hopes dissolve in disillusionment. Where are the men of clear mind and resolute will that the West needs desperately to save its precious inheritance?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CRISIS IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE

By Henry L. Roberts

IF we are much too near the recent tumultuous and tragic events in Poland and Hungary to write their history or to venture any predictions for the future in Eastern Europe, we can at least make a serious, if tentative, appraisal of what we feel we know and do not know about the nature of this crisis which has shaken the satellite empire. What is the significance of the changes and disturbances in the Soviet orbit since Stalin's death, and more especially since the monolithic apparatus of party and state control which he perfected has come under criticism by Communists themselves?

When we consider four of the more illuminating developments in 1956—the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. and the secret Khrushchev report; the stormy advent of the Gomulka régime in Poland; the Hungarian revolution and its suppression by Soviet troops; and the reactions of Tito's Jugoslavia to these happenings—we see that the trend away from Stalin's rigid pattern of organization and control has proceeded along three different, and conflicting, lines: 1) toward *modified centralized control;* 2) toward a *"polycentric system,"* to use a phrase adopted, though not invented, by Palmiro Togliatti; and 3) toward the ascendancy of *centrifugal forces.* Within the Communist world the play of these divergent trends is framed, on the one hand, by an almost universally felt need to reduce some of the rigors and excesses of the Stalin era, and, on the other, by the need to prevent the return to a non-Communist political and social order. There is no reason to question the reality, from the Communist point of view, of either of these needs. Some Party members may feel that things were simpler in the old days, but there is ample evidence, for example in Khrushchev's secret report, that even the most powerful Communist figures felt the pistol pressing at the base of their skulls.

Within the Soviet Union itself, where both the state and the individual have long been under the control of the Party, the problem is largely one of managing this "decompression" so as to arrive at what is rather cloudily termed "a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism." From the perspective of the non-Communist observer, this is no easy task and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may call for a nice sense of balance and timing—rather like a fakir shifting position on his bed of spikes. Still, we have a good deal of evidence that over the last 40 years the Russian people have been rather thoroughly conditioned to the Soviet system, and on the whole the Soviet leaders have shown a reasonably accurate sense of what the Russian people will or will not accede to.

It is another matter when we turn to the Soviet Union's relations with the satellites. Here, too, despite statements about the fraternity of Communist parties and admissions of domineering behavior in the past, it seems clear, and natural, that the Soviet leaders should prefer a pattern of modified centralized control, stressing the notion of *primus inter pares*. It is quite likely that there may be some difference of opinion among the Soviet leaders as to the actual application of this principle in dealing with the satellite parties, but it appears almost inevitable that the Soviet Union, having been the creator of these régimes, should continue to demand acknowledgment of its parental status. Nevertheless, the Soviet effort to maintain a modified form of centralized control does encounter both the highly important fact of national pride and the relatively short span of Communist control in the satellites.

National pride and the absence of a generation's conditioning have obviously had a decisive part in the events leading to Gomulka's "national Communist" régime in Poland. Indeed, it is hard to see just how the Russian Communists, for all their ideological blinders, could have failed so profoundly to take adequate account of the fierce pride of the Poles and their still vivid memories of 1944–45. Yet one cannot but have the impression that the Russians somehow made a serious miscalculation in estimating the effect of de-Stalinization in Poland. As it turned out, there was formed a working alliance between a leading faction of the Polish Communist Party and Polish nationalism against Soviet interference and control. The new régime, however, has not moved toward withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—perhaps because of a continuing and generally held concern about the security of Poland's Western frontier—nor has it gone beyond the limits of a single-party system. In other words, Polish Communism for the moment enjoys a coördinate rather than subordinate relationship to the C.P.S.U.—the pattern of "polycentricity."

This appears to be an inherently precarious, though possibly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

durable, situation: it could easily be impelled further in either direction. Except for Gomulka's personal tribulations under Stalinism and the fact that the new régime has stood up against Khrushchev and Bulganin, there are few *positive* bonds uniting the Polish people and the present leadership. It is quite conceivable that further domestic demands, political and economic, may well up and sweep beyond the limits of even national Communist tolerance. The Hungarian tragedy and the preoccupation with Germany may moderate their expression. But we certainly do not know enough to predict or even to guess how the Gomulka régime, or the Russian, would respond (and perhaps respond in anticipation) to such demands.

Notwithstanding its tragic outcome, the Hungarian case resembles the Polish in several respects: an intense pride, a tradition of national battles against Russians, a schism in the local Communist Party and rising popular demand for a change.

At this point we probably lack the information we need to explain fully why the repercussions of de-Stalinization led to such catastrophically different consequences. The absence of a frontier dispute with Germany; the rather different, and apparently less well organized, development of the opposition within the Hungarian Communist Party; the uncertainty and delay in dealing with Rakosi and Gerö; and, of course, the preceding events in Poland —these doubtless contributed to the explosion. But it may have been simply accidents of timing and of individual behavior that set it off: inept handling of troops and unnecessary provocation. At any rate by the time that Imre Nagy (who seemed slated to be the Hungarian Gomulka) was called in, the panicked Communist leadership had already called for military aid against the people. In consequence, the revolution, under the pressure of conflict, quickly moved beyond the "national Communist" position to one that was increasingly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. The Soviet decision to crush the revolution by force seems to follow directly from this movement beyond the confines of Communism and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, of course, the Russians had good reason to fear the spread of the recalcitrant Polish and Hungarian temper to the rest of Eastern Europe; the sudden and, for the Russians, fortunate eruption of fighting in the Near East may have led them to conclude that the time was favorable for a crackdown. Whatever the particular reasons—and this is a subject for historical inquiry—the Hungarian revolution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clearly demonstrates the momentary ascendancy of centrifugal forces which were rapidly bearing Hungary out of the Communist orbit until the Russians moved in with Stalinist severity.

The reaction of Titoist Jugoslavia to all these events is of particular interest, since Tito for some years has been the explicit advocate of a "polycentric" system of national Communist régimes, independent in their relations with Moscow and with one another, but also proceeding along the road, or roads, to "socialism," as the Communists use the term. In the Jugoslav case, the working alliance between Party and national interest goes back to the origins of Tito's real power, his leadership of the Partisans in the Second World War, and was greatly strengthened during the years he successfully defied Stalin and the Cominform. In this respect the positions of Tito and Gomulka are in no way similar. It is to be observed, however, that this working alliance has not meant any great advance in political liberty; indeed, when Djilas urged in 1953 that "to weaken the monopoly of political movements . . . is the demand of the times," he was slapped down. Kardelj defended the need for "certain elements of coercion in order to get away from old and backward ways as soon as possible," and Tito declared that extending democracy to the bourgeoisie would lead "to anarchy, to a terrible uncertainty." Here, then, in a régime that was relatively stable and not under immediate pressure either from the Soviet Union or from an aroused populace, the limits of Communist tolerance were clearly and frankly demonstrated.

The Jugoslav régime's reaction to events abroad, in Poland and Hungary, is in full accord with their reaction to the Djilas challenge domestically. On November 4, 1956, the Foreign Affairs Editor of *Tanjug* made the following comments:

> The justified revolt of the people against the policy of Rakosi, Gerö and others began to follow the course which obviously was not desired by the forces which were in the majority and whose purpose was to eliminate all the negative consequences of the past, which hindered a normal and healthy development of the consolidation of Socialism and Socialist Democracy in Hungary. . . .
>
> An objective and coldblooded analysis of events forces us to approach the present-day happenings and the most recent situation from a realistic position. This means that a return to the old régimes either in Hungary or in other Eastern European countries is, under the present circumstances, impossible to imagine or suppose. . . .
>
> As far as we in Jugoslavia are concerned, as fighters for Socialism, for active

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peaceful coexistence and for consolidation of peace and progress, it is clear, as we have many times reiterated, that there is neither peace nor progress, nor independence in the countries of Eastern Europe except on the basis of Socialism. Every attempt to change the state of affairs in these countries contrary to the objectives of Socialism, as was tried in Hungary, can lead to consequences which are not in the interest either of these peoples or of the preservation of peace in the world. However, a normal development is possible which would enable the strengthening of real democratic relations on the basis of true Socialist growth which is in the interest of the people, peace, international coöperation and a relaxation of tension in the world. Poland is proof of this where the development leads to the consolidation of Socialism, Socialist Democracy, independence and equal relations among Socialist and other countries. . . .

Of course, we consider to be a negative fact that the new government had to appeal for the help of the Soviet Army. The use of foreign troops to deal with domestic affairs is in contradiction to the principles on which Jugoslavia bases her foreign policy and which should rule in international relations. However, we cannot overlook the fact that the use of these troops is precisely the result of such a negative development which we refer to above. . . .

For the Jugoslav Communists there is thus a definite similarity in the Polish and Jugoslav positions (with the important exception that Jugoslavia is not in the Warsaw Pact); the Hungarian revolution is regarded as an understandable but impermissible retrogression which had to be checked, regrettably by force. That an open Soviet attack on the Titoist critique should have occurred, however, on the same day, November 19, that the Jugoslav Government was reported to have arrested Djilas for attacking national and Soviet Communism alike is a most striking illustration of the double tension generated by the Titoist line.

In some respects we seem to be witnessing one of the classical problems in politics: how to retreat from a full dictatorship without losing control over the course of events or opening the way to a "restoration." That this is a delicate problem is illustrated by the troubles Cromwell found in seeking an alternative to the Protectorate or Napoleon III in creating his "Liberal Empire." Still, it might be argued, such a task, while difficult, is not necessarily impossible; a proper balance of popular forces and party controls might create a new pattern of political and social organization in Eastern Europe along the lines the Jugoslav Communists anticipate.

It is not necessarily impossible. Nevertheless, Professor Hammond correctly points to "the difficulties which the Jugoslav leaders are having in finding a new kind of 'Socialist democracy'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which is supposed to be different from both Soviet Communism and Western democracy. With no other models to go by, there is always a temptation for them either to continue to imitate Soviet methods or to move in the direction of Western democracy, although actually they want to copy neither."[1] In addition to the lack of models to go by, there are two further difficulties, one of which relates to the nature of Leninism itself (to which Tito as well as Khrushchev subscribes) and the other to the international repercussions of de-Stalinization.

When we seek for parallels and analogies to the Communist revolution and its consolidation in the Soviet system, we should perhaps think less in terms of the swing of a pendulum than of a *tour de force,* and see Lenin less in the company of a Cromwell or a Napoleon III than of a Napoleon I or a Bismarck: that is, as the creator, through his own will, insight and aims, of a quite new "solution" to a political and social issue, a solution which is in no sense a "natural" outcome proceeding from the interaction of political and social forces, but a *tour de force* which would have been very difficult to anticipate before its achievement.

In Lenin's case this element is particularly dominant. As early as the turn of the century, he was attacking "worship of the spontaneity of the labor movement" and stressing the decisive rôle of theory, of consciousness and of the "distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses." This intense, disciplined will to revolution in turn involved a reforging of Marxism to make it apply, by main force if need be, to conditions in Russia. Certainly there was nothing inevitable about the Bolshevik capture of the Russian revolution; rather, it stands out, much mythology to the contrary, as one of the great demonstrations of the rôle of contingency, accident and personality in history. Nevertheless, the capture took place and was maintained; and the whole subsequent history of Communism has been deeply influenced by this *tour de force.* Indeed one might say that it is precisely the heart of the theory and practice of Leninism. This mistrust of "spontaneity"—*i.e.* of the free popular will—is not just a passing mood or even a personal feeling of scorn or misanthropy (though these attitudes are certainly fostered in the system) but integral to Leninism.

As a result, the search for a popular or national Communism

[1] Thomas Taylor Hammond, "The Djilas Affair and Jugoslav Communism," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1955, p. 314.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a real system of government may be a search for a chimera, not because a "mixed" economic or political system is impossible to achieve but because Leninism is an explicit denial of control by the people, or even by a class. The question arises, for example, whether the Polish Communists can possibly hold free national elections, not necessarily because they would lose them—very likely they would, but it is certainly possible that some day a Communist Party might win a free election somewhere—but because they may be unable to admit the premise of having elections as the determinant.

It is for this reason that the concept of "two stages" in the liberalization of a satellite,[2] while logical enough from the non-Communist point of view, may—in suggesting that the tragedy of the Hungarian rebellion was the effort to bypass the first stage—miss the mark as far as the play of forces in Eastern Europe is concerned. The prospect of passing to full liberation via national Communism is, up to now at least, purely a mental projection. The actual road, it is granted, has nowhere been constructed, and the mere possibility of this second stage can serve, in the first instance, to inhibit liberalization in the national Communist stage and, in the second instance, to intensify Soviet suspicion that national Communism may indeed be the first step toward the reintroduction of capitalism. The very hope which non-Communists may entertain of a gradual, natural process of moving by stages toward libération is well calculated to ring the alarm bell of "spontaneity" in Leninist ears.

We have not, then, been able to gain any clear picture from recent events in the satellites of what a more "normal" and stable situation in a still Communist Eastern Europe might be. It is not that democracy is necessarily the only answer; in our view it is the preferable one, though historically it has not been the prevailing form of government in that region. Rather it is that the essential traits of Leninism have survived not only the passing of Stalin but even the creation of independent centers of Communist power, and that these traits, deeply rooted now in underlying premises, habits of thought and practice, and institutions,

[2] See, for example, Walter Lippmann in the *New York Herald Tribune,* November 6, 1956: "There are, we have every reason to believe, two stages in the liberation of a satellite. The first stage is Titoism or national liberty, which is not anti-Communist and which remains within the Soviet sphere of military and political influence. The second stage is complete liberty at home and abroad. No country which has once been within the Soviet orbit—not even Jugoslavia—has ever reached the second stage."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may operate to some extent independently of the persons involved and indeed profoundly condition their behavior.

The difficulty of envisaging the course of an evolutionary path out of the present situation in Eastern Europe, or even a stabilized grouping of national Communist régimes, is heightened by the existence of tension between Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. This tension, of course, in no small part arises from the situation in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the two are so intimately and mutually related that one cannot be understood without reference to the other.

The obvious Soviet fear, which is certainly comprehensible, is that a satellite which threatens to become non-Communist and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, will soon be anti-Communist and seek Western protection. The vigor and brutality with which the Hungarian revolution was suppressed, in urgent disregard of damaging reactions elsewhere in the world, testifies to Soviet sensitivity on this point. It seems evident that in this case military and ideological considerations, which may not always be in harmony, found common ground in destroying the Hungarian revolt.

From this it is tempting to conclude (especially in view of our failure to make any effort at intervention in support of the revolution) that the better part of American policy is to accept the "national Communist" solution and drop the idea of democracy and independence. This, however, requires some consideration. Admittedly, half a loaf is better than none. Most of us would agree that Titoism or national Communism is preferable to the solid Stalinist bloc. But there is no need to make necessity, if it is that, virtuous, as we are frequently inclined to do. National Communism may be a lesser evil; it is not a positive good. This is so partly because we do not know what it may become (nor do the national Communists), but chiefly because the element of autonomy, of free choice, is still absent.

Many people in the United States and abroad feel that Americans are too formal and moralistic on this question of free choice. It may be that we do place too much emphasis on the particular touchstone of "free elections" in situations where problems are both delicate and complex and the chances of such elections remote. It may be that elections must be the final product, the ultimate symbol of autonomy rather than its first condition. But all this really misses the point. Americans, I believe, would be satis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fied with other real evidence of autonomy, if it were forthcoming, such as, for example, an uninhibited communication with all elements of the population and a sense that the people felt able to speak their own minds freely to approve or disapprove of the régime which governed them. But such evidence is lacking.

Nor should our making do with "national Communism" promote the illusion that this will necessarily promote international understanding. It might, but we should not forget that we and the Soviet Union look at this phenomenon in diametrically opposed ways. We see it as a moderate increase in national independence, with the hope of an eventual further reduction of Communist power and influence. The Soviet leaders, in so far as they are willing to accept it, probably see it as a necessary concession to maintain a Communist camp, and perhaps some of them entertain the hope that it may prove a more flexible device for the eventual victory of Communism. The situation might resemble the Stresemann-Briand coöperation of the 1920's—Stresemann welcoming coöperation as a step to the revision of the Versailles settlement, Briand welcoming it as a reinforcement of the settlement; both sides were subsequently disillusioned.

If Soviet-Western tension influences the crisis in Eastern Europe, the converse is no less true. Even in the brief interval since the Soviet intervention in Hungary a number of very important consequences have emerged. The first is that even in a case where an anti-Soviet uprising managed to achieve a territorial base the United States took no steps to give effective support for "liberation." This is not the place to pursue the question whether the United States could have done more under the circumstances or whether it had raised false hopes among the insurgents; these are matters requiring closer study and further knowledge of pertinent facts. It is clear that the incredible bare-handed heroism of the Hungarians caught everyone by surprise and that in the somewhat different setting of the Polish crisis the United States had already indicated that it would not intervene militarily. But whatever the final judgment of our rôle may be, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union, at no little cost to the "thaw," demonstrated that it was the only Great Power that counted on its side of the Iron Curtain.

Not only that, the Soviet threat to intervene, through "volunteers," in the Suez conflict has had a very marked effect on that crisis. When we look at the two crises together—as all the world

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is doing—the unpleasant fact emerges that the Russians have been much more successful in exerting pressure in the non-Communist world than we have been in the Communist orbit. The conclusions that may be drawn from this, especially by the uncommitted nations, can obviously be very damaging. Moreover, in the game of "walking to the brink" the Russians have, in this case, outmatched us, and the exploitation of this advantage could lead to most dangerous blackmail against our allies and ourselves.

The question arises whether the best way to check this development is to exert corresponding and equivalent pressure on the satellite area or to take all steps necessary to block Soviet actions on this side of the Iron Curtain. Apart from the obvious and perhaps unavoidable risk of war in both cases, each approach has its disadvantages. Limiting our actions to the curbing of Soviet activities in the Near East leaves us entirely on the defensive, and in an area which, while non-Communist, is certainly not pro-Western. On the other hand, exerting counter pressure via the satellites may not have the effect of diminishing Soviet pressure in the Near East but might only produce a revolving-door effect, with the intensification of both crises.

In the light of its international repercussions, then, the crisis in Eastern Europe, while not without serious costs to the Soviet Union, does appear, when taken in conjunction with the Suez conflict, to have had unfavorable consequences for us. Still, beneath the more spectacular and violent events of these days we catch intimations of certain other developments that may eventually prove to be of the greatest importance: the fact that even after being struck down militarily the Hungarians persevered in passive resistance, sufficiently effective, it appears at this moment of writing, to baffle efforts to reëstablish a working régime; the stories of Russian soldiers who refused to fire on the crowds and who were horrified to discover they were not wanted; the continuing ferment created by the admission of "errors" committed under the "cult of personality;" and finally the overwhelming desire of the Russian people themselves for a "thaw," for a respite from their 40-years' forced march. In all this we see signs of real "spontaneity" which could become so pervasive as radically to alter the world situation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WESTERN COMMUNISTS ON THE DEFENSIVE

By A. Rossi

THE process which has become known as the "downgrading" of Stalin has evolved through a number of stages, beginning immediately after the dictator's death and finally bursting into full view at the Twentieth Party Congress, with the political bomb thrown by Khrushchev in his "secret" speech of February 24, 1956. The long intervening period had been one of incubation and preparation, of which the outside world knew practically nothing. During this time the Communist Parties of the West were almost totally in the dark and had no idea that a sweeping change was in the making. Their ignorance, which lasted from March 1953 until February 1956, is explained by the fact that these Parties never bring their critical faculties to bear on anything pertaining to the U.S.S.R.; it does not occur to them that economic and sociological analysis of a free and objective kind can be applied in the Soviet Union; they simply content themselves with the explanations Moscow chooses to furnish them. The changes, the zigzags in Moscow, escape them. Their literature contains nothing in the way of an original contribution that might be useful to anyone seeking to interpret what is happening on the surface or behind the scenes of Soviet society and of the ruling Party.

There is also, I believe, a more important reason why Western Communists were in the dark. De-Stalinization was conceived by the Soviet leaders primarily as a means of overcoming serious difficulties within their own country. Khrushchev and the others did, of course, seek to use the offensive against the memory and methods of Stalin as proof of their desire to promote an easing of international tensions. But it would be a mistake to regard the offensive as a foreign policy "manœuvre;" primarily it was dictated by domestic conditions. De-Stalinization was, above all, an attempt to revitalize the Russian Communist Party itself, which had clearly become a less effective instrument as a result of the ossification produced throughout its ranks by the methods of the Stalin era. Excessively bureaucratized, it had become isolated from the people, who were growing increasingly hostile toward it or, at the very least, indifferent. In these circumstances Moscow at first avoided involving the Communist Parties of the West

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the sometimes contradictory vicissitudes of de-Stalinization; the French Communist Party, for example, was informed that de-Stalinization was an internal affair of the Russian Party with which French comrades need not concern themselves.

Within less than a year the reactions of the Western Communist Parties have gone through four successive stages: 1, the period from February to May 1956, covering the open meetings of the Twentieth Party Congress and their early repercussions; 2, the publication by the Department of State at the beginning of June of the text of Khrushchev's speech; 3, the June 30 resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party; and 4, the events in Poland and Hungary during the past summer and fall.

II

Prior to the publication of Khrushchev's speech there was little reaction among the Western Communist Parties to the discussions in the Twentieth Congress. When their representatives who had served as delegates to the Congress returned from Moscow and submitted their reports to the Central Committees, they limited themselves to discreet resumés of the principal topics discussed: condemnation of the "cult of personality;" the possibility of a number of national roads to socialism; the need for collective leadership and "democratic centralism;" condemnation of an excessively sectarian and doctrinaire ideology; the search toward "unity of the working classes;" and, above all, glorification of the economic successes of the U.S.S.R. and of the expansion of the "socialist world" to the point where socialism had become a "world system." In these reports the question of Stalin's errors received scant attention.

An entirely new situation was created by the publication on June 5 of Khrushchev's "secret" report. It was a staggering blow to all the Communist Parties of the West. It threw them off balance and left them dumbfounded for days. Khrushchev's "revelations" put them on the defensive not only with the public but with their own members. Unable to explain to themselves what had happened in Russia, they were in no position to retort effectively, and in general preferred to take refuge in silence, hoping thus to gain time and let the storm blow over. Their first reaction was one of annoyance and dissatisfaction with Khrushchev for having failed to observe his own admonition "to wash

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dirty linen in private;" instead, the report had been so widely disseminated that it was now impossible to ignore it. At first the Communist Parties hoped for an official denial, indeed they awaited it for several days, but none was forthcoming. In their innermost thoughts, the Western Communists condemned Khrushchev's rash act much more than they did the crimes of Stalin. They objected far more bitterly to the way in which Khrushchev had exposed Communists to the attacks and criticisms of their enemies than they did to the evils of the Stalin régime. Here and there an individual voice was raised in protest against the enormity of the crimes revealed by the report, but there was no collective revolt, no moral crisis within the Communist ranks as a whole. Public opinion was far more shaken by what had been learned than were the Communists; and it was public opinion rising to fever pitch, rather than the report itself, which jolted and disturbed the Communists.

For the first time in almost 40 years Communist leaders in positions of responsibility and power had opened the archives of the régime and thrown off the armor of silence with which they had formerly protected themselves against even the most obvious facts. Their policy had been one of consistent denial; they simply refused to admit anything that could embarrass them. Now the Khrushchev report had cast a blot on the Communist movement from which it would suffer for years to come. What the Communist Parties really could not forgive was the *loss of prestige* which they had to endure. Togliatti, writing in mid-June for the magazine *Nuovi Argomenti,* said that this loss of prestige would be felt most of all by the Soviet leaders who had permitted the scandal, but obviously the other Communist Parties could not expect to come through unscathed.

It is not surprising that in moral terms the reactions of the Western Communist Parties should on the whole have been so limited. Ever since 1917 the Communists had been trained to approve and extol all that was necessary or useful for "the Revolution," that is, for Soviet power, without taking any other consideration into account. Anything that served this purpose was justified. But the Khrushchev report admitted for the first time that millions of human beings had been sacrificed unnecessarily. Khrushchev's fight was not against crime itself but against *useless* crime. Suddenly the all-embracing justification that identified morality with utility was gone. The Communist Parties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were now deprived not only of the guiding light of moral conscience but even of the criterion of utility which they had always held up in its place; they were adrift without a compass of any sort. Hence their confusion and discomfiture.

No matter how thick the barrier which the Communist Parties have thrown up against the penetration of non-Soviet influences, they cannot wholly shut out their own environment. Wherever public opinion exists its reactions are bound to be felt sooner or later within the Western Parties, if they do not wish to condemn themselves to complete isolation. Even though the Communists have always affected to despise public opinion and prided themselves on settling questions with the U.S.S.R. privately, they cannot live in a climate of general reprobation. Nothing more nor less than "bourgeois morality" has put the Communist Parties on the spot and forced them to discuss, at least among themselves, certain problems posed by Khrushchev's revelations. They soon realized that some of their younger members, whose viewpoints had not yet been fully developed, were beginning to be troubled by a glimmer of conscience that had awakened within them. Furthermore, they were put in an awkward position by the Socialists and Christian Democrats who worked beside them in the factories and badgered them with questions. They did not know what to answer and tried to avoid discussion.

Sometimes the Communists resorted again to the brutal and arrogant tone which they had used throughout the years, but they found that these old methods were no longer effective and provoked only skepticism and sarcastic rejoinders. Even when they did manage to extricate themselves from their own contradictions, once they were alone together they could not help but recognize that something had been going wrong in the Soviet Union for at least 20 years. The facts brought to light must be explained, for it had to be recognized that they cast doubt on the very essence of the régime. It was impossible to escape the conclusion reached by Togliatti, for all his usual cautiousness, that symptoms of "degeneracy" had become evident in the régime and in Soviet society itself.

During June the reactions of public opinion and even of the once faithful Communist Parties themselves began to cause serious concern to the ruling clique in Moscow. Recriminations over the indiscretions committed must surely have arisen within the hierarchy, and the result was a resolution adopted by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Central Committee on June 30 which marked the beginning of a new phase. It sought primarily to assuage the "feelings of bitterness and profound regret" that had arisen among the Communist Parties of the West as a result of the Khrushchev report. Until the very eve of the Khrushchev revelations these Parties had been practising the most fanatical cult of Stalin, and they could not resign themselves to the brutal attack on their idol that had now been unleashed in Moscow. It did not, they complained, give sufficient credit to Stalin's merits. Therefore the resolution, while condemning Stalinist methods, devoted much more attention to the "positive" aspects of Stalin's achievements. This correction was well received by the two largest Communist Parties in the West, the French and Italian, and made it easier for them to acccept the Muscovite "shift."

It is apparent that the Soviet leaders—or at least the majority of them, including Khrushchev—had failed to foresee the violence of the reactions that the report would provoke among the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. The bonds between these Parties and Moscow were threatened. To avoid this danger, the last part of the resolution was devoted to an affirmation of the need for "international solidarity" among the Communist Parties, the workers and Moscow—solidarity based on the rôle which the Soviet Union by its "example" and its "success" would continue to play as leader of the Communist Parties and the "socialist world." This was followed by a campaign to denounce the attempts of the "imperialists" (particularly the Americans, needless to say) to detach the Communist Parties and the satellites from Moscow and to shatter "international labor solidarity." In addition, delegations of Communist Party leaders started flocking to Moscow to talk with the chiefs of the Soviet Party and work out formulas for reconciling their differences, to quiet the fears which de-Stalinization had provoked and to restore their shaken confidence in the Soviet Union.

The Moscow resolution of June 30 appeared to have calmed the agitated waters and to have checked any latent crises within the Communist Parties. The Western Communist leaders hoped to restore order in the ranks and put a swift end to any stirrings of opposition. Suddenly the events in Poland, followed by those in Hungary, violently upset the balance and created a new crisis. This confirmed once more the fact that the Communist Parties, whatever precautions they may have taken, are directly affected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the general situation in their own countries and in Europe as a whole.

What is happening within the Soviet Communist Party is, however, of the first importance. The impression that the ruling hierarchy is not entirely of one mind, that on certain matters it has ceased to be "monolithic," has produced a sort of blind panic among the Western Communist Parties and has profoundly shaken their trust. Stalin's rule they found harsh, but reassuring, whereas collective leadership has brought fluctuations and uncertainties. Soviet rule in its Stalinist form had its drawbacks, but under it they knew where they stood. To this day the Communist Parties, whether they admit it or not, continue to base their hopes on Russia's successes. On the balance sheet of their gains and losses the most conspicuous figures are those pertaining to the Soviet Union, and they are the ones that count. None of the Communist Parties of the West believes in the possibility of ever seizing power through a victorious revolution. While there may be those among the masses who cherish such revolutionary dreams, the Party leaders know very well that it cannot happen. Their rôle is limited to that of territorial reserves, keeping themselves in readiness for a contingency which will not be of their making. Their actions must of necessity be confined primarily to the economic and psychological sphere; they must be content to assist the Soviet Union through their campaigns of agitation and propaganda. The nerve center of the Communist system is in Russia and the repercussions of any shock or damage suffered there are felt more keenly than defeats within the national Party itself. Hence the enormous importance of events in the satellite countries which might diminish or increase the power of the U.S.S.R. This explains the violence of the attacks on Tito at the time of the Jugoslav schism in 1948, for the idea that a part of the "socialist world" could detach itself from the Soviet whole and become autonomous was intolerable to the Communist Parties; it threatened to modify the balance of power in Europe to the detriment of Russia.

The Poznan riots of last June were regarded by the Communist Parties outside the U.S.S.R. as anti-Soviet acts of war. Nevertheless, the nature of the revolt was such that it seriously affected Russia's prestige in the eyes of the public and particularly of the labor unions in all countries. With Poznan a certain uneasiness became evident in the Communist Parties and, though

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they tried at the outset to blame the riots on "imperialist provocation," some first stirrings of doubt were beginning to be felt in the ranks and particularly among fellow-travellers. Events in Poland and especially in Hungary had a catalytic effect on the latent internal crisis in the Communist Parties of the West. That crisis would not have been so serious or so widespread had it not been for those events. Whatever their outcome, they cannot be dismissed henceforth from the calculations and concerns of the Communist Parties. The consequences of this shattering blow to the confidence of the Communist Parties will be felt in the ranks for a long time to come, either directly or through the reactions of public opinion.

Without the events in Poland and Hungary, an analysis of the situation in the Communist Parties of the West would have been a much less extensive undertaking; with them, there begins a new chapter in the Communist crisis provoked by de-Stalinization. This chapter is by far the most important.

III

While the situation we have described is common to all the Communist Parties of the West, each Party has certain individual characteristics of its own. It may be worthwhile to analyze the position of the two strongest Parties, the Italian and French, the only ones in Western Europe which were members of the Cominform.

The French Communist Party has only about 450,000 members, while the Italian Party has some 2,000,000. But the political importance of the French Party is much greater than that of the Italian because of the position France occupies in Europe and because of her rôle in regard to two questions of paramount concern to Russia: the fight against the unification of Germany and German rearmament.

Of all the Communist Parties, the one in France has clung most tenaciously to Stalinism and in practice has refused to abandon it. Maurice Thorez always took his orders directly from Stalin. At the bidding of the Kremlin he deserted from the French Army in August 1939 and fled to Moscow, where he directed the defeatist campaign until Germany turned on the Soviet Union. Thorez has retained his position as Party leader in circumstances which suggest the persistence of what has been called the "cult of personality." He is not physically in condition to lead a great

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struggle, but around him has formed a group headed by his wife, Mme. Jeannette Vermeersch, which rules the Party. Other outstanding figures are M. François Billoux of the older generation of Communists, and Marcel Servin of the younger. That this group may be considered "Stalinist" was clearly demonstrated by the position adopted at the time of the dictator's death and, with only slight changes, defended by the Party to this day. Jacques Duclos, despite disagreements with the dominant group and despite his parliamentarian leanings, is still very much a Stalinist.

The Party intellectuals on active duty are more imbued with "Zhdanovism" in cultural matters than are their colleagues in any of the other Communist Parties. The other intellectuals, who are less "involved," keep quiet. Since Pierre Hervé began his campaign against bureaucratic "fetishes," aimed directly at Thorez and his group, he has been expelled from the Party. It is symptomatic of the French situation that the best-known of the "fellow-travellers," Jean-Paul Sartre (who more recently has broken with the Party to the extent of condemning the Hungarian massacres), should have taken up his pen to attack Hervé and hinder his efforts to establish an opposition to the policy of the Party and the errors of its leaders. It is likewise characteristic that one of the best-known scientists in France, M. Joliot-Curie, should have chosen the occasion of the Fourteenth Congress of the French Communist Party (held in April 1956) to proclaim his fidelity to the Party and to declare that there was no reason to demand more freedom within it. After the letter which he wrote at that time, M. Joliot-Curie was named a working member of the Party's Central Committee.

The ground was very carefully prepared so that no serious concession to de-Stalinization would be made when the Congress of the French Communist Party met. Neither the speeches delivered at the Congress nor the discussions at the local level revealed the slightest trace of any real change of approach or methods. Preparations for the Congress were carried out in a manner which could well be called Stalinist. Even the events in Poland and Hungary failed to provoke a serious crisis within the Party. When the Nazi-Soviet Pact was announced in August 1939, more than 20 Communist members of Parliament resigned from the Party; in 1956, Russia's intervention in Hungary caused the resignation of only one Communist Deputy, M. Aimé Césaire, who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is a representative from the Antilles and is better known as a poet than as a Party militant.

Of course the game is not yet over and other symptoms of crisis may yet appear, but they are unlikely to develop within the Party while the present situation in North Africa lasts. On this point, it appears we may safely conclude that as long as France is engaged in the Algerian war there will be no serious crisis in the French Communist Party. The Thorez group will be able to maintain its hold with little difficulty.

The Italian Communist Party used to be among the staunchest adherents of the cult of Stalin. Its Secretary-General, Palmiro Togliatti, strongly supported the spirit and methods of Stalinism throughout the long period when he was a guest in Moscow. The Communist or pro-Communist masses regarded Stalin as the guarantor of their victory in Italy; to buoy their own hopes and to terrorize the "Bourgeoisie" they raised the spectre of the early arrival of an avenging and liberating Stalin ("The mustache will soon be here!"). Thus the Soviet offensive against Stalin found both the leaders and the rank and file unprepared, uneasy and fundamentally hostile. Returning from the Twentieth Congress in which he had participated, Togliatti tried at first to win time and soothe the Party's fears. The reactions of the Party members soon forced him to take a position. But he could not hide the salient facts of de-Stalinization as decreed in Moscow, and while deploring the "loss of prestige" suffered by the Russian leaders as a result of the publication of the Khrushchev report, he used his now famous interview of mid-June to underline some of the points on which the Twentieth Congress had been most insistent, notably the "polycentric" formula for international organization of the Communist Parties. The June 30 resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party criticized some passages of the Togliatti interview, but the quarrel—if it could be called that—did not last long. Reconciliation was quickly achieved on the basis of recognizing the rôle to be played by the Russian Party and the Soviet State as exemplars and therefore leaders of world Communism. The dissident voices which had been raised here and there in the Italian Party were quelled by means of a few expulsions and by the Stalinist tactic of denouncing all opposition as "treason." Togliatti was thus able to turn to the work of preparing for the Eighth Congress of the Party, in December 1956, without fear of any major surprises.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But shortly thereafter occurred the crisis in Poland and the explosion in Hungary. With respect to the latter the Italian Communist Party adopted a flatly conformist and reactionary position, condemning the Budapest revolt from the start and justifying the intervention of Russian troops. This attitude disgusted the whole population of Italy and produced within the Party itself opposition groups which had not been in evidence before. In spite of Togliatti, and often directly in opposition to him, a wave of protest spread among those hitherto bound by the strictest discipline: editors of the Party's daily newspaper, Communist and pro-Communist intellectuals, the crypto-Communist press, Communist labor leaders, and even into the sanctuary of the Gramsci Institute in Rome, hearthstone of Communist doctrine in Italy. During the second half of October the Italian Communist Party suffered its most serious crisis in a very long time. The prestige and authority of Togliatti and of the ruling group in general were gravely threatened.

But at that very moment an unexpected event offered Togliatti a chance to save himself. The fortunes of the Italian Communist Party had reached their lowest ebb when news came of the military operations against Egypt and the crisis over the Suez Canal. This diversion enabled the Italian Communists to extricate themselves from their untenable position, and they immediately exploited it to the full. Events in Hungary receded somewhat into the background; the Communists were able to breathe again.

Of course, the overwhelming sense of sympathy for the Hungarian rebels has not yet run its course, but its most serious consequences for the Communists have been weathered. Togliatti has taken heart and, writing on behalf of the Party leadership in the November 3 issue of *Unita,* he has proclaimed complete solidarity with the Soviet Union and recognition of its essential rôle in maintaining control over the satellite countries at all costs. Any danger to relations between the Western Communist Parties and the Russian Party arising out of the doctrine of "many roads to socialism" has been removed by official insistence that the bonds between the "socialist countries" be strengthened, especially those with Soviet Russia and her foreign policy.

Space does not permit more than a brief review of what has been happening among the smaller Communist Parties of Europe. In general the psychological and moral reactions produced on the British and Scandinavian Communist Parties by the revela-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions of the Khrushchev report have been keener than elsewhere, confirming the fact that these Parties are acutely vulnerable to the pressure of public opinion and of societies with liberal traditions. There is no question but that the position of the Communist Parties in these countries has been weakened since February 1956, and that their chances of playing a significant political rôle have been narrowed still further.

Lenin's dream, shared throughout the years by all Bolsheviks, that Communism in Britain could overcome its isolation and impotence by taking over the Labor Party, will never be realized. In his recent report to the Party Congress at Battersea, Mr. Palme Dutt, theoretician of the British Communist Party, called for a united front—a "popular front" with the Labor Party—and proposed that representatives of Communist trade unions be permitted to vote at the Labor Party Congress. This innocent suggestion, which was simply a new edition of proposals made at intervals ever since 1920, will have no more success than its predecessors.

It might be noted in passing that the American Communist Party will be equally unsuccessful if it should by any chance revert to the position adopted shortly after the end of the Second World War by the Party Secretary at that time, who envisaged a Communist Party independent of Moscow. At that time, Jacques Duclos was assigned to excommunicate this heresy, but even were it now given Moscow's blessing it would have no meaning, since it would be nothing but a tactical manœuvre.

Among the Scandinavian Parties, Moscow has been particularly attentive to the Social Democratic Party in Norway, perhaps remembering that in 1919-1920 a strong Communist Party was formed in that country which began to fall apart after 1922 and finally merged with the Social Democrats. In Switzerland, the Moscow crisis has fanned new disagreement within the Communist Party, already weakened by earlier conflict between Leon Nicole and M. Vincent. The latter has also gone over to the opposition and the Swiss Communists no longer have any importance.

The publication and dissemination of Khrushchev's "secret" report have helped to change the political map of Western Europe to the disadvantage of the Communist Parties. They realize it, and it is symptomatic that none of them (not even the Russian Party) has brought out a public edition of the report. The British

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Party gave it a cursory going-over at a closed session. In the accounts of the Twentieth Congress published by the different Communist Parties no mention of the report is made and its text is not included.

The bonds of discipline, self-interest and concern for the future have restrained Communist reactions to the report. But we must not fail to see the forest for the trees. The report has dealt the Communist Parties an initial blow. Within their ranks things can never again be the same. None of the substantive questions which have been raised can be left unanswered. The leaders may try to cover up the scandal, but it is there and cannot be erased from the pages of history. Events in the satellite countries are threatening the prestige of the Communist Parties, their régimes and their leaders. Questions are being asked about the nature of those régimes and of the so-called socialist state that is to guide all others. These questions are the order of the day and they will not resolve themselves.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

By Dexter Perkins

THE great quadrennial assize of the American people, completed last November, provoked widespread discussion of American foreign policy. Such discussion raises the general question as to whether or not the partisan struggle for power has, over the years, resulted in the clarification of major issues in the diplomatic field. And, even beyond this, we may ask if partisan rivalry in the field of foreign policy has served the interests of the American people as a whole. The writer, in posing these questions, very obviously is ready with an answer, and the answer is preponderantly in the negative. But before proceeding to examine the matter, I should clear the ground of possible misunderstandings of what it is I am trying to show.

In the first place, no one denies that the partisan struggle is an essential part of the democratic scheme of things. Popular government, to be most effective, requires a party in office and a party in opposition. It requires that the acts of those in office shall be submitted to constant scrutiny and to constant criticism, and that the opportunity shall be afforded to expel from power one political organization and replace it with another. In expressing a doubt as to the utility of presidential elections in clarifying the issues of foreign policy, I do not for a moment intend to denigrate the democratic process itself.

Nor is it intended to suggest that popular government is incompatible with the successful conduct of foreign policy. Though some of our publicists seem to take this point of view, the judgment of history does not confirm any such hypothesis. The totalitarian régimes of Adolf Hitler, of Benito Mussolini and of the Japanese militarists all committed errors greater and more conclusive than any committed by the great democratic nations, and all have disappeared, the victims of their own folly. The brutal régime in power in Russia has many cardinal mistakes in its record—its futile attempt to come to terms with Hitler in 1939, which only strengthened him for the assault of 1941; its provocative policies in the years following the end of the war, which awakened the vigorous opposition of the United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and brought about the redevelopment of American military power; its cavalier treatment of Jugoslavia, which, as we can see today, has led in due course to successful defiance of the Kremlin and to the weakening of the bonds in the satellite states; and now its ruthless repression of the revolution in Hungary. I do not intend in what follows in any way to suggest that the democracies are, in the nature of things, incompetent to deal with questions of foreign affairs, or to take a pessimistic view of the future in this regard.

Thirdly, it is not at all the purpose of this essay to suggest that the popular discussion of foreign affairs is something intrinsically undesirable and that we had best leave to the professionals the conduct of our diplomacy. In a democratic state it is essential that the people should be informed; more than that, it is essential that they should be heeded. No foreign policy will last, and none will succeed, that does not have its roots in public opinion, that cannot be endorsed and sustained by the legislative representatives of the people, that does not correspond to the mores and the prepossessions of the mass of the nation. While the process of negotiation may—and often ought to be—secret, the general purposes and objectives of American foreign policy must be known, must in the long run correspond to the public will. The question is not whether they are to be scrutinized but whether it is more useful to review them in a calm and serene atmosphere or in the heat of popular passion.

The case does not run all one way. First of all, it should be remarked that the election debate could not be avoided even if we wished. It is useless to believe that candidates for high public office will exclude from their appeals to the voter any question on which they think an issue can be made or an error exploited. It is simply not possible to avoid discussing what is uppermost in the public mind. It is asking more than human nature can bear to expect that chinks in the armor of the party in power will not be exploited by the opposition, and exploited to the full.

But we can put the case for public debate on higher grounds than this. To many Americans, even in these latter days, the diplomatic action of the nation is something esoteric. Deeply as questions of foreign policy affect the lives and fortunes of us all, it is still the case that they do not occupy the place, in the minds of many citizens, that is at all commensurate with their real im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance. It is therefore something to the good that they have a place in the great quadrennial assize. Despite the exaggerations and distortions of a campaign, the public interest is stimulated; the public knowledge is widened; the public judgment may be in some degree clarified.

Furthermore, a Presidential election frequently makes clear, if not a concrete policy, at least a public mood. For example, the election of 1952—whatever else it did or did not do—made it crystal clear that the American people did not desire the resumption of the Korean War, that they wished the struggle there to be brought to an honorable end if that were at all possible. The election of 1940, to go further back in time, made it reasonably clear that the predominant part of the electorate looked with apprehension on the growth of the power of Hitlerian Germany. The election of 1936, to go still further back in time, took place when isolationist sentiment was dominant. The election of 1924 revealed that American entrance into the League of Nations was a dead issue at that time. This is not to say that the public sentiment, viewed objectively, represented the best interests of the United States in every case. But it did clearly mark the boundaries within which a foreign policy would, perforce, have to proceed.

Moreover, though there is an element of the imponderable in any judgment on the matter, it may well be that there is a long-term effect on foreign policy questions as a result of campaign debate. For example, in the campaign of 1900, the Democrats seemed to be getting nowhere with their issue of anti-imperialism. But the long-term policies by which the territories acquired in 1899 were given a larger and larger degree of independence might conceivably have been less completely and less quickly carried out if it had not been for the Democrats' insistence during the campaign that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. In the same way, in the election of 1920, the friends of the League came in for severe disappointment. But the idea of international collaboration lived on; the idea of collective security, which lay at the heart of the Covenant, survived. And in the longer run it may be that the effort made to emphasize this issue was by no means wasted.

Finally, it may sometimes be the case that the introduction of an important foreign policy issue into a great political campaign has indirect results which are beneficial. It could be maintained,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for instance, though it could hardly be mathematically proved, that the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 1921–22, was a kind of Republican answer to the Democratic advocacy of the League; that the strong sentiment in favor of international coöperation generated in the Harding-Cox campaign had somehow to be satisfied, and that if there had not been such a vigorous discussion of the Covenant, the question of naval disarmament would have been less successfully dealt with in the period that followed.

None the less, there is a strong argument for the thesis that campaign discussion of foreign policy questions is frequently, perhaps usually, inconclusive on the major issues examined; that the debate is often irrelevant to future policy; that appeals are sometimes made to ethnic interests in a fashion that is not in the long run to the advantage of anybody; and that an issue is often drawn too sharply and a position assumed from which retreat is difficult, no matter how desirable a shift of policy may be.

Before we examine whether a Presidential election does in fact provide a definite decision on important foreign policy issues, it is relevant to observe that in very few campaigns is a single issue dominant. The tendency of the party in power is to point with pride all along the line; the tendency of the party out of power is to attack here, there and everywhere, and its candidate, like the Polish cavalryman, usually mounts his horse and rides off in all directions at once. When this is the case, it is difficult, after the battle is over, to say precisely what it is that has been decided, to separate one problem from another or to measure with any degree of accuracy exactly what the public response was on the given foreign policy question at issue.

There have, indeed, been only three campaigns when a kind of paramountcy might reasonably be assigned to a specific matter in the field of external relations, and on only one of these, it seems fair to say, was a decision actually arrived at. We have to go a long way back to find this situation; we have to go back to 1844. In June of that year a treaty for the annexation of Texas was placed before the Senate by President Tyler and it was decisively defeated. Then came the Presidential election, and the Democratic Party and its candidate declared—and declared without equivocation—for annexation. The other party, the Whigs and their candidate, Henry Clay, hedged. Although the election might easily have swung the other way if it had not been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the presence of the Liberty Party on the ballot in New York State and the fact that this party probably drew more votes from the Whigs than the Democrats, the annexationist party none the less won. And the remarkable fact is that the very Congress which had manifested its opposition to the Texas treaty in June now proceeded by decisive votes, by joint resolution, to bring the Lone Star State into the Union. We can hardly fail to believe that the legislators were influenced by the verdict of the voters.

But in another respect those who voted the Democratic ticket in 1844 on foreign policy grounds may well have cheated themselves. For the victorious party was also pledged to insist upon the recognition of the American right to all of Oregon (then in dispute with Great Britain), and this meant Oregon up to the line of 54 degrees, 40 minutes. Yet in 1846 President Polk came to an understanding with the British Government which defined the boundary for the most part along the line of 49 degrees, and never above it. So much, then, for 1844.

The second occasion on which an attempt was made to bring foreign policy into the campaign as a matter of central importance was the campaign of 1900. Many of the Democrats had been very critical of the treaty of peace with Spain; their leader, William Jennings Bryan, had been bitterly opposed to the annexation of territory that could not be assimilated with the rest of the Union, and the Democratic platform of 1900 denounced the opposition in no uncertain terms, declaring that the question of imperialism constituted the "paramount issue" of the campaign. But, as Professor Bailey cogently pointed out many years ago in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* the attempt to keep the minds of the voters on this particular question was by no means a success. The treaty of peace with Spain had already been ratified and this complicated the problem. As the electoral battle proceeded, Bryan tended to skate away from the foreign policy question and turned to domestic issues. The country, prosperous and contented, would probably in any case have returned President McKinley to office; and it would be a bold man who would say that in 1900 the American people definitely affirmed the policy of imperialism. Indeed, it is the best judgment of those who have studied the matter that, if the issue could have been isolated, a contrary verdict would have been rendered.

Of course the most striking case of a debate on foreign policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is the election of 1920. The Senate of the United States had twice defeated the Treaty of Versailles; President Wilson, most inadvisedly as it seems in retrospect, insisted that the matter be thrown into the Presidential campaign; and the Democratic Party in the main supported the President. The Democratic platform called for "the immediate ratification of the treaty without reservations which impair its essential integrity," though, in words the President may not have fully approved, it added that we "do not oppose the acceptance of any reservations making clearer or more specific the obligations of the United States to the League associates." The Republican Party, in a declaration which was a masterpiece of generalities and which left the party free to act in a number of different ways, said not a word about ratification and was equivocal on the question of American membership in the League. One might have thought that a fairly clear choice was presented to the American voter. But it was not so to be. The Republican candidate gave some people the impression that he was for the League and to others the impression that he was against it. Thirty-one distinguished Republicans, including such eminent figures as President Lowell of Harvard, Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover, urged a vote for Mr. Harding on the ground that this was the only way to bring us into the new world organization; they even went so far as to say that their party would be "bound by every consideration of honor and good faith" to take affirmative action. But, when the Republican Party won, no step was taken to ratify the Treaty of Versailles; Mr. Hughes, the new Secretary of State, in vain urged such a course on the new President, but the so-called irreconcilable wing of the Republican Party called the tune. It is highly probable that many Republican voters desired at least the ratification of the treaty with appropriate reservations; the Vice-President-Elect of the United States, Calvin Coolidge, expressed that opinion at the time; but nothing was done.

In considering this example of the intrusion of party politics into a question of foreign policy, we must, of course, avoid too sweeping a judgment. It is possible to argue that, had the United States joined the League, it would have done so halfheartedly, that it was by no means ready to accept the principle of collective security and that really not much harm was done. But surely *some* harm was done. For the failure of the treaty deprived the United States of a seat on the reparations commission set up to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determine and regulate the payment of the obligations imposed on Germany; and it is a verifiable fact that the absence of the United States from this commission was one of the reasons—perhaps the major reason—why the whole reparations question got out of hand and led to the French invasion of the Ruhr, the passive resistance of the Germans and a tense international situation which might otherwise have been avoided. It is difficult to deny that in this case insistence on carrying a great foreign policy issue to the people turned out to be an unhappy decision.

But more frequent than the attempt to make a clear-cut issue in the course of a Presidential campaign is the tendency to make retrospective judgments instead of enunciating positive policies. This tendency is understandable; and indeed the voter who feels strongly that mistakes have been made in the past has a justifiable reason for desiring a change of administration. None the less, the post facto judgment cannot be said to clarify matters in any very effective way. Take, for example, the campaign of 1916. At that time the controversy with Germany over the submarine had been temporarily put to rest. The Germans had, in the previous May, abandoned the underseas warfare, though reserving the right to resume it if the American Government did not take vigorous action against what the Reich alleged were British violations of international law. Democratic politicians raised the cry, "He kept us out of war." The cry was essentially disingenuous; for no one could say that the President could keep us out of war in the future and, indeed, he was pretty much committed to lead us *into* war if the government in Berlin again challenged us on the sea. But the Republican candidate, Hughes, was in no very good position to outline a policy different from that of the Democrats. He could not say that he would go to war without a *casus belli;* he could only criticize what had been done, and this without consistency, sometimes alleging that if he had been in office he would have prevented the submarine challenge and sometimes saying that he would have acted more vigorously if the challenge had been made. Neither the one side nor the other really prepared the country for what was ahead, though perhaps it should be said that Theodore Roosevelt, speaking for the Republicans, attempted to do so. In the same way, in that campaign, Mr. Hughes vigorously criticized Wilsonian policy toward Mexico. There was just reason for so doing, but he could not and did not propose any alternative course.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The same tendency to criticize the past, rather than formulate alternative policy was evident in the campaign just finished. Without in the least assuming that our diplomacy during the past four years has been beyond criticism, without denying the right of the opposition to criticize, it may perhaps be fairly said that very little in the way of constructive commentary came from the debate. To the specific question of the hydrogen bomb I shall return a little later, but, if one puts this matter aside for the moment, the generalization appears sound.

In more than one political campaign where foreign policy has been significant, a deceptive emphasis has been placed on peace. An illustration of this is to be found in the campaign of 1940. Before stating the point, however, it is necessary to say, in simple justice, that President Roosevelt, on the eve of the electoral conflict, put through the famous bases-destroyers deal, one of the most remarkable examples of decisive action in a Presidential year, and that Wendell Willkie accepted the manner, if not the substance, of the decision. Yet, as the political struggle went on, the candidates talked more and more about peace. Those who wish to understand this fully should look at Charles A. Beard's "American Foreign Policy in the Making." Beard arranged in two parallel columns the assurances of Wendell Willkie and Franklin Roosevelt that the United States would keep out of wars, usually "foreign wars," to use a thoroughly sophistical phrase. So far as the debate went, little was done to prepare the country for the lend-lease legislation of the next year, and the Republican candidate, when testifying in favor of that measure in 1941, somewhat jauntily explained his previous utterances on the ground that they were just politics.

The campaign of 1940 is not the only one where the question of peace has been handled in rather rough fashion. The welkin resounded with talk of peace in the campaign of last autumn. Yet, so far as their devotion to peace is concerned, there was no discernible difference between the candidates or the parties. Both, for example, had supported the intervention in Korea in 1950; both wished to limit our commitments in the Orient in 1956. Both were chary of taking any bellicose action in the Near East. Differences as to procedure, differences as to past techniques, yes; but no difference as to essential aims.

The talk of peace in the 1956 campaign almost certainly corresponded with the mood of the voters. Yet surely abstract de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

votion to peace is not policy. Moreover, in so far as we lay the accent on peace, as if peace could be had by wishing it, we diminish the emphasis on those necessary measures in the field of defense and in the field of negotiation which tend to promote world stability and the legitimate interests of the United States. We tend to create the impression that we are anxious to avoid trouble if not at any cost, at least at almost any cost. We take academic positions in favor of the Hungarian insurgents, for instance, when we have no intention of following protest with action. Or we condemn the action of the British and the French in Egypt without in the least being willing to apply sanctions against them. Things might have been the same even if an election had not been impending; but it is easier to avoid this kind of pronouncement when there is no immediate question of votes involved.

There have been occasions in the past, and there are occasions today, when an electoral campaign is entangled with problems of racial or sectional groups. In the campaign of 1920, for example, the German and the Irish vote were a matter of interest to the politicians; and in catering to them the genuine issues of the campaign were to some degree obscured. The isolationism of 1940 can be traced to certain ethnic considerations. The hard fate of Poland offered an opportunity for an appeal to a special group of our citizens in 1944 and again in 1956. It was difficult to discuss the problem of Israel objectively in the heat of the last campaign, though the Administration itself dealt with the problem courageously. It is not that specific commitments are made which might later prove to be embarrassing; most of our Presidential candidates have been above that. It is merely that considerations extrinsic to the national interest occupy the minds of the voters and deflect their judgment.

To make a different point, there is a danger that positions will be taken from which it is difficult to retreat. It was not wise of the Democrats to talk about 54-40 in 1844 if they intended to compromise on 49. It was not wise of Warren Harding, at the end of the campaign of 1920, to talk of scrapping the League. And in the campaign of 1956 we have an example of a somewhat similar difficulty, in the controversy over the hydrogen bomb. We shall, of course, grant to Adlai Stevenson complete sincerity in his agitation for the abandonment of the testing of the larger hydrogen bombs. The question is a weighty one and—unless we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take the position that it is too technical for popular understanding—one that needed to be clarified. But at the same time various questions may be asked with propriety. May not the raising of the problem have produced an undesirable hardening of view on the part of the Administration? Has not discussion of this matter tended to thrust into the background the far-reaching problem of reduction (and inspection) of atomic armaments in general? I put forward these inquiries with some hesitation, but they seem to me to be the right inquiries to make.

But in dealing with electoral issues, we have not answered the whole question posed at the beginning of this article. What of partisan and foreign affairs in general? Here, as in the more restricted area of campaigns, we cannot expect, whatever may be the theory of the matter, that partisanship will cease because we wish it to cease. Just as partisanship sometimes bedevils us in an election, so it sometimes bedevils us between elections. There are many very clear examples drawn from relatively recent history. One of them comes from the experience of the years 1939–41. No one should impugn the motives of those who, in those fateful years, wished sincerely and on what they deemed good grounds to abstain from a positive policy of assistance to Great Britain. But when one examines the votes in Congress, it becomes patent that opposition to the policy of the Administration tended to form along party lines. This was almost wholly true in the debate on the repeal of the arms embargo in the fall of 1939. It was true to a substantial degree in the debate on lend-lease in 1941. It was true of the debate on the extension of the draft in the summer of the same year. It was again emphatically true when the President asked for authority to arm the merchant ships of the United States and to end the restrictions on their free navigation in the fall of that same year. It is not possible to believe that such alignments were based on objective judgment of the issues involved.

The same thing was true of the recall of General MacArthur in 1951. The General himself had sought partisan support just before his recall in his famous letter to Congressman Martin. The discussion that followed turned on a very fundamental and far-reaching question of policy, that is, whether we would limit our operations in Korea and accept a truce there which left the northern part of the country in the hands of the Communists, or whether we should extend our military activities. It certainly did not make it easier to come to a decision when party passions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were deeply aroused and when our division on the question, and much that might have been kept secret, was broadcast to the world. Here again the case does not run all one way. To cite only one example, Democratic opposition to any commitment with regard to Quemoy and Matsu may have saved the Administration from a step conceivably embarrassing and unsupported by preponderant opinion. Yet in general our greatest achievements in the field of foreign policy have occurred when there was bipartisan support.

Take, for example, the Good Neighbor Policy. This was really initiated under Republican administrations; it was amplified and extended under Democratic administrations. Though there have been flaws in the record, it has in general given consistency to our diplomatic action in Latin America and would, by most observers, be adjudged a success. Take the Marshall Plan. Here, perhaps, is the greatest diplomatic achievement of the postwar period. It was originated in a Democratic administration and put through a Congress controlled by Republicans. Take the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the product of bipartisan consultation and of bipartisan coöperation. And, while it is harder to judge of its effects than of the effects of the Marshall Plan, it seems probable that by the show of resolution which it embodied, it had much to do with the modification of Russian policy in the years that followed. Take the action of Congress with regard to the régime of General Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Formosa. The policy we have adopted towards Chiang may be variously judged. But is it not certain that by speaking out clearly, as the President did on the question of protecting the island, and by securing from the Congress bipartisan support, he did something to clarify the situation in the Far East? Have not the successes of American foreign policy, in a far more general sense, come when we were united, and not when we were divided?

There is a partial riposte, however, to this last observation. How bring about unity, it may be objected, except through discussion? The answer is, there is no other way. But the discussion will be more likely to reach its goal, the decision arrived at will be more likely to stand the test of time, if we try so far as possible to abstract from it the strong emotional overtones and undertones of an electoral contest, if we discuss it in terms other than those of partisan rivalry.

Our historical experience demonstrates, I believe, that with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one exception, it has been difficult to give to a single question in the field of foreign policy a central position in a Presidential campaign; that the natural tendency of candidates for office is to blur, rather than to define sharply, the specific issue; that there is an understandable disposition to retrospective judgment rather than to clear-cut affirmation with regard to the future; that it is easy to resort to shibboleths and abstractions in a way that does little to clarify urgent issues of policy; that the point of view of large groups of voters, particularly the ethnic groups, hampers candid discussion; and that in the heat of the partisan struggle positions may be taken from which it is difficult to retreat. In stating these things, it is by no means to be supposed that we can or will alter the character of American political rivalry; we are asking little less than a substantial change in our political mores. But in proportion as American political leaders seek to exorcise the party spirit, express themselves with candor on the issues, look forward and not backward, and put away the temptation to appeal to special interests, the foreign policy of the United States will develop a consistency that makes effective action possible, and a clarity that is the harbinger of wisdom and the secret of success.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET

By Roy Harrod

I WAS at The Hague in the spring of 1948 when Sir Winston Churchill, against the background of a great thunderstorm, called upon the nations of Western Europe to unite. There was plenty of ardor and enthusiasm at that meeting. Those present felt that they were at the birth of a great movement. My own committee (on economic unity) labored long and hard, and did not quail at sitting on hard chairs—with no refreshment—until 6 a.m. on the final night to complete our draft.

In one sense the impetus was the negative one of fear. At that time the Russian situation looked extremely menacing. Here were these ancient countries, having between them sufficient population and resources to match the Russians, finding themselves in fact completely at their mercy. In the actual situation, the opposition to a Russian aggression could be but feeble. Even if one put the best possible complexion upon Russian intentions, it was not pleasant to be in an exposed position, to be dependent on the good will of a strange and, to all outward appearances, hostile Power about which little was known. Yet if these countries could get together quickly and act as one, their relative strength could be radically altered.

It would be wrong to say, however, that the meeting was solely animated by fear of Russia. There was a more positive feeling of pride in the European heritage, and a sense that the countries concerned had fallen into a sorry plight through lack of resolution and coöperation. As individuals, the citizens of Europe were as vital and resourceful as they had ever been; but their political setup failed to galvanize their energies. The proud and ancient civilizations, which had given so much to the world, seemed to be crumbling under our eyes. Revival could not be achieved on too narrow a base. "Europe," nothing less, must be the watchword in future.

And our thoughts concerned the future. Though pride in past achievements formed a background to the thinking, the spokesmen at The Hague represented a wide popular movement which believed that coöperation could bring greater efficiency, higher living standards and quicker progress.

On the wave of enthusiasm, very far-reaching plans were dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cussed. There should be some kind of political federation. On the economic side, sweeping plans were brought forward for having a single system of taxes and uniform rates of wages throughout Europe. However infected one might be by the atmosphere of the place, one could not help asking oneself whether these aspirations had indeed any relation to reality. Were we living in a dream world? When it came to the point, would the citizens of the countries concerned, with their strong national attachments, really be prepared to sweep aside age-old practices—economic, political and constitutional, or were we simply a band of visionaries? Many of these paper plans were far too utopian. It did not follow that there was nothing at all in the idea that more integration and much closer coöperation were both vitally needed and practicable. Thus, it seemed that much work would be needed in sorting out the wheat of the practicable and needful from the chaff of the visionary and ideological.

Even in this opening phase there was a rather large difference between British and continental sentiment. This did not turn so much on an intellectual assessment of what was necessary as on a subtle and imponderable difference in the popular attitude. I think that it is fair to say that, at least at that time, the peoples of continental Europe had largely lost faith in their own political leadership, and even in their own forms of government. On the Continent, people had the feeling that they had been terribly let down by their political institutions, had little feeling of loyalty for them and were looking about for some new political forms, some European institutions, in fine, to which they could harness their loyalty and their faith. But the people of Britain did not feel that at all. They had no disgust or even deep discontent with their Parliamentary institutions; their traditional pride in them was unimpaired. Some might feel that British foreign policy had been stupidly conducted in the years before 1939; but if the leaders had erred, they had done so in good faith, and their stupidity, if such it was, had been shared by the majority of British people. Consequently, if the British deemed it needful to accord powers to some new European institutions, that would be in the interest of a good cause, and not at all for the sake of finding something which was more worthy of their loyalty than their own Parliament. I believe that this difference of feeling was very profound and has been the main cause of the difference in approach to the European problem in the years that followed. It seemed clear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the British would be most reluctant to hand over to some strange constitutional body all those matters on which they rejoiced to be able to exert their democratic will through their own Parliament. One might as well tell the Americans that, with a view to more harmonious international coöperation, they must put their own Constitution onto the scrap heap.

It is necessary at this point to touch on a delicate question. The United States has throughout the postwar period taken a constructive and helpful attitude towards greater European integration. There have, I believe, been feelings of displeasure with Britain for having seemed to drag her feet. A paradox is involved here. It has to be admitted that in the minds of some, although certainly not all, of those most keen on European unity in 1948 there was an anti-American bias. There were fears in certain quarters that the influence of the United States might become too dominant in European affairs and might make inroads upon those features in the European way of life which are different from the American. One might summarize this attitude in the words "a third bloc." Some even went so far as to put as much stress on the function of offsetting possible American dominance as they did on defense against Soviet Russia. By no means all of those at The Hague, however, perhaps not even the majority, favored this idea of a "third bloc." It has of course been a cardinal principle of British policy since the war that the first consideration in foreign affairs should be the closest possible coöperation with the United States. The paradox is that the very "dragging of the feet" by Britain, which appeared unsatisfactory when seen from the United States, was, when seen at this end, in part the manifestation of a reluctance to be involved in any operation that might have an anti-American bias.

Already before the visionaries met together at The Hague, steps had been taken towards European coöperation on severely practical lines. These arose from the magnificent project of Marshall Aid. In the autumn of 1947 the nations of Europe met together to discuss how this great offer should be dealt with at their end, and O.E.E.C. was formed. The prospective flow of funds made necessary mutual consultation about the disposition of them. Furthermore, under wise American influence, the receipt of benefit was to be made the occasion of severely practical measures for reducing barriers to trade in Europe. By successive stages, the plan for the European Payments Union was developed; and this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union is still functioning. At the same time it was arranged that quantitative import restrictions on intra-European trade should be progressively reduced, under the name of "liberalization." This policy, too, is still in operation. Each of these steps, some of them unpleasant, involved definite limitations on the freedom of action of the member countries. None the less, these things were done; and they had a beneficial influence in increasing the flow of trade. Under the influence of American generosity, greater European integration became a realized fact.

There was an aspect of these proceedings that very soon struck one. I have already explained that the British people would be most reluctant to have their Parliament surrender authority in matters on which it enjoyed exercising its sovereign democratic will. Examples of such matters are the system of taxation and all that is related to the system of social security. But it was evident that in the making of commitments, and in the limited surrender of sovereignty in respect to currency (E.P.U.) and trade (liberalization), neither Parliament nor people was conscious of any great deprivation. It followed that while there were some areas in which the people would bitterly resent a surrender of sovereignty, there were others which they would bear with equanimity. And this seemed to point to the right line of progress for increasing European integration.

Among enthusiasts for European unity, two schools of thought appeared, the Federalists and the Functionalists. The former favored a new political setup with the surrender of legislative authority, while the latter advocated the taking over by European authorities of certain specific functions. By the latter approach one might select those functions which could be assumed by European authorities without the people feeling that their native institutions had been gravely impaired. There is an analogy here with a dictum of which the late Lord Keynes was fond. He favored the assumption by the Government of a good many functions, thereby offending liberals and individualists, although he was himself essentially a liberal. He was in the habit of explaining that he by no means wished the state to take on jobs that private enterprise was already doing and could perhaps do more efficiently than the state, but that the state should take on tasks which, if it did not perform, would not be performed at all. Such a task would be the regulation of over-all investment at a level required to prevent unemployment on the one hand or in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flation on the other. If the central authority did not do this, no one else could. Might one not apply the same principle to Europe in relation to the separate national parliaments? Europe should not take away from the parliaments tasks that they were discharging well, but should do things that, as separate parliaments, they just could not do.

The European Payments Union may be regarded as an essay in functionalism. The Coal and Steel Community, though limited to six nations, can be taken as another. Britain did not join the latter group, mainly owing to the belief that its functions and objectives were not clearly enough defined. Even now one may be permitted to have some doubts about them. The European Defense Community was on a different plane, but not altogether discordant with the idea of functionalism. I need not go through that chapter of disappointments here, but the uncertainties it engendered impeded progress along other lines for a substantial period.

From the early stages the removal of tariff barriers very naturally figured prominently in discussions about integration. Obviously something of this sort was called for. None the less, the complete removal of protection might involve vast economic upheavals. It must be remembered that industries in European countries compete hotly with one another along various lines. A removal of tariff barriers might cause great displacements of capital and labor and involve much temporary hardship. This was a project therefore that governments were bound, in the ordinary discharge of their duties to their citizens, to approach very cautiously.

At this point we must refer to a particular of American ideology. The United States draws a sharp distinction, which it is not always easy for non-Americans to understand, between a group of countries coming together and completely abolishing their mutual tariffs, and a group of countries coming together and giving each other mutual preferences. One might suppose that these two alternatives were either both good or both bad; it is not on the face of it clear why a stigma should be attached to the latter, while the former is regarded as praiseworthy. The effects of the reduction of mutual tariffs must surely be the same in kind, although not in degree, as those of total abolition. It may be ventured that this distinction, which seems so clear to the American mind, flows not from any rational premises, but from the acci-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dents of American history. I will return to this point in another connection. The countries of Europe would have preferred to make a beginning with mutual preferences, and this might indeed already have been done had the countries been completely free to follow their own choice. It is true that a partial reduction of duties, on a preferential basis, is permitted by GATT provided there is a firm commitment that this partial reduction is to be an opening step towards the final stage of complete abolition. But it is about this final stage that the governments of Europe have had doubts; and it would not have been honorable to proceed with the opening steps of a partial reduction unless they were prepared from the beginning to commit themselves fully to the final stage of complete abolition.

However, the project of complete abolition continued to be discussed for a number of years, not only by visionaries but also in responsible circles in Europe. In view of her traditions, so strongly rooted in free trade, Britain should not have been more reluctant than other European countries to contemplate such a revolution. But one great difficulty stood out from the beginning —her relation to the rest of the Commonwealth. In the early days the existence of the Commonwealth may have served as an excuse for lazy-mindedness, for not considering carefully the various obstacles to the abolition of tariffs and whether they could be surmounted. The Commonwealth may have provided a sort of alibi against the duty of hard and painful thinking about this matter. Indeed, on certain occasions, enthusiasts of European integration canvassed opinion among members of the outer Commonwealth and brought representatives to conferences on the European question. The enthusiasts sought to show that there would be no obdurate resistance to European integration coming from the outer Commonwealth. None the less, there were certain difficulties that were very real.

I propose to consider this crucial and central problem in two stages. In the first stage I shall ignore completely the existence of Imperial Preference. The Commonwealth difficulty does not turn on that alone.

(1) It is quite clear that Britain will not consent to discriminate *against* goods coming to her from the Commonwealth. There are, I suppose, some who consider the Commonwealth obsolete and belonging to the dead past. But it is not so in fact. The pages of history cannot be torn up at short notice. The various parts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Commonwealth remain bound together, both by history and by ties of present friendship. Britain believes that the Commonwealth is still a useful entity in the further development of civilization, and that it makes some contribution to stability in the world as a whole. Britain cannot be expected to place the Commonwealth on a lower level than continental Europe and to give more favored treatment to European goods than she gives to Commonwealth goods. Now an essential feature of the project for abolishing trade barriers in Europe would be that European goods would be admitted into Britain free of duty. From the British point of view this would mean that Commonwealth goods would also have to be admitted free of duty; otherwise there would be discrimination against the Commonwealth. But how does this admission of Commonwealth goods free of duty square with the European plan?

At a first glance someone might be disposed to suggest that the European arrangement should include the British Commonwealth. (Such a vast grouping might, however, be interpreted as having an anti-American slant; but I waive that point for the moment.) The project for including the Commonwealth is totally impracticable. The countries of Europe would by no means agree to admit Commonwealth produce free of duty. They have their own targets in relation to protection. It would be one thing, for instance, for France to expose herself to competition from German agriculture; such a concession might be granted with a view to gaining the great benefits of European integration. But it would be quite another thing to ask France or Germany to open their doors to the free admission of agricultural products from all parts of the British Commonwealth. Conversely, the Commonwealth countries would not be willing to admit all the manufactured products of Europe free of duty. They have in varying degrees a policy of protecting their own manufacturing industries. They do not even admit British manufactures free of duty, but only give them moderate preferences. There could be no question of asking the members of the outer Commonwealth to admit all the various kinds of manufactured articles from Europe free of duty. Consequently, the inclusion of the whole Commonwealth in the European scheme for the abolition of mutual duties is out of the question; it does not come up for discussion at all. Here we seem to have a hopeless impasse.

This difficulty is not in fact insuperable. Under the rules of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GATT two forms of common market are allowed, the Customs Union and the Free Trade Area. By the former plan the contracting nations must have one common tariff on all goods coming from the outside world. In the Free Trade Area, on the other hand, there is to be a complete abolition of tariffs as between the members belonging to it, but each retains its own freedom to have whatever tariff policy it pleases against the outside world. It is to be emphasized at the outset that those who favor having as much multilateral trade as possible on a world-wide basis should prefer the Free Trade Area to the Customs Union. The former gives those nations that favor low tariffs against the outside world the latitude of continuing with their own chosen policy, although their partners in the Free Trade Area may desire somewhat higher tariffs. If the nations of Europe got together and formed a Customs Union, they would no doubt avoid raising their tariff levels against the rest of the world, although those who favor the "third bloc" idea would surely press them to do so. The idea would be to maintain external tariffs at levels no higher than those obtaining prior to the formation of the Union. But it would be impossible to realize this intention *in full*. Inevitably, a particular nation will feel that a high tariff on a certain commodity is a vital necessity. Though it may be just able to forego protection within the Union in exchange for demonstrable benefits, it certainly cannot do so in favor of goods from the outside world, *e.g.* from the United States. In this case the other countries forming the Union may feel themselves forced to agree that they should all have a tariff at a higher level on this commodity. Such instances are bound to be multiplied. It is idle to pretend that, if all nations are forced into the strait jacket of having a single tariff common to them all against each article from the outside world, the general tariff level of Europe will not be higher than if the several nations retain the liberty to proceed with their own policies in regard to external tariffs. The latitude allowed by the plan for a Free Trade Area permits the low-tariff countries to continue their practice, however vital it might be to particular members to have higher tariffs on certain items. Clearly the Free Trade Area is more favorable to world-wide, multilateral trade than the Customs Union.

Now the idea of the Free Trade Area solves one part of the British Commonwealth problem, and it is to be noted that Britain is now pressing for a Free Trade Area. It is possible that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

six countries which form the Coal and Steel Community will have a Customs Union, while associating themselves with a larger group of O.E.E.C. countries in the Free Trade Area; that is one available solution. Alternatively, the small group of countries might drop the idea of the Customs Union altogether, and then there would be just one arrangement, a Free Trade Area for the whole group of O.E.E.C. countries.

Under this scheme, the British would be at liberty to allow the import of produce duty free from the Commonwealth. It would thus avoid the necessity of discriminating *against* Commonwealth produce, which would be a fatal obstacle to her joining the arrangement at all. But the other European countries would not be under any obligation to admit this produce duty free; they could arrange what tariffs they chose, or have at present, against produce from the outer British Commonwealth. Thus the scheme for a Free Trade Area solves the first problem arising from the Commonwealth.

The objection that has been raised to the Free Trade Area for several years is that it is impracticable. It is feared, for example, that goods coming into Britain duty free would then be passed on to other European countries, thus avoiding the tariffs that they imposed on products from outside the Free Trade Area. British experts are not convinced of this, but I shall return to this question presently.

(2) Next there is the vexing question of Imperial Preference itself. In this connection, let me say that I personally was strongly opposed to the Ottawa arrangements, regarding them as retrogressive. None the less, time has passed since then. That the British position on external account was weakened by the Second World War is common knowledge; this fact cannot be ignored. One may hold that all tariffs are undesirable and that one's final target should be to abolish them. But one has to have regard to an existing situation. Certain positions have been strengthened by the moderate protection given to British manufactures in Commonwealth markets under preferential arrangements. The war entailed a vast upheaval and necessitated large-scale adjustments. Britain has had to double her exports, approximately, in order to pay for almost the same volume of imports as she enjoyed before the war; as the proportion of her resources going to produce goods for export was very great even before the war, this has meant a vast strain on her resources and has required sharp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

austerity for a long postwar period. No British government with a common sense of duty to its citizens can in these circumstances afford to throw away a substantial advantage in this field. This is not to say that there may not come a time when the whole system of preferences can be abolished. But not yet—not in a period for which present statesmanship has to provide.

Once again I am bound to touch on a point in American ideology. In wartime discussions the United States drew a sharp distinction between the reduction of tariff barriers and the elimination of discriminations. It may be granted that both tariffs and, within a tariff régime, preferences, are undesirable, and that the final target should be the elimination of both. It is not clear to the British mind why there should be a difference in kind between the undesirability of discriminations (which ought to be eliminated) and tariffs (which ought only to be reduced). Of course all may join in condemning trade discriminations that have a political bias or serve as weapons in some kind of political or economic warfare. But not all discriminations are of this sort. Discrimination may be due to the scarcity of a currency, and the Americans have generously recognized that this kind of discrimination is proper under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (although the relevant clause has never been brought into operation). Furthermore, it is hard to see why nation A should not be allowed to give more favored treatment to imports from B than it does to imports from C, if C has a higher tariff on its goods than B. Indeed it was a cardinal principle of American economic policy to do precisely this prior to the First World War. Furthermore, Britain holds that the Commonwealth is an organic unity of vital importance to the world, and that special arrangements with it are therefore allowable.

Nevertheless, Britain is committed under wartime agreements to work towards the eventual elimination of discriminations, provided that tariff barriers are sufficiently reduced. No yardstick was set up for determining what reduction would be sufficient as a fair quid pro quo. Looking at the matter from the British point of view, I fear that no one would feel the American tariff policy is yet sufficiently liberal in this regard. This is not to disparage the notable liberalization that has been achieved; great credit is due the United States. But the fact remains that British exporters still feel that as soon as they make substantial progress in the United States market, an increase in duty is liable to be clapped

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on; or, in cases where this unfortunate result has been avoided, there have been prolonged periods of anxiety about whether it would be clapped on or not. Such anxieties and uncertainties are hopeless obstacles to the steady cultivation of an export market. As a fair quid pro quo, one would need at least to have a succession of Congresses in which there was no longer a propensity to raise tariffs as soon as a particular import made a substantial inroad upon the domestic market.

But what becomes of Imperial Preferences with Britain in a Free Trade Area? The quite modest preferences which Britain enjoys in the outer Commonwealth on her manufactured goods give an advantage which any British government would feel itself debarred from throwing away in existing circumstances. In return Britain gives preferences on certain imports from the Commonwealth. Much the most important of these are in the field of agriculture. It would not be enough merely to allow Commonwealth produce to come in on the same terms—namely duty free—as European produce. In return for the protection she enjoys on her manufactured exports, Britain would feel it necessary to retain some preference for the Commonwealth as against produce from Europe.

To enable Britain to maintain this position, it is proposed that agriculture be excluded from the common market arrangements. Two points may be noted in this regard. First, the overriding argument in favor of a common market for Europe is to get more efficient production. The example of the United States suggests that large economies in production can be secured if there is a large domestic market providing an opportunity for mass production and long runs on the production lines. Under the common market arrangements, the whole of Western Europe would be the domestic market for her factories, and it is hoped that they would gradually be able to build up large-scale production and secure some of the economies in output already achieved in the United States. This is the central argument bearing upon the project in question. It does not apply to agriculture at all. European agriculture may be inefficient in various ways, but these inefficiencies have no relation to the size of the market; in agriculture, unlike industry, a producer can sell at the prevailing price whatever he is able to produce. He may be restricted in his efficiency by lack of know-how, by lack of finance and other factors, but the size of the market is not a consideration. He produces as much as he can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with his available resources. So if we bear in mind the real purpose of this common market project, and dismiss from our mind doctrinaire principles, there appears to be no case against the exclusion of agriculture.

Secondly, it cannot be denied that all round the world agriculture is accorded special treatment. I do not say that this is healthy or desirable. In due course the position may be changed. But here and now it would be difficult for the representative of any country to stand up in GATT and cast a stone at the countries of Europe if they asked that agriculture be excluded from a common market arrangement.

The British attitude to the common market is not yet crystallized. Active discussion is now proceeding in industrial and trade union circles and, on the whole, reaction seems to be favorable. I judge that Britain is likely to support the project, subject to the conditions aforementioned, namely, (1) that the common market take the form of a Free Trade Area, and (2) that agriculture be excluded.

It remains to add something on the alleged practical difficulties of the Free Trade Area. British experience in relation to Imperial Preference suggests that these difficulties are exaggerated, since, if they were really insurmountable, the system could not have worked. All countries outside the Commonwealth would have consigned their goods to some Commonwealth area—the Commonwealth is fairly widely distributed around the map—with a view to their being re-consigned to Britain at the preferred tariff rate. Britain would then have found that *all* her imports came (in name) from the Commonwealth! Yet in fact she has been able to work the system, and leakages have not been a prominent problem. Americans have been at pains to devote capital to the construction of factories in Canada in order to enjoy British preferential rates; this they need never have done if it had been so simple a matter to disguise their products as Canadian merely by consigning them to Britain via Canada.

However, I would not urge that practical difficulties would be altogether absent. I believe that for a wide range of goods the European community should in fact agree upon a common external tariff; it should be for many articles a Customs Union *de facto*, while being a Free Trade Area *de jure*. Precisely to avoid the practical difficulties connected with marks of origin, it should seek to have a single uniform tariff over as wide a range of prod-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ucts as possible. But this would start from the great advantage of having a Free Trade Area *de jure*. Whenever one country wanted to have a lower tariff than the community as a whole, it would be allowed to do this under the Free Trade Area plan without question or argument, subject only to its guaranteeing to provide administrative arrangements to prevent the shunting of commodities through its area. Provided the range of goods on which duties were various was kept fairly limited, the administrative difficulties should be by no means insurmountable.

Britain is said to have had a change of view recently in its attitude to the common market. The main reason for this is that by devoting harder thought to the matter she has perceived that the Commonwealth difficulties should be capable of being overcome along the two lines suggested.

One may go behind this and ask why harder thought has been given recently to the subject. It may be said that Britain for the first time believes that the continental countries mean business, and that she feels that it would be gravely to her disadvantage to have a common market formed on the Continent while she was left out in the cold. There is something to this, although perhaps it suggests too cynical a view. So long as it was felt by busy people at the center of things that the common market was merely a talking point for visionaries, it was perhaps not a good expenditure of energy to devote much hard work to the problem of how Britain might be associated with it; as the project came nearer realization, it became sensible to put in the hard work.

But there is another side to this. There are those in Britain who believe that the common market is a good thing in itself, and that it may succeed or fail of realization depending on whether Britain does or does not show a willingness to participate. Thus the British interest in the common market has been designed deliberately to give a push to the project in Europe. Those who dislike the whole idea are opposed to Britain showing a provisional interest in it, just for the reason that they fear it may give an impetus to the movement. I believe that it is doing so, and that the interest Britain is now showing is for the common good.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NUCLEAR PLENTY AND LIMITED WAR

By James E. King, Jr.

IN the first decade of the nuclear age the predominance of the United States in nuclear weapons steadily declined. History will note the paradox that, when the military advantage that nuclear weapons gave the United States was unchallenged, our considered policy was to restore the conventional strength we had lost in a hasty postwar demobilization and an ill-considered reduction of our standing forces, in order that we might not become wholly dependent upon the new weapons for our defense. But during the later years, when our nuclear advantage was clearly fading, the defense policy of the New Look reversed the emphasis and, without abandoning conventional weapons and forces, placed ever-increasing dependence on nuclear weapons.

The tenor of the new policy was made evident by the pronouncement, on January 12, 1954, of the "doctrine of massive retaliation" to "contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world."[1] This doctrine became manifestly unsatisfactory as the comprehensive strategic basis of our national defense policy as soon as the Russians were able to retaliate massively in their turn. Hence, although "massive" retaliation is still the threat that is supposed to deter an aggressor from all-out attack upon the United States, we now have among our strategies the "graduated deterrence" of "measured" retaliation—the threat that is supposed to deter an aggressor from actions hostile to our interests that are not "worth" total nuclear war. The full range of nuclear threats in support of our foreign policies may be termed "nuclear deterrence."[2]

Meantime, the President of the United States and the Premier of the U.S.S.R. have both said that total nuclear war would end civilization as we know it—a view confirmed by the scientists who unlocked the secret of the atomic nucleus. The results of the Geneva Conference of 1955, called the "Geneva spirit," have been described as official, though tacit, recognition that war on the traditional total pattern must be excluded from among the instruments of national power. War must be banished from the human com-

[1] Speech by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 12, 1954.

[2] *Cf.* John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1954. Also Henry A. Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munity, or it must become something quite different from what it has been in the past.

The necessity is underlined, and the difficulties are multiplied, by the continuing struggle between two great social revolutions in which each side holds that the other is bent upon its destruction. In this conflict the threat of war is explicit. For us the "Geneva spirit" is not enough. We must avoid total war, but without yielding to the pressures of the newer and more aggressive revolution to the East.

Nor is this the only source of conflict in the world. After the tragic events of October and November 1956, it is hardly necessary to discourage hopes that war can, in fact, be banished from the earth, or even that war between the Great Powers can permanently be avoided. The only attainable safeguard seems to be the limitation of war to levels of destruction compatible with civilization.

The popular long-range solution of the problem is to make war (at least big wars) impossible by means of controlled disarmament. But experience tells us that an arms race is more the symptom than the cause of international tensions. The symptom itself is harmful and calls for treatment when treatment is possible, but no one expects the treatment of symptoms to cure the indicated malady. If controlled disarmament becomes possible it will be indicative of a basic change in the struggle, including greatly lessened danger of war. Even so the world will not be guaranteed against the appearance of new causes of tension, of new aggressive forces in the society of nations.

The distinguishing feature of the concept of nuclear deterrence is the belief that by exploiting the power given us by nuclear weapons, by committing ourselves in advance to their employment in any open conflict with Communist imperialism, we can both reduce the chance of conflict and ensure that if it comes it will be a "limited" action in which we can defend our national interests without committing suicide in the debris of our civilization. Combined with the feeling that this is the only way, in any case, that we can guarantee our security without jeopardizing our economic stability, the belief accounts for the increasing emphasis upon nuclear defense so evident during the last four years. This article will examine this belief and the attendant economic rationale. It will inquire into the prospects of warfare in the nuclear age, and, with emphasis upon the requirements of our defense,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compare various suggestions for its limitation. The thesis that will be developed is that the best way to limit war is to eliminate the employment of nuclear weapons, and to keep even conventional war limited, and that a defense policy aimed at making this kind of limitation possible is in the best interest of the United States. The relevant facts are all available to the public. The conclusion follows from the way they are put together.

II

Arguments for nuclear deterrence based upon the assumption that we enjoy a decisive nuclear superiority obscure the essential issue. If we are decisively superior we clearly can deter aggression in nearly all cases, and, if aggression occurs as a result of the aggressor's miscalculation, we can set acceptable limits to the resulting hostilities. But if our superiority is recognized by a potential aggressor, real threats are unlikely to develop except by his misadventure or our lack of firmness in dealing with him. It is notable how much of recent discussion of United States military and foreign policy has been devoted to our alleged lack of determination to use the advantages we are assumed to have in nuclear power, and how little to the question whether we really have such advantages, and what we should do about it if we do not have them, or if, having them temporarily, we are about to lose them.

Sir Winston Churchill, in his address to the House of Commons of March 1, 1955, in which he announced the formulation of a British defense policy for the nuclear age, called the consequences of growing nuclear stockpiles "saturation." He described it as that point at which "although one Power is stronger than the other—perhaps much stronger—both are capable of inflicting crippling or quasi-mortal injury on the other with what they have got." The common American term for Churchill's saturation is "nuclear plenty."

The stage of nuclear plenty has already been reached—or soon will be reached with the growth of the Russian long-range bomber fleet—in the sphere in which an intercontinental nuclear war would be fought. This is the stage at which each side has the weapons and the delivery means to destroy the other, given the existing state of defenses against such an attack.

There appears to be nothing that we can do to avert the loss of our decisive advantage and the advent of nuclear plenty at the strategic level. Building more bombers is not the answer; it mat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ters not how many times over we can destroy the Russians if they can destroy us just once. Nor are technological developments in prospect that give assurance of restoring our advantage. Intercontinental ballistic missiles may reduce the number of weapons lost in delivery. This will merely reduce the stockpile levels required for plenty. Even if we are first to achieve the I.C.B.M. it will not alter the situation so long as the Russians can still retaliate successfully with annihilating attack by manned bombers. Improving our defenses against air attack will raise the cost of attack and the levels of stockpiles and air power at which the stage of nuclear plenty obtains; but no one has been able to show, and few believe, that defenses can be so perfected as to prevent the delivery of the quite small numbers of big bombs required to produce widespread destruction and general paralysis. Defense against the I.C.B.M. has been called possible, but again a virtually perfect defense seems unlikely. All this is not to say, of course, that we should fold our hands. Both the ability to attack and the ability to defend are essential elements in maintaining the "balance of terror." We cannot permit the balance of advantage to slip to the other side; maintaining the strategic stalemate is vital.

A like situation is approaching in every sphere in which nuclear weapons might be employed. A far greater number of "small" bombs will be required to establish nuclear plenty for "tactical" war, but there must be some upper limit to what is needed, and there is no reason to believe that the ceiling exceeds the capacity of the Communist bloc to manufacture, stock and employ that number. Though we still do possess superiority, perhaps even a decisive one, in this sphere, it is likely to be as transient as was our strategic predominance when "massive retaliation" was declared to be the basis of our defense policy.

When both the "strategic" and the "tactical" advantages are lost we shall be faced with nuclear plenty across the board. Only then will our defense problem in the nuclear age fully emerge. It is against this coming that nuclear deterrence must be measured.

Given the qualitative variety of delivery means now available, it is characteristic of nuclear weapons that they immensely increase the flexibility with which military power can be employed. This results from the economy of effort with which nuclear destructive power can be delivered. Any military force that possesses nuclear power in plenty and has the ability to deliver nu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear weapons on all the appropriate targets can increase the power it exerts by easy stages, from any starting point up to the level of total annihilation, anywhere within range of its delivery means; and this increase can be accomplished, unless the action is strongly opposed, with much less effort than would be required to mount a conventional force for a minor "police effort." Mr. Dulles must have had this characteristic in mind when he emphasized the importance of highly mobile sea and air power as the most logical means of delivering deterrent nuclear power in the Pacific.[3]

When the stage of nuclear plenty is reached, the inherent flexibility of nuclear power is an asset to both parties to a nuclear conflict. The Secretary of State has said that "the essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be made to suffer for his aggression more than he can possibly gain by it."[4] But if his weapons and delivery means are comparable to ours it will be no easy matter to convince him. We may assume that he wants to avoid total nuclear war; he correctly makes the same assumption about us. The contemplated action then must be *limited*. Who defines the limits?

"Limitation," in a situation of nuclear plenty, appears to be the pawn in a game of wills. Either side is capable at any time of exerting force of such magnitude that the other side cannot defeat it, or make him "suffer" for it, without extending the existing limits of the action. The outcome of the game of wills must be determined by a balancing of acceptable limits, and the political advantage would appear to lie with the side that is the more willing to risk nuclear war.

The effectiveness of our threat to make the aggressor "suffer from his aggression more than he can possibly gain by it" will depend upon his estimate of the limits we will tolerate compared with the limits he can tolerate. So long as his threshold of tolerance is below what he believes we will tolerate the deterrence works. But let him believe that his limits are above ours and he may not be deterred by our threat of retaliation. If then we take the action we have threatened we shall find ourselves in nuclear war, which, unless *some* limit is accepted, promises to grow into total war. But the side that first reaches its maximum limit admits defeat. As the defender we might be willing to settle for stale-

[3] Remarks at a press conference, December 21, 1954.
[4] *Foreign Affairs, op. cit.*, p. 358.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mate. But, just because of its flexibility, once nuclear power is committed it probably cannot be effectively stalemated short of total war, certainly not unless both sides accept the same limits. And for them to be able to do so the limits must be identifiable and stable. This, as will be seen later, is the major shortcoming of nuclear limits—that they are neither identifiable nor stable. In actual nuclear conflict, then, military initiative lies with the side that is the more willing to run the risk of *total* nuclear war, while the tenuousness of the limits makes the risk of total war very nearly incalculable.

III

Before we can compare the prospect of limiting war by eliminating the employment of nuclear weapons with the prospect of limiting *nuclear* war, we must establish the feasibility of conventional war in the nuclear age and dispose of claims that if the United States gives up the employment of nuclear weapons it will be surrendering definite military advantages in the cold war.

The most difficult objection to dispose of is that arising from what is called fate: the bald assertion that nuclear weapons will be used in any future conflict between Powers possessing them simply because they exist. The assertion denies that mankind can control its destiny on the brink of annihilation. If so, it may be true that the nuclear dilemma defies solution. But if nuclear war can be "limited," human prudence is not powerless to control events. Hence it is not necessarily the case that we shall fail, if we undertake to establish as the first limit on future war the rule that nuclear weapons shall not be used.

A different argument is sometimes heard. It states that conventional and nuclear military postures cannot coexist, and that, in a sort of military Gresham's law, the "bad" currency of nuclear force will drive out the "good" currency of conventional force. This might be called the "any fine morning" justification for a commitment to nuclear arms: if we dispose our troops for conventional war, it runs, "any fine morning" the enemy can attack with nuclear weapons and wipe them out, while if we deploy them for nuclear war they cannot fight conventionally.

Of course we can adopt defense policies that will compel us to fight with nuclear weapons if we must fight at all, or we can let ourselves drift into such a situation. We can provide ourselves with forces that cannot fight effectively any other way, we can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

design our mobilization plans exclusively for nuclear war, and we can deploy our troops in the field in such numbers and in such a manner that they would be certain to be overrun by the enemy if they did not employ nuclear weapons. And all these actions will force our enemy to use nuclear weapons too, if he has them. But these things are matters of choice, not of fate.

There is no denying that all future wars will be fought in the shadow of nuclear power. The fact that three nations now have the means to translate any conflict in which they become engaged into a war of nuclear annihilation will have its effect even upon those conflicts in which they are not engaged. And as other Powers acquire nuclear weapons, the shadow of total nuclear war will become more, not less, foreboding. This well may mean that "forces will have to deploy *as if* nuclear weapons might be used"[5] in any conflict. Does it follow that they cannot fight conventionally? It is impossible at this time to foresee with clarity the impact of nuclear weapons on future battlefields, whether these weapons are actually being used or just casting their shadow. But a reasonable case for the conduct of conventional war in the nuclear age can be made.

Conventional forces do not have to be massed in the manner of World War II, and it is quite unlikely that they ever again will be. Not only would the belligerents fear "any fine morning," but also those that could do so must support both conventional and nuclear forces and maintain reserves against the prospect of the conflict becoming nuclear. But an even more decisive consideration is the necessity that the *conventional* action be limited, which in World War II it was not. Unlimited, or total, conventional war in the age of nuclear plenty is a contradiction. Not only would the side that mobilized its resources and deployed its forces for total conventional war invite nuclear attack under circumstances most favorable to its enemy, but also it would be exerting its force to such an extent that its enemy must almost certainly be driven to nuclear retaliation. Total war is designed to *win*, or to avoid total surrender, and "victory" in the familiar sense is incompatible with war's limitation.

The "any fine morning" argument assumes that tactical spearheads, which are the only combat elements in conventional war that *must* concentrate sufficiently to make attractive nuclear targets, would be so attractive that the other side could not resist

[5] Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attacking them with nuclear weapons. But if failure to resist temptation meant opening the Pandora's box of nuclear war it is difficult to believe that success in any single battle, except the last extremity, would be worth it. And the last extremity, which involves the survival of the losing side, is ruled out by the nature of limited war.

There is no self-evident incompatibility between a military effort generally so organized and deployed as to minimize losses should the enemy suddenly shift to nuclear weapons, and the temporary grouping of forces in the field in such a way as to attack or to defend successfully with conventional weapons. Limited conventional war in the nuclear shadow is almost certain to be far more open anyway, with smaller forces in contact, and with manœuvre playing a major rôle. Those who state so confidently that troops deployed to minimize the danger from nuclear attack cannot fight conventionally seem to ignore the fact that both sides must be so deployed, because both must equally be prepared for nuclear attack.

Perhaps they are reflecting their feeling that neither side can hope to *win* in these circumstances, because of the indecisive nature of the military actions that would be possible. But it depends on what they mean by "win." They generally agree that nuclear war can and must be limited, which means that they rule out total victory and unconditional surrender. On the nuclear battlefield, then, if the action is to be limited, either a stalemate must be reached or one side or the other must abandon its effort when the risk of total war becomes excessive in a conflict that is not "worth" it. Conventional warfare in the nuclear shadow means precisely the same, but without the additional risk inherent in the tenuousness of nuclear limitation.

Let us now examine military arguments that urge the advantages to the United States of nuclear defense.

The first maintains, paradoxically enough, that the employment of nuclear weapons in "tactical" warfare gives the defense the same decided advantage that their employment in "strategic" air war gives the offense. It has been said that this is so because, in the history of war, advances in mobility have generally favored the offense, while advances in firepower have generally favored the defense.[6]

Regardless of its historical validity, the rule is difficult to apply

[6] Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the case at hand. The mobility of aircraft is combined with the firepower of nuclear weapons to give the strategic stalemate its character. It is not clear which of the two advances is determining. On the ground, firepower that cannot be freely moved and deployed may aid the defense to the disadvantage of the attacker. This is apparently what the machine gun did during the early years of World War I. But mount the machine gun on the tank and you have the *mobile firepower* to break the stalemate on the battlefield. Planes, missiles and even ground vehicles can deliver nuclear weapons on future battlefields. This looks like more mobile firepower. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons might eventually lead to heavy dependence on deep concrete emplacements for survival on the battlefield and this would certainly stagnate the action. But mobility is an alternative, particularly if the action is to be limited.

Another version of the case that nuclear weapons favor the defense rests upon a tactical forecast. In this view, a defensive force armed with nuclear weapons will be able to use its nuclear firepower to prevent the enemy from concentrating for attack; hence, provided it has sufficient strength to guard its front against enemy infiltration, it cannot be attacked. Again the result would be stalemate on the battlefield. The argument must assume that the attacker will not be using nuclear weapons.

Given nuclear plenty, the attacker will use his nuclear firepower against the defender's nuclear weapons at the point of attack. When he has neutralized them he can concentrate to overrun the defender's screen of troops. There seems to be no reason to question that the attacker can blast his way through any defense, provided he has the means and is willing to pay the price. The balance of the opposing forces in weapons, training, morale and leadership, and the "hardness" of the defense, that is, the extent to which there are underground fortifications, will doubtless play something like their familiar rôles, allowance being made for the high probability that percentage casualties on both sides will be far greater than in recent wars.

It is possible that space limitation may play a new rôle on nuclear battlefields. When dispersal is essential to survival there may be an upper limit to the number of nuclear weapons that either side can employ, a limit set not by stockpiles or numbers of troops but by the ability of their delivery means to survive nuclear attack. If so, the decisive factor may not be the number

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of weapons used on both sides but the ratio of attacking weapons to delivery means being attacked. The ratio will favor the offense only if the defense occupies a smaller area. The consequence of a ratio unfavorable to either side would be a tendency to raise the limits of the area of conflict in order that more weapons can be used or to increase the chance of survival of delivery means, which comes to the same thing. Either side may open another theatre or attack the sources of the enemy's nuclear power outside the theatre. The prospect illustrates the difficulty, given the flexibility of nuclear power, of limiting a nuclear action. If there is no critical area limitation, as, for example, might be the case in Western Europe, it seems evident that whatever advantage one side may gain by using nuclear weapons can promptly be topped by the other side by using more of them, using bigger ones or using them on targets not previously attacked.

Another military argument for committing ourselves to the employment of nuclear weapons is the so-called fire brigade theory. One of our problems is how we can honor our treaty obligations to the small Powers on the Communist periphery. The earlier notion that we could do this merely by using our strategic or naval air to deliver nuclear bombs on the aggressor has been found wanting. Despite the Secretary of State's claim that such action could be taken without endangering "unrelated civilian centers," nuclear bombing of this sort resembles total war too closely for comfort. What happens, for example, to "related" civilian centers? And as for offering the ground forces of our small allies close support with nuclear weapons from the air, we know too well the difficulty of providing effective conventional air support to our own forces to be hopeful of the results. With nuclear weapons only a few mishaps could be disastrous for the defenders.

The proposed solution, then, is to provide highly mobile ground forces, armed with nuclear weapons in the "tactical" sizes, that can be air-lifted anywhere in the world on short notice. These "fire brigades" would be sent in to support the armed forces of our allies threatened with attack, or under attack, by the superior ground forces of the Communist aggressor. Because of the tremendous firepower inherent in the employment of nuclear weapons, such forces (according to the theory) would be the equivalent of conventionally armed forces many times their size. And so they would be.

The theory is sound as long as we alone are able to organize and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deploy such forces, or as long as the aggressor has no effective defense or counterattack capability against them. But while that condition prevails it is doubtful that we need them except in token strength to prove what we can do. The problem of defending our allies does not become an acute one until the aggressor believes that an attack on them might succeed. And he will not believe it until he, too, has the weapons and delivery means to mount such forces, or to counter them.

The fire brigade theory is another application of the notion that we can defeat aggression with "limits" to the action that suit our convenience; actually the plentiful possession of nuclear weapons and means of delivery permits the aggressor to expand the scope of the action to limits that suit his convenience. It does not follow that we should not develop such forces; there is an imperative necessity that we be able to apply our nuclear power flexibly and promptly if forced to do so. It does follow, however, that the provision of such forces is no panacea for the defense problems arising from our treaty obligations in the age of nuclear plenty.

It appears, then, that all claims that dependence upon nuclear weapons will yield us a return that we cannot afford to give up, despite the risks, rest upon some advantage that we are supposed to have over the aggressor that we cannot exploit without using nuclear weapons. But upon examination these advantages turn out to be questionable or, at best, temporary. In neither case do they justify the greater risk of total nuclear war implicit in reliance on them, unless there are better grounds for hope that nuclear war can be limited than have been found so far.

IV

The alternative proposals for limitation of war in military terms may now be examined and compared.

Advocates of nuclear deterrence commonly rest their case that nuclear war can be limited on the possibility of confining the employment of nuclear weapons to "tactical" uses of the smaller sizes. Though one of them has said that "there exists no way to define a limited war on purely military terms" because "wars can be limited only by political decisions, by defining objectives which do not threaten the survival of the enemy," he adds that "the possibility of keeping a limited nuclear war limited depends on our ability to extend the range of low-yield weapons of a kiloton and below, and to devise tactics for their utilization on the battlefield."[7]

[7] Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 357, 361.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It should be added that "military necessity" is not a "purely military" finding. It was not a decision made by the military that committed us to unrestricted submarine warfare in World War II, nor to the massive "strategic" bombing of enemy cities, nor to the use of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It will be said that without these actions the war would have dragged on for years, at the cost of many more American lives. This objection illustrates precisely what is meant by military necessity.

Under the dictates of military necessity the attempt to bar "strategic" employments of nuclear weapons would only have the result that any uses that are deemed necessary are regarded as "tactical." This is illustrated when the proponents of this particular limitation say that urban areas in the immediate "battle area" would be exempt from immunity as "strategic" targets, and that the battle area might be 50 miles deep. But why just 50 miles? Why not 100 miles, or 1,500—the range that identifies the intermediate range ballistic missile, the I.R.B.M.? Would the enemy's air bases or his missile launching sites be exempt? Would he exempt our ports? Certainly the combat zone, even excluding attack upon general reserves and war "potential," will be hundreds of miles deep. If we wanted to ensure that our ports would be spared, for example, in the defense of Western Europe, we should have to grant immunity to many targets we considered "tactical." Military necessity would dictate that we choose limits in terms of advantage and disadvantage rather than for clarity and stability. It is questionable whether we could resist this necessity, and quite unlikely that the enemy would long tolerate our enjoying an advantage.

Efforts to limit the employment of nuclear weapons in terms of explosive power would run into similar conflicts with military necessity. But there is an additional difficulty, that as the gradations are potentially continuous there are no practical cutoff points. Imagine our trying to maintain a limit at, say, 50 kilotons or less in the face of the claims from our men in the field that the enemy was using weapons of 100 kilotons or more, a claim that could neither be confirmed nor confuted without extended and time-consuming scientific detection and analysis. Limitation below megaton sizes, to reduce the fallout hazard and limit indiscriminate killing of civilians, might survive until their explosive power, *and fallout,* became a military necessity "to save American (or Russian or British) lives."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Small bombs are not being developed for humanitarian reasons, but for the military reason that in the employments for which they are designed they are more, not less, destructive. They can be used in the proximity of our own troops, where the enemy must concentrate his forces for attack. But not all "tactical" targets would be close to our own troops, and those that were farther back, that were "harder" or whose location was not precisely known, could only economically be attacked with more powerful weapons. It will be objected that even small nuclear weapons are large by comparison with World War II T.N.T. weapons and that only a comparatively few of them would be required to do the job of a larger bomb. This is true, but it does not eliminate the problem of economy in lives and delivery means, which are likely to be the really scarce articles in nuclear war. Considerations of economy alone would dictate the use of thermonuclear bombs against certain "tactical" targets.

But the critical consideration, for purposes of this analysis, is the difficulty of making any nuclear limit work. Even if the risk of thermonuclear war inclined men to want to make the limits work, the odds would be against them. Military necessity, given the flexibility and the awful destructiveness of nuclear weapons, would place them in the grip of forces they could probably not control. To permit the enemy to enjoy the advantage that he would gain by broadening the scope of the conflict, or raising its limits, perhaps even for a single day, could be disastrous. By the same token the temptation to seize such an advantage might be irresistible. And at the same time, in the general near-chaos of the nuclear battlefield it would be virtually impossible to know what the existing limits were and whether they were actually being observed or violated.

In contrast to the fatal uncertainty of nuclear limitation, the limitation of war by eliminating the use of nuclear weapons has a decisive advantage. It is one of practicality. Because of the sharpness of the limit there could be no marginal, no hidden, no unwitting violations. The action would be slower, less chaotic; judgment would have a better chance to function. One side might still win in a day if it could have a day's exclusive use of nuclear weapons. But neither side could hope to get away with it, because its offense would be known instantly, and it would know what retaliation to expect. In these circumstances it is possible to believe that a viable limit might be set to military necessity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It has already been said that there would have to be limits on conventional action as well, to bolster the distinction between conventional and nuclear destruction and to avoid rendering the loser so desperate that he will resort to nuclear weapons in defiance of common sense. Conventional war can approach uncomfortably close to the destructiveness of nuclear war in special circumstances, such as our fire-bombing of Japanese cities. These additional limits would be subject to marginal errors and violations, but the urgency to retaliate would be of an order quite different from that following the violation of a nuclear limit, and the interest of both sides in maintaining the ban on nuclear weapons would dispose them to avoid ambiguous action and to curb their retaliatory impulses in cases of apparent violation. Conventional war in the age of nuclear plenty both must and can be limited; it is very unlikely that nuclear war can be.

V

The military arguments for nuclear deterrence do not exhaust the case for it. They may, in fact, have played a minor rôle in the change in our defense policy that was mentioned at the outset. Arguments derived from economic considerations have been more prominent, though of course they cannot be considered in isolation from the military prospect.

Mr. Dulles said, when he proclaimed massive retaliation, "We want, for ourselves and for the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at bearable cost." For him and for most of the advocates of nuclear deterrence, costs are bearable only if nuclear weapons are to be employed.

It is characteristic of New Look defense planning that nuclear weapons are thought of as labor-saving devices. We have made a good thing of such devices, from hand tools to automation. They have enormously increased the productivity and hence the value of our workers. Why then should we take one of them off the production line, where he is worth perhaps $6,000 a year to our gross national product, and put him in the battle line against a Russian or a Chinese whose presence at the front is costing Russian production little and Chinese production nothing? If we work with machines, why not fight with machines, the ultimate war machine being, of course, the nuclear weapon?

The argument would be quite persuasive if the Russians and Chinese had no nuclear weapons. No one has ever doubted that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a small nuclear force could defeat a far larger non-nuclear force. But this is not the problem. If nuclear weapons reduce military manpower requirements, in some real terms, the effect must be roughly the same on both sides. On whether they do or not, the experts have not yet decided. The problem is in good part one of definition, because if using nuclear weapons enables a military force to produce greater destructive power with fewer men, using more nuclear weapons with the same number of men will produce even greater destructive power. It has already been said that the density of nuclear battlefields will be lower, but it does not follow that superior numbers will not be an advantage to the side that can provide them, equip them with nuclear weapons and use them. Even when the battle area is restricted there must be a high proportion of replacements in being somewhere. By proposing to use nuclear weapons we do not dispose of the need to determine how many forces we should maintain, and that determination must be influenced by the number of nuclear forces the prospective enemy has or can have.

In addition, the argument based on our productive superiority breaks down to the extent that the Russians, and eventually the Chinese, too, by arming their forces with nuclear weapons, are enabled at a single stride to overcome our tremendous production advantage. The Red soldier may still be worth only a pittance in terms of his potential contribution to the national product, but his nuclear weapons are just as deadly as ours, and not many more of him are needed to deliver them. Emphasis upon nuclear warfare, in fact, to the degree that it enables the Communists to concentrate their scarce resources in a limited area of production, appears to be tantamount to abandoning just that much of the advantage given us by our general productive superiority. For this reason a war fought with complex and expensive conventional weapons, but with the prospect of a far smaller loss of valuable lives than in nuclear war—it being assumed that the war must be limited in either case—would appear to be the better bargain for us.[8]

There are ways of using our productive superiority and our technical ingenuity to save manpower, and lives, in conventional war. We have proved this in recent wars. The lesson of Korea in this regard has often been overlooked, for most critics have

[8] See "Military Policy and National Security," W. W. Kaufmann, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1956, p. 250.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been preoccupied with visions of what might have been accomplished if we had raised the limits of that action. The lesson is that the forces on our side consistently opposed forces two to four times their number. This was true not only of American and British Commonwealth troops, but also, during the later period, after they had been trained and equipped, of Korean troops. During the last year of the action we proved that we could actually mount effective offensives against superior numbers. We used our productive capacity and our technical ingenuity to compensate for the inferiority of our numerical strength. And the forces opposing us were not just peasant masses, they were the best that the North Koreans and Chinese could put in the field with massive Russian support. Furthermore, we accomplished this when much of the product of our rearmament effort was going into our strategic reserves and to our European allies against the possibility that the war might become general.

Even so Korea was fought on the pattern of World War II. If it was the first war of the atomic age, in which the limits of the action were imposed by the existence of nuclear weapons, it was also possibly the last war fought without full realization of the impact of nuclear weapons. The nature of conventional war in the nuclear age is no more evident than the details of nuclear war itself. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that conventional combat would be hardly less dispersed than nuclear combat, that mobile firepower will play the major rôle, hence that our ingenuity and productive skill will be fully challenged to supply our forces with the latest tools of war. Air transport, air supply and air support are obvious fields for further exploration. Missile technology has possibilities that are not restricted to the destruction of cities with hydrogen bombs. Communications and command problems of extraordinary difficulty and complexity will tax our abilities, but they will be taxing abilities in which we are superior to our enemies.

The power to inflict destruction cheaply is not the same thing as the best or even the most economical defense. It is true that a handful of men on both sides can most economically wipe out civilization if that is the object. The cheapest way to do it at the moment, despite the increasing cost of modern aircraft, is with strategic bombers and thermonuclear bombs. In a few years long-range missiles will make for even greater economy. But this economy is not real because it is not measured by something that is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

desired. What we desire is a defense that does not lead to total war.

For us, of course, there is no such thing these days as a force committed only to conventional weapons. The alternative is between a preclusive commitment to nuclear combat and the maintenance of our ability to fight nuclear or conventional war. The latter does require extra effort and extra expense; there is no disputing the saving inherent in developing a single capability, whether nuclear or conventional. But the additional cost—perhaps largely in the maintenance of artillery weapons, troops and supply—seems a small price to pay for the improved chance of our ultimate survival if war can be kept conventional.

It cannot be said with certainty, then, that the number of troops we should maintain is importantly different whether the prospect we face is limited nuclear war that we hope to keep limited or conventional war that we hope to keep conventional *and limited*. It will depend, as always heretofore, upon a variety of circumstances, many of which have their origin outside the field of military competence.

VI

The reader must of course ask whether our cold-war enemies will benefit if we decide that a ban on nuclear weapons is essential to the limits that must be imposed on war. Will it only incline them to use their nuclear weapons, or will it enable them to exploit their ground-forces advantage in conventional war? The answer goes back to the first assumption—total nuclear war is an imminent and deadly peril to all mankind. It plays no favorites, and only the nuclear Powers can do anything about it. We and the Communists are forced to collaborate in the search for an effective limit to war, regardless of other differences. It is reasonable to expect them to follow the same line of speculation that we have followed and to come to the same conclusions. It would, in particular, be grossly shortsighted of them to assume that nuclear plenty leaves their conventional masses in possession of the field. These masses are appropriate only to unlimited *conventional* war, and the only unlimited war in the nuclear age must be *nuclear*.

Each side in the great conflict must feel its way. If they must recognize that conventional force cannot be used without limit, we must abandon our preference for crusades, our feeling that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wars are only justified if they end in total victory over a hated enemy, that limited wars are "phony." Major emphasis upon avoiding war is justified because the risks of total war are so much better known than the effectiveness of the steps that can be taken to avoid them. But we cannot treat "peace" as an end in itself, and they are not likely to do so. "Peace" in this sense would tend to petrify the status quo and bottle up the dynamic forces loose in the world. An eventual explosion would be inevitable, upon which it might be impossible to impose limits. Limited war may be regarded as a safety valve to prevent such an explosion. It will fail if overloaded—if, for example, the Communists try to use their manpower advantage to gain their ends under protection of the nuclear ban, or if we lose patience and try to use war to effect the kind of epochal resolution of conflict that we have expected of great wars in the past.

All these things we see darkly. But our vision is needlessly obscured by the two related false notions: one, that nuclear power is just another weapons development, like gunpowder, that can be used to strengthen the arsenal of freedom; and the other, that a comfortable nuclear lead is the guarantee of our security. Nuclear destruction is *not* like gunpowder, which gradually changed the military art over centuries and had negligible effects on the balance of power among Western nations. Nuclear power, in little more than a decade, has introduced an entirely new dimension into human affairs—the dimension of mutual annihilation. And our nuclear lead is perishable. We cannot much longer avoid facing the nuclear age.

The prospect is disturbing, particularly to those who have thought that we could depend upon our nuclear advantages. It was not in the cards that we should owe our security to divine favor. The future counsels prudence, but not faintheartedness. While using every opportunity to reduce international tensions and to extend the reign of order among nations, we must work positively for the limitation of war. To this end we must exert ourselves to the utmost in the technological competition to prevent the balance of advantage from shifting to the other side, and we must make it quite clear that we are prepared to risk annihilation itself to prevent Communist conquest by default, either by threat of nuclear terror or by conventional arms under cover of the nuclear ban. We must, in short, guarantee that only effectively limited hostilities *can* be rationally undertaken.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions ourselves. Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retaliation," which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival. And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either objectives or means, survival *will* be at stake, whether the issue is worth it or not. But saying that we must be prepared to lose does not mean that we shall lose, particularly in the long run. Our strengths are many, not least the fact that our revolution offers a better promise to mankind than the Communist alternative.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH

By Calvin B. Hoover

THE rates of economic growth projected in the Sixth Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union are impressive. National income in 1960 is planned to be 160 percent of that in 1955, an increase of about 10.5 percent per year. Although these figures are slightly lower than those claimed for the preceding Five-Year Plan, they are three times those for the United States in the period 1950–55. Similarly, it is planned that by 1960 real wages in the Soviet Union will be 130 percent of the 1955 level, slightly less than the increase claimed for the previous five-year period but still far above the rate in Western capitalistic countries. If these Soviet figures reflect reality the consequences are fateful in terms either of military potential or of winning in a race of competitive coexistence. But are the planned rates attainable? Have the even higher rates of increase claimed in the past been accurate?

It is, of course, quite impossible in a brief space to discuss adequately the validity of Soviet statistics. The publication of a statistical abstract for the Soviet Union by the State Statistical Publishing House in Moscow in the summer of 1956 has, however, raised this complex question once again.[1] Far more data are included than have been available since before World War II. Likewise, numerous data which have been previously available only in percentages of uncertain bases are now stated in terms of absolute figures. Preliminary examination indicates a rather close correspondence between the figures published in the new statistical abstract and those built up by statisticians in the United States through the laborious process of putting together data gleaned from a variety of Soviet sources.[2] This proves only that figures now published are generally consistent with those previously derived from heterogeneous sources. It does not prove that these data were correct. The new statistical abstract does little to correct the strong inflationary bias in the statistics of

[1] "Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR. Statisticheskii Sbornik." Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Statisticheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1956. (Hereinafter referred to as "the new statistical abstract.") In a foreword, the Central Statistical Administration states that "the statistical compilation contains the most important data which reflect the development of the U.S.S.R. national economy by comparison with the years 1928, pre-war 1940 and pre-revolutionary 1913."

[2] The estimate of the population of the Soviet Union as approximately 200 million published in the new statistical abstract is a conspicuous exception to this statement. This is in conflict with the estimate of about 220 million based on Soviet sources previously known.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

past performance of the Soviet economy, but there is evidence that statistics for more recent years come closer to reality.

The publication of the new statistical abstract is likely to strengthen the convictions of those economists and statisticians who accept substantially at face value current Soviet claims of annual rates of increase in industrial production and in national income three times as great as those of the United States and other capitalistic countries. Almost none of the economists and statisticians who have worked in the Russian field had indeed ever believed that Soviet statistics were either completely falsified for propaganda reasons or were totally unusable as many nonspecialists have assumed.[3] Yet it is obviously impossible to test directly the accuracy of Soviet statistics on any really comprehensive scale. The very idea of a count by some impartial statistical body of the actual annual production of, say, steel is patently absurd. What has been done is to see whether these statistics are internally consistent and consistent with other official data such as statistics for the end uses of steel.[4]

The primary reason why non-Soviet economists and statisticians rule out wholesale fabrication and falsification of Soviet statistics is the insuperable difficulty of trying to keep "two sets of books," one for the general public, including foreigners, and another for those Soviet officials who must use statistics in running the economy. Now that the new statistical abstract has been issued in an edition of 100,000 copies, with another large edition announced to follow, the hopeless confusion which would be entailed in maintaining another comprehensive set of statistics is obvious. However, this does not eliminate the possibility that the statistics in the new abstract are inaccurate, conceivably on a large scale. Past official estimates of the annual increase in national income have probably been from two to three times too high. It is now admitted that agricultural statistics have been

[3] Probably the best analysis of Soviet statistics is the symposium, "Soviet Economic Growth," participated in by most of the American specialists in the field and published in 1953 under the editorship of Abram Bergson. It made new efforts to reduce the past strong inflationary bias in Soviet statistics and to subject these statistics to re-analysis. Thus Dr. Gregory Grossman, who deals with Soviet national income in the symposium, arrived at an annual rate of growth in Soviet national income for 1928–37 and for 1928–50 of 6.5 to 7 percent, compared with Soviet statistics of 16 percent and 19 percent for the two periods.

[4] During the past two years the National Bureau of Economic Research has been carrying out, under the direction of Professor Warren Nutter, the most comprehensive critical analysis of Soviet statistics of economic growth undertaken so far. This study, to be published shortly, should afford us as definitive a test of the validity of Soviet statistics as can be obtained from internal analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defective. The method of using "biological yield" instead of actual "barn yield" led to a serious overstatement of grain production. Although this practice was changed, it is admitted that the correction was not large enough and that statistics of grain production published in the past have been much too high.

It is certain that aggregate figures which purport to show increases in the output of consumer goods have been greatly exaggerated.[5] Thus, according to the new statistical abstract the physical volume of production of consumer goods at the end of 1955 was nine times that of 1928. The claimed increase for producer goods during the same period was 39 times, and for both types of goods together, 21 times. During the same period in the United States industrial production increased threefold.

This claimed and planned increase of ninefold in the industrial output of consumer goods is in contrast with the output of meat and dairy products. The numbers of cattle and especially hogs have risen sharply since 1952; yet in terms of meat consumption per capita the Soviet people are little, if any, better off today than they were in 1928 at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. The meat and dairy situation is only the most extreme aspect of the generally unfavorable agricultural production.

There can be no doubt that the supply of manufactured consumer goods is indeed far more adequate than is the supply of food. Yet it does not seem likely that the contrast between the two categories is so great as is indicated by Soviet statistics. One reason is that the shortage of agricultural raw materials must in itself have been a limiting factor on the production of some consumer goods. It is much more likely that the figures for industrial production are too high rather than that the figures on food production are too low. The statistics for meat and dairy production could not depart so far from reality since the whole population would be acutely aware of these shortages. Furthermore, it was necessary to publicize these depressing statistics in 1953 in order to facilitate the drastic change in agricultural pricing policy announced at that time by Khrushchev. There was not the same pressure to deflate statistics for production of consumer goods.

The inaccuracy of Soviet statistics is most pronounced in claimed rates of increases in national income. For example, according to the new statistical abstract, national income in 1955

[5] This statement was underscored when Prime Minister Gomulka, following the overturn in Poland, disclosed the unreality of the highly optimistic statistics previously published.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was more than 14 times as large as in 1928. During the same period in the United States real national income roughly doubled. It is not feasible to check the Soviet figure with precision, yet such an increase is certainly far beyond observed reality.

The apparent paradox of the observable low standard of living in the Soviet Union and the high claimed rates of Soviet economic growth has sometimes been explained by reference to high rates of saving and investment and the heavy emphasis on the production of producer goods. Soviet statistics do indeed show high rates of saving and investment and higher rates of production of producer goods than consumer goods. But Soviet statistics also purport to show far higher rates of increase in the production of consumer goods than in capitalistic countries.

While claimed rates of increase in Soviet real wages are much more modest than those for national income and for production of consumer goods, they are much above those in capitalistic countries. These Soviet claims appear far too high. Janet Chapman in a careful study published in *The Review of Economics and Statistics* in May 1954 shows that real wages in Soviet Russia declined substantially between 1928 and 1952. This means that the reductions in consumer goods prices after 1948 had not by 1952 restored real wages to their 1928 level. Real wages have been improved, however, by price reductions since 1952.

If, then, one were to judge Soviet statistics by the reliability of aggregates such as those we have examined, Soviet statistics would have to be accorded a very low rating. It is certain that the statisticians who translated absolute figures into aggregates knew quite well that statistics showing high rates of increase would commend themselves to the Soviet hierarchy. The cumulative effect of this wish to please can be very important, even without actual falsification of component data.

The means for translating absolute figures into large percentage increases lay readily to hand. In the early stages of mass production of goods not previously produced, percentage increases will naturally be large. Also statistics for industries where growth rates were low can be conveniently dropped. Similarly national income statistics may include commodities and services previously produced and consumed by peasant households.

Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that the quality of Soviet statistics is improving. Some distortions due to the use of an obsolete pricing basis were corrected some years ago, and suc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cessive corrections have improved methods of estimating crop production. In general, however, past statistical exaggerations have not been corrected in the new statistical abstract, although an effort is apparently being made to place current statistics on a somewhat more realistic basis.

The new ruling directorate in the Soviet Union gives the impression of being much more willing than Stalin to allow Russian statisticians and economists to produce and publish objective data. A foreword to the new statistical abstract promises that further data will be published soon, and meanwhile new figures are appearing in the Soviet press—not merely percentages but absolute figures as well. The very fact that a larger volume of statistics is being published today may serve to improve their accuracy.

II

The absurdity of any attempt at direct and independent check of Soviet production statistics has been pointed out. It is not wholly out of the question, however, to make some sort of test through actual observation of the standard of living. During recent years the pricing of goods by means of actual "shopping" would have meant the danger of arrest for economic espionage. This is no longer true, however, and Soviet prices of consumer goods and their availabilities can now be ascertained in this way.

Unfortunately the same process is not as feasible when applied to wages. It is indeed possible to obtain information on wage rates from the managers of Soviet industrial plants and even to ask individual workmen about their wages. But obviously this is not a very precise method of testing actual wages and is not at all comparable to ascertaining retail prices by shopping. Very rough estimates of changes in the standard of living over periods of time can nevertheless be made. The margin of error in any purely individual observation would of course be great, particularly in the absence of facilities for the construction of actual index numbers of prices and wages.

It was with these thoughts in mind that I revisited Soviet Russia in the summer of 1956, some 27 years after I had spent my first year there and 17 years after my last previous visit. (I also made one short trip to Russia in 1933.) By coincidence, my personal observation of prices and wages was during the same month, namely July, in both 1939 and 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I found economic conditions in the Soviet Union better than I had expected. This suggests that I had too greatly discounted Soviet statistics of rates of economic growth. On the other hand, the evidence from all available sources, including personal observation, does not support Soviet claims of improvement in the standard of living at anything like past rates referred to above.

There was no doubt that there had been some improvement in the standard of living since 1939. People are still not nearly so well clothed as in Western Europe or in the United States but a degree of improvement was noticeable. General rationing of consumer goods no longer exists, although some limitations are set on purchases by each customer. Queues for milk were frequently in evidence and supplies of particular goods were often sold out.

In view of the unimpressive improvement which I was to observe in agricultural efficiency compared to 1939, I felt surprise that the food situation was no worse than it was. The Soviet Government had succeeded in keeping the price of black bread of excellent quality at 1 ruble 25 kopecks per kilo.[6] Since I estimated the average wage of urban workers in the summer of 1956 at around 700 rubles per month, with the lowest wage of urban workers at a little under 300 rubles,[7] it will be seen that this is not exorbitant. However, the price of black bread is maintained at a price relatively far below that of other foods, largely through a system of compulsory deliveries of a high proportion of the grain crop at low prices. This produces anomalies; for example, a price for grain per kilo on the free market double that at which black bread is sold at the fixed price. As a result, many peasants feed bread to their cows in spite of severe penalties for doing so.

Although the price of black bread is not exorbitant in terms of current wages, the same could hardly be said of beef at 12.50 rubles per kilo in state stores (usually not available) and at 22 to 24 rubles per kilo in the free kolkhoz market, and of pork at 18.50 rubles per kilo in state stores and 23 rubles on the free market. Other per kilo prices in state stores were butter at 26 rubles; sugar, 9 rubles for the cheapest grade; cheese, 26 to 32

[6] At the official rate of exchange the ruble is worth 25 cents. Americans resident in Moscow generally estimate it to be worth about 7 cents.

[7] An announcement was made in the Soviet press on September 8, 1956, of the intention to establish minimum wages on January 1, 1957, of 270 rubles monthly in non-urban areas and of 350 rubles in urban industry. It was stated that this would increase the compensation of workers affected by 33 percent and that the total Soviet wage bill would be increased by 8 billion rubles. Consequently both the lower wage limit and the average wage which I have estimated for July 1956 may be somewhat too high.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rubles. Eggs were approximately a ruble each. Cabbage could be purchased at 1 ruble per kilo in state stores when available, while the price went to 6 rubles per kilo in the free market when it was not available in state stores. Potatoes were selling at 60 kopecks per kilo when available in state stores, and at 1 ruble 25 kopecks on the free market. The price of a 100-gram chocolate bar was from 12 to 16 rubles in state stores.

Men's leather shoes sold at from 180 to 400 rubles, depending upon quality. A man's worsted suit of medium quality cost 1,500 rubles. What appeared to be a good quality woman's rayon dress which might have sold for $15.00 in the United States was priced at 582 rubles. Another, of summer weight, was priced at 319 rubles. A woman's rayon slip which might have cost $3.00 in the United States was priced at 280 rubles. A small, somewhat crudely made electric refrigerator cost 680 rubles, an electric washing machine, 2,250 rubles. When compared with the minimum wage and average wage referred to above, these prices of consumer goods, observed at random, afford a means of sorts for judging the current standard of living. It must be added that rental costs, particularly for old housing, are quite low and medical services are free.

The foregoing figures indicate that in comparison with 1939 the price of black bread had gone up 46 percent, butter 25 percent, eggs 33 percent, chocolate bars 100 percent, sugar 137 percent, milk 29 percent. The comparison of vegetable prices between the two periods is very difficult because vegetables were often available only on the free market where the price fluctuated widely from season to season. Roughly, one might estimate that food prices were some 60 percent higher than in 1939. Prices of shoes had apparently increased substantially less, probably no more than 20 percent, although variations in quality made comparisons difficult. Prices of men's worsted suits had apparently increased by some 60 percent, although here also differences in quality made comparison unreliable. In 1939 almost no electrical appliances had been on sale.

Assuming that food represents 50 percent of a family budget, and figuring an increase of 30 percent in the prices of all other goods and services, one could estimate that the cost of living had increased some 45 percent in comparison with 1939. When I had been in Moscow in 1939 the average wage of urban workers, according to the best available information, had been around 350

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rubles per month. Thus from 1939 to 1956 the money wage had doubled in comparison to an increase in the cost of living of some 45 percent. This meant that real wages of urban workers increased by somewhat less than 40 percent over the past 17 years. This should be regarded, however, primarily as a subjective estimate rather than as a statistical calculation.

This personal estimate is in contrast with the official calculation in the new statistical abstract which shows an increase of 90 percent in the real wages of industrial workers from 1940 to 1955. Although not precisely comparable, average real hourly earnings of workers in manufacturing industries in the United States during roughly the same period increased by nearly 50 percent. Average annual earnings of non-agricultural workers in the United States increased by very nearly the same percentage.

Housing continues to be exceedingly bad in spite of huge new programs for the construction of apartment houses for urban workers. The low quality of Soviet housing reflects not only the lag in compensating for the growth in urban population by new construction, but also the almost unbelievably low standards in the inside and outside finishing of housing and in maintenance after construction. Yet judging by the modest improvement in some other fields, such as railroads, standards of maintenance even in housing may well improve in the future.

There is now a substantial number of private automobiles in the Soviet Union, although it is still minuscule compared with the United States. Television sets are on sale and so are radios. Rather crudely made electrical appliances such as refrigerators are available in increasing numbers. In a society where there is such a great inequality in compensation as there is in Soviet Russia, and with average wages so low, these luxury products are restricted primarily to members of the Soviet political, military and economic bureaucracy, the more highly paid workers and to some peasants from the more productive collective farms who manage to sell considerable amounts of food products from their individual plots. Yet, it must be said that there are signs of an increase in numbers of what might be called the Soviet upper middle class whose higher standard of living is gradually being achieved by a widening number of Soviet citizens.

A substantial fraction of Soviet national income has gone into monumental and grandiose projects such as the Leningrad and Moscow subways, new railway passenger stations and airports,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the new Moscow University and hundreds of costly, ornate and even luxurious sanatoria, particularly in the Black Sea area. These expensive projects never have to meet the test of consumer sovereignty in the market place. Neither do they depend upon public approval expressed through voting on bond issues nor upon appropriations made and taxes levied through parliamentary processes. Nevertheless a considerable number of people do benefit from these monuments. The quality of their construction demonstrates, as does the quality of Soviet armaments, that in areas of highest priority poor standards are not an inevitable feature of Soviet industrial production.

An improved system of old-age pensions announced during the summer of 1956 provides for a minimum payment at retirement age of 300 rubles per month. A minimum wage of 300 rubles per month in cities and 270 rubles per month in non-urban areas was to go into effect in January 1957. A reduction in working hours in industry from 48 to 46 hours was also announced. These particular improvements in well-being were of relatively greater benefit to the lower income classes, since the pension payments are relatively larger at lower income levels and there are maximum limits on pension payments. There have also been references in the press to the desirability of reducing excessively large bonus and other "incentive payments" to industrial executives.

The food situation is still unsatisfactory, with meat and dairy products in short supply. Nevertheless, measured in calories, the food supply is apparently not so low as to limit labor productivity drastically, except to the extent that the insufficiency of agricultural raw materials limits industrial production.

One reason why the food situation, in particular with regard to meat, was not as bad as I had expected was because the Russian population had not increased during this period as much as we had believed. According to the new Soviet statistics, about 10 percent fewer people had to be fed than I had previously supposed. Moreover, the supply of pork had been increased substantially since the time of Khrushchev's speech and the supply of fish products had much improved also.

Agricultural production shows every evidence of continuing to be the weakest element in the Soviet economy and this was officially admitted to be true. By American standards, the number of agricultural workers on collective and state farms in proportion to output is unbelievably large. This is true in spite of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substantial increases during recent years in the output of agricultural machinery. Large numbers of horses and even oxen are still in evidence on some collective farms, in addition to the large tractors furnished by the Machine Tractor Stations and the small tractors which some of the collective farms themselves maintain. In spite of the large numbers of men, draft animals and machines being used, they do not seem adequate for the job. This was shown, on the one hand, by the weedy condition of the fields newly planted to corn, and on the other, by government efforts to induce young men and women from the cities to take up agricultural work in the arid regions of Middle Asia.[8]

Khrushchev's program for opening up new lands larger than the total area sown to wheat in the United States is likely to prove decisive not only for grain production but for the rate of growth of the whole economy. If this program can be carried out while maintaining an adequate supply of labor, machinery and fertilizer to the other areas, the chronic Soviet food crisis will largely be solved.

III

The difficulties of checking Soviet claims of past performance by personal observation are as nothing compared to the problem of estimating the feasibility of future goals. Our only recourse here is to compare the planned rates of Soviet economic growth with those which have been attained by capitalistic countries and then to consider whether there are particular characteristics of the Soviet economic system which might enable it to surpass the performance of the West. Personal observation plus one's judgment of the validity of current Soviet statistics will then play a part in our final estimate.

It has been pointed out that the projected rate of annual increase in national income for the Sixth Five-Year Plan is roughly 10.5 percent, or about 60 percent for the five-year period.[9] This is somewhat lower than the 68 percent claimed as having been achieved during the recently completed Fifth Five-Year Plan.

[8] What I saw in a limited number of factories indicated a high ratio of men to machines there also, reflecting the large lag in Soviet labor productivity behind that of the U.S.

[9] According to the Sixth Five-Year Plan, more than 80 percent of the increase in industrial production is to be accounted for by the increase in labor productivity. Apart from expansion of the labor force, labor productivity in industry during the period is planned to increase to 150 percent of 1955. This is a slight increase over the 144 percent claimed for the period 1950–1955. The annual rate of increase in per capita labor productivity in the United States has been estimated at some 2 percent per year during the present century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If one discounted this planned rate of increase in national income by as much as we believe the earlier increases to have been exaggerated, the figure of 10.5 percent would have to be much more than cut in half. But there is reason to believe that the greatest overestimation in Soviet claimed rates of economic growth was in the earlier periods and that current Soviet statistics have reduced this overestimation somewhat. Nevertheless, the rate of estimated growth for the Sixth Five-Year Plan is twice as high as that attained by any important capitalistic country over any considerable number of years and is three times as high as the average annual rate of increase in the United States during the past 80 years.

There are some reasons why rates of economic growth in the Soviet Union might be expected to be higher than those of capitalistic countries. A collectivistic, authoritarian state does not have to fear that its average economic growth will be reduced by recurrent depressions, and in fact Soviet economic growth has not been retarded in this way. When all the important elements of an economy are centrally directed a depression such as the United States experienced in the thirties is out of the question. (Indeed it may be that our so-called capitalistic economies are now subject to such effective controls that a major depression is impossible in the West also.) The evidence indicates in addition, however, that Russia has not even experienced brief recessions such as the United States felt in 1938, in 1949 and in 1954.

The management of Soviet industry apparently does not have to reduce production in order to prevent excess inventories. This is partly because virtually all commodities are in such short supply that almost everything which can be produced is taken off the market without much question of price or quality. It may be that if per capita production were as high in the Soviet Union as in the United States this situation would change. However, in the nature of the Soviet economic system, industrial managers do not have to compete with each other in satisfying the needs, preferences or whims of the consumer. Likewise, neither research effort nor advertising and promotion cost is incurred simply to entice additional dollars from consumers. If excess inventories pile up in some industries, production is not necessarily cut back, although further investment and employment of manpower may be reduced during the next planned period until increased demand restores equilibrium in inventories.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A related advantage of the Soviet system is that the volume of investment is limited only by the amount of saving which the Soviet Government feels it can require of the population. This means not only that the percentage of national income saved can be much higher than in a democratic, capitalistic economy but also that national income does not decline because of insufficient investment. The business expectations of individual managers do not affect the volume of investment as they do under capitalism.

By restricting the supply of consumer goods and withholding consumer purchasing power while devoting correspondingly large proportions of national income to the construction of capital equipment, the Soviet Union is assuring that a relatively larger stream of goods can be expected in the future. As the ratio of capital equipment to labor rises, the national income will also rise.

A collectivist, authoritarian economic system also has an advantage in carrying out new industrial construction because the managers of expanding enterprises do not need to fear that competitors may simultaneously build new plants with resulting excess capacity in a particular industry. Paradoxically, this can mean that the Soviet economic system may push new plant construction more continuously up to the limits of economic resources than in a corporate "free enterprise" economy.[10]

It is true that these advantages of the Soviet economic system may be offset, or more than offset, by some of the well-known advantages of an economic system such as that of the United States. The competitive spur which still functions even under corporate capitalism is, of course, missing in the Soviet economy. The cumbersomeness of a centrally planned and directed economy is evidenced by repeated reorganizations of the Soviet economy in an effort to reduce confusion and rigidity. The efforts to create a substitute for the incentives of the profit system have indeed put a high premium on the fulfillment of the yearly plan. But so high a premium as the standard 30 percent bonus to management for plan fulfillment operates as a penalty against risk-taking through experiments with new methods and processes which may pay off only in later years. The general advantages in productive efficiency of both labor and management working

[10] In the past, the advantage which any less developed economy has in importing the techniques of more advanced countries has favorably influenced the rate of growth of Soviet industry. This advantage has largely been exploited, however, and is unlikely to affect future rates of growth greatly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a system of personal freedom might indeed be expected of themselves to offset some or all of the economic advantages of a directed economy and an authoritarian society.

The hypothesis might be advanced, however, that once machinery embodying a given technology is in place and operating (and assuming a given set of natural resources), rates of increase in productivity in modern industrial plants depend in the short run primarily upon the rate at which capital investment takes place and the relative continuity of production and investment, almost regardless of the nature of the economic system. It has been pointed out that the Soviet economic system has had the advantage in terms of continuity of production and construction of new capital facilities and in the ratio of savings-investment to national income. This leaves the advantage in terms of improvement in quality and in terms of the development of new products, new methods and new processes with the quasi-capitalistic economies of the West.

This would suggest that, measured in purely quantitative terms, the Soviet rate of growth may be comparable to that attained in capitalistic countries during periods when production is carried on uninterrupted by recurrent falling off in demand for goods or unfavorable entrepreneurial expectations. Such a rate of increase might be put at some 6 percent annually, or a little more than half that projected in the current Five-Year Plan.

It is only fair to say that this estimate of an annual economic growth rate of 6 percent instead of 10.5 percent probably represents a greater discount of Soviet potentialities than would be acceptable to most specialists in the field. Such a rate of growth, however, is not far from the figure of 6 to 7 percent estimated by Grossman as the probable real rate during the past and attainable during the next decade or so. This rate is higher than I would have considered probable before my visit this past summer. The high subjectivity of this estimate, based upon my observation of industrial and agricultural production, standard of living and statistical analysis, is of course undeniable.

A rate of increase of some 6 percent is apparently not much higher than that physically attainable by economic systems such as those of the United States and Western Europe. It is, however, almost double the rate at which national income in the United States seems to increase so long as it is necessary to put brakes on business expansion to prevent inflation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If our estimate is reliable, it will be roughly a decade and a half before the productivity of the Soviet economy could equal that of the United States at the present time. It would take somewhat longer to attain the present per capita level of production in the United States. The components of production in the two economies would of course be different, with raw materials and producer goods representing a higher proportion of total income in the Soviet economy. Also, the comparative rates of economic growth in the two countries will naturally be affected by the percentage of the national income which is devoted to armament. However, these proportions are not independent variables, since the rate of one country influences that of the other.

If in the future the Soviet populace should begin to exercise control over the proportion of national income devoted to consumption as compared to investment this might reduce future rates of Soviet economic growth. While the rulers of Soviet Russia, of course, take into account both the actual and potential resistance of the Soviet populace to capital saving as it affects consumption, there is as yet no parliamentary or market mechanism by which the populace can express this resistance directly. Consequently Soviet rates of economic growth are not likely to be limited by this factor in the foreseeable future.

On the other hand it is not out of the question that our modified systems of capitalism in the West may develop new techniques of monetary and credit control which will make it possible to control inflation without limiting the physical productivity of the economy. In this case there would be little reason to expect the Soviet rate of economic growth to be greater than that of modern capitalistic countries. In the meantime, a Soviet rate of economic growth almost twice that of the United States (if my crude estimates can be assumed to represent reality) would reflect a factor of great force in the present world conflict. This is particularly true with respect to the underdeveloped countries of the world, which are likely to be impressed by the Soviet example even though the pattern of their own resources may not make the Soviet experience applicable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

By Willard L. Thorp

IN the early years after the war, the Russians expanded their ideological exports while pursuing a policy of economic isolationism whenever more tangible goods were involved. Wherever they could make themselves heard, they challenged United States concepts of trade and aid as exploitation and imperialism, but they did not compete in substance. Within its own self-imposed limitations, American foreign economic policy was relatively free to engage in trade and aid with the countries not in the Soviet bloc.

The partial oxidation of the Iron Curtain by Bulganin and Khrushchev has not only made possible some degree of controlled artistic, athletic and scientific interchange, but it appears also to have important economic implications. Soviet bloc economic negotiators are busy in both the industrial and the underdeveloped countries. Arrangements are being made for the expanded bartering of commodities, the extension of credit and the provision of technical assistance. At the same time, American policy in this area has become even more hesitant and vacillating, awaiting the results of half a dozen new Administrative reappraisals and Congressional investigations.

The background of the Soviet economic offensive is relatively simple. In 1937, the Soviet Union carried on 96 percent of its limited foreign trade with countries now in the free world.[1] Taking all the Eastern European countries as a group, their prewar trade with the present free world was more than 85 percent of their total trade.

The postwar period witnessed not only a political convergence of the Soviet Union and her new satellites but also an economic integration. By the end of the postwar decade, the trade pattern was completely altered. After eliminating the effect of changes in price level, the volume of their trade with each other has expanded more than 2.5 times while their trade with the rest of the

[1] The chief sources of material for this article were the *Seventh* and *Eighth Report to Congress* by the International Coöperation Administration on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951; the United Nations, *World Economic Survey 1955*; and the United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, August 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world was less than half its prewar level. Thus in 1954 only 20 to 30 percent of the trade of most Eastern European countries (21 percent for the U.S.S.R.) was with the rest of the world. Within the Eastern European group, the Soviet Union had emerged as the most important trading partner. Even by 1948, its exports to the other countries in the bloc had multiplied by 25 times and imports by 10 times, compared to the very low prewar levels.

The basis of this new trade pattern was primarily the effort to develop the Soviet bloc as a self-contained economic unit. There were four reasons for this. First was the concentration on military strength and development, an objective which obviously involves reducing economic dependence upon unreliable (foreign) sources of strategic raw materials and finished goods. Second was the iron-curtain policy, with its effort to reduce contacts with the Western world to a minimum in order to insure discipline and acceptance of the régime. Third was the reliance upon economic planning and the consequent effort to eliminate those uncertainties which are introduced by dependence upon transactions with buyers and sellers beyond the control of the planners. Finally, many of the arguments were applied to the bloc as a whole which are now being advanced for a "common market" in Europe. At first the plans were essentially nationalist, but more recently special emphasis has been given to the desirability of organizing to permit large-scale production and specialization, thereby increasing productivity for the group as a whole.

Even had there not been internal reasons for developing this Soviet-bloc autarky, other forces would have contributed to reducing their trade with the free world. Their industrial expansion and lagging agriculture ran counter to the reconstruction of the prewar trade pattern when they exported food and feedstuffs in return for manufactured goods, largely consumer items. Furthermore, the imposition of strategic trade restrictions by Western countries put obstacles in the way of trade in those very items for which presumably these countries had the greatest demand.

For all these reasons, in spite of economic expansion within the Soviet bloc and rapid recovery and growth in the free world, the trade between the two declined from a not very high postwar peak in 1948 to a low point in the first half of 1953. Since then, trade between the bloc and the rest of the world has more than doubled and is still expanding rapidly, although it is not large in volume. Trade with the bloc countries, which was 7.4 percent of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the free world's trade in 1938, was only 2.3 percent in 1954 and 2.6 percent in 1955. And it is still true that the countries within the bloc do about 75 percent of their trade with each other.

The increases in trade with the free world since 1953 are not merely random economic variables. They represent a definite shift in policy and emphasis. There has been an even greater increase in the volume of talk by Soviet leaders, broadcasting their desire for increased trade with the free world. This recent development is clearly a part of the new post-Stalin picture. It is consistent with the so-called peace offensive and the call for reduced international tensions. But it seems to be more than an adaptation to the new mood. It looks as though the past occasional and insignificant use of economic means to achieve foreign objectives (*i.e.* a shipload of wheat to Italy at a critical time) is being replaced by a positive utilization of foreign economic policy as a major instrument in the struggle to win friends and influence people.

On the more strictly economic side, the new structure of trade is suggestive. There is a definite tendency to expand exports of manufactures in exchange for imports of food and raw materials, and this would seem to correspond to the productivity record in the Communist countries. There may therefore be some economic logic behind the expansion of trade as well as its use to further the continuing political objectives of Soviet Communism.

So far as Western Europe and the United States are concerned, the main expression of trade policy toward the bloc in recent years has been the operation of the so-called strategic controls. While American economic foreign policy in general has sought to lower trade barriers and encourage trade expansion, trade with the bloc countries has been restricted with respect to items which might contribute to Communist military strength. Furthermore, so far as the United States is concerned, the reductions in tariffs negotiated under the Trade Agreements Act, usually generalized to other countries in accordance with most-favored-nation commitments, have not been extended to countries in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, there is a considerable area for trade in so-called "peaceful trade" items not covered in the restrictive trade program. However, although a wide network of trade agreements has been negotiated, the volume of trade actually achieved has been relatively small.

Strategic controls originated at the time when it became ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parent that we were engaged in an arms race with a dangerous adversary. We had demobilized while the Russians had not, and our immediate defense lay in the atomic bomb, obviously a temporary advantage. Military strength is relative, and it was important to gain time by delaying Russian progress. Thus the policy was adopted of restricting trade in goods which might contribute to Soviet military strength. In general, the other industrial countries joined in the program, although its specific application was a constant source of friction. That it was incorporated as a condition for the receipt of United States assistance made it an even greater irritant. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly created some delays in the Russian military program and helped hold the line until the NATO defenses could be developed.

Assuming that there will continue to be an embargo on actual military items, additional restrictions no longer can be said to have much importance for our security. Whatever bottlenecks were created by the original policy have undoubtedly been broken by this time. In fact, it was clear at the beginning that one of the results of the restrictive policy would be to force the Soviet bloc to develop its own production of the prohibited items. With such a primary position in planning given to the military, it is hard to conceive that the Soviet bloc has left itself in any way dependent upon foreign trade to meet its military requirements.

If the significance of the strategic controls in terms of military requirements is reduced to a minimum, there still remains the possibility of using controls to hamper the general economic progress of the countries in the bloc. However, this cuts both ways. From the economic point of view, it is impossible to conclude that trade in one direction is more valuable than trade in the other. How can one say that fuel and raw materials flowing out of Eastern Europe are more or less valuable than wheat and tobacco flowing in, or than small ships, or even than electric motors?

The changing pattern of trade is clearly relevant to this argument for continuing controls. In 1954, the increase in bloc imports was largely in consumer goods—food, tobacco, textiles and paper. In 1955, imports of consumer goods held level and the chief increases were in ships, iron and steel, and nonferrous metals. The imports of machinery, which had been declining in earlier years, did not increase in 1955 even though there was some relaxation of the strategic controls by the Western countries in August 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The largest export items from the bloc were coal (although in 1955 United States shipments of coal to Western Europe were larger than those from Eastern Europe by two and a half times), petroleum and petroleum products, and timber, but iron and steel products and machinery exports are increasing rapidly. In 1955, for the first time, Eastern European exports of manufactured products to Western Europe exceeded food exports. However, the two categories together were less than fuel and raw material exports. The new pattern which is developing, particularly in relation to overseas trade, is the export by the bloc of manufactured goods and the import of foodstuffs and raw materials.

In the light of the present situation, it seems more appropriate that efforts should be made by Western Europe and the United States to increase their trade with the bloc, particularly with the satellite countries. This can have much more than economic importance. When Jugoslavia pulled out from under Soviet domination, its most difficult problem was created by the trade embargo immediately placed upon it by the Soviet bloc. In 1948, 50.7 percent of its exports and 45.6 percent of its imports came from Eastern Europe. From then until 1954, its trade with the bloc was zero. The success of its effort to throw off the Moscow yoke depended in large part upon how quickly its trade could be reoriented toward the free world. This was no easy matter, and it was only because the United States, the United Kingdom and France gave special assistance that "Titoism" was possible. Similar assistance may be used again to encourage satellite independence, but this can be only a temporary substitute for the development of trade channels.

The Soviet Union clearly recognizes the importance of binding the satellites to itself and to each other by strong economic ties. Drew Middleton reported in *The New York Times,* shortly after the political developments in Poland, that the Soviet Union had offered to buy the Polish coal now going to the West. Clearly, this is an effort to strengthen the economic interdependence of Poland and the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, in the Soviet Union's policy statement of October 30, 1956, on relations with other Communist nations, the subject is raised but not resolved, by the statement that "the Soviet Government is ready to discuss, together with the governments of other Socialist states, measures insuring the further development of economic ties between Socialist countries."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It will not be an easy matter to make any substantial break in the volume of intra-bloc trade. The more recent East-West trade agreements, negotiated, to be sure, before the unrest broke out in the satellites, all provide for increases in trade, and the early months of 1956 show both imports and exports up by about 15 percent above early 1955. While there have been talks of very large increases (the Russian tourist-team talked in London of a fivefold increase in five years), it is difficult to envisage what the bloc might supply in such a case. Since this trade is such a small proportion of free Europe's trade, it probably could easily be supplied on the Western side, but the necessary reverse flow is more difficult to envisage. Foodstuffs are out of the picture, but increases in petroleum and coal may be possible, as well as the kind of diversified trade with which countries such as Czechoslovakia are familiar. In short, there seems to be little possibility for any spectacular developments in trade between Western and Eastern Europe, but such increases as are possible should now be encouraged as at least one step in the process of liberation.

Two fears which have often been expressed are that the Soviet bloc might use any significant trade position to disturb and disrupt markets, and that expanded trade might create dependence upon it by countries that are now free. So far as market disturbance is concerned, such leverage is largely on the selling side of the market and is a matter of magnitudes and alternatives. When Soviet manganese was withdrawn from the world market, it did create a shortage and there was a delay before other sources such as India were able to fill the gap. On the other hand, the Western purchasers of Polish coal have always known that American coal was readily available if the bargaining became too difficult. Russian and Rumanian petroleum are also easily replaceable, assuming normal channels are open. To be sure, sudden dumping on a market can cause short-run confusion, but this might raise a serious problem only if it took the form of dumping large quantities of precious metals. A large gold flow, not a likely development, might conceivably lead to inflation in countries with weak monetary controls.

There are a few countries for whose products the Soviet bloc provides an important market, notably Iceland and Finland. These are both special cases and the free world has perhaps been somewhat negligent in permitting them to slip so far into the Soviet economic orbit. In 1953, after desperate efforts to find

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other markets, Iceland began to sell its fish products in quantity to the Soviet bloc, and the volume and percentage of its exports to the bloc have increased each year since then. Finland's trade was directed to the Soviet bloc in large part by its reparations commitments. Although its exports to the bloc were larger in 1955 than ever before, the proportion of its trade which this volume represented has declined somewhat since the peak in 1953.

There are two other countries in the free world where one can expect that trade with Eastern Europe may soon reach the 20 percent mark, Austria and Jugoslavia. The signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 was followed by a payments agreement relating to former German assets and by a series of trade agreements. As a matter of fact, it may well be that most of any apparent statistical increase in Austrian exports to the bloc will be merely the explicit recognition of unrecorded exports during the Soviet occupation. However, of all the Western European countries, Austria had the greatest Eastern European trade before the war and is still far below those earlier percentages.

In the case of Jugoslavia, after a period of orientation toward the Soviet bloc, trade relations were completely severed in late 1948. Trade was resumed in 1954 and increased rapidly in 1955. Larger quotas plus substantial Soviet credits augur a further substantial increase in 1956. Some of Jugoslavia's traditional exports, such as fruit, vegetables and tobacco, were never easily marketed in Western European markets and her trade with the West has had to be supported by grants and credits.

For Western Europe as a whole, trade with Eastern Europe (excluding trade between Western and Eastern Germany) is still exceedingly small—3.4 percent of its imports and 3.2 percent of its exports, less than half the prewar figures.

In the special cases described above, the problem for the free world is one of providing alternatives—not necessarily alternatives which need to be used but options which are there as a protection against increasing dependence and the threat of coercion. And the same considerations, directed at the satellites, would argue for the effort to increase their trade with the free world.

II

The new economic policy has been much more spectacular in relation to the underdeveloped countries. Although the expansion of trade with countries supplying food and raw material is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explained by some analysts in terms of economic advantage, the fact that this new interest in trade is not solely an economic matter was made clear by Mr. Khrushchev in speaking to a group of visiting United States Senators: "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes as a means of promoting better relations between our countries." Although he was talking about United States-Soviet relations, this pronouncement takes on even greater significance when related to the underdeveloped countries, where the Communists have their greatest hope for further accessions to their ranks. With this in mind, a whole series of new policies has been put into practice by the Soviet bloc.

One technique has been to provide a market for goods which are proving difficult to sell in the free world. The purchase of fish from Iceland, rice from Burma and cotton from Egypt are all illustrations of this approach. In 1955, the Sino-Soviet bloc purchased more than 10 percent of the exports of nine countries: Iceland (27.8 percent), Egypt (26.7), Finland (25.8), Turkey (21.8), Iran (15.2), Jugoslavia (13.8), Burma (12.0), Austria (10.2) and Afghanistan (estimated at 50 percent). Only five countries purchased as much as 10 percent from the bloc: Finland (27.0), Hong Kong (24.2), Iceland (22.2), Turkey (18.3) and Afghanistan (exact percent not known). These are important percentages, many of which are still rising, but they still do not indicate that dominance over any considerable area is being achieved through trade.

The Soviet effort to expand economic relations with the underdeveloped countries has involved not only trade but also credits, technical assistance, trade fairs, technical exchange, trade missions and propaganda. The most common trade pattern is the exchange of primary products for manufactured goods on an intergovernmental basis. In addition, credits have been extended on an expanding scale. Credit agreements concluded during 1955 amounted to nearly $600 millions, most of which went to Jugoslavia, Egypt, Afghanistan and India. These credits involved low interest rates, long periods of repayment and sometimes arrangements for compensation in kind, as in the case of Egyptian cotton. In addition to credit, substantial technical assistance has been made available, ranging from aid in oil exploration (India) to the setting up of a technical institute in Rangoon and a 100-bed hospital in Kabul.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These new programs are not to be regarded lightly. To be sure, the members of the Soviet bloc would probably be embarrassed if all their offers were accepted but they do have the capacity to carry out substantial programs. In fact, they could probably equal our present levels of non-defense-support aid to the underdeveloped countries if they should determine to do so. Of course, the extension of substantial credits in any one year cannot be compared with an actual flow of trade, since the credit usually relates to shipments to be made over a period of several years. The Soviet bloc is starting from a very low level of trade with most underdeveloped countries. However, its emphasis is on support of economic development and this is undoubtedly the area of greatest political impact.

The political values are clearly uppermost. The economic effects are decidedly marginal. By expanding trade, they may even improve the position of their own consumers by obtaining rice for a product such as cement. By exporting capital, they may slow down their own rate of expansion a little or even delay the rate at which their growth is reflected in the standard of living, but neither of these will clearly appear to their citizens as a calculated and explicit burden. For various reasons, they can easily send more technicians abroad than can we under our present procedures. Furthermore, their programs often have more appeal than ours, even if they may be less sensible in terms of the allocation of resources. They may do the more conspicuous or symbolic project, such as paving the streets in Kabul, or the more impressive, such as building a steel mill in India. And always there is the steady beat of propaganda asserting that Soviet programs are disinterested without strings, while Western programs are militaristic, imperialistic and set about with conditions.

What is the basis for this new Soviet activity? One can of course find many self-serving declarations by the Russian leaders. Marx originally predicted the revolution as the result of the explosion of misery and clearly the present-day Communists are not acting on that basis, for assistance interferes with Marx's economic determinism. Nor can they be operating upon the American thesis that improvement will deter the embrace of Communism. There is very little evidence that the Slavic temperament or the Soviet rulers have ever relied on gratitude as an important source of motivation. But they always have placed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great weight on economic factors. Perhaps this new policy is simply a combination of a desire to demonstrate the economic strength of the Communist bloc and an effort to establish closer economic ties as a basis for political rapprochement. From our point of view, it would appear to imply a recognition that the American programs, which took their shape in the first five years after the War, were sufficiently effective and successful to require some counteraction.

The problems already mentioned with respect to Iceland and Finland appear also among the underdeveloped countries. In several instances, the Soviet bloc has been able to inject itself by purchasing commodities not easily marketed in the free world. In the cases of cotton, rubber and rice, American developments contributed to the marketing difficulties of the underdeveloped countries, and Egypt, Ceylon and Burma found outlets in the Soviet bloc. All these arrangements were more or less barter deals and they obtained manufactured goods which they wanted in exchange for their own surpluses. In strictly economic terms, such arrangements cannot be automatically censured. The bartering of commodities for which there is no market in the free world can be a definite economic gain providing useful commodities are obtained in exchange. Furthermore, assistance presently available to the underdeveloped countries is not at the limit of their absorptive capacity. Such aid and assistance as can come from the Soviet bloc (and it is likely to prove disappointing over time) will add to the resources available for economic development.

This having been said, there appears to be no justification for adopting a nonchalant view of the new Soviet offensive. The great danger, of course, is that some countries may get into the position where economic pressure can be applied as a method of obtaining political concessions. As in the case of countries in Western Europe, the amount of leverage which can be obtained from economic ties is related in large part to the degree to which alternatives are readily available. If economic opportunities and assistance are readily available from the West, then the danger is less one of coercion and is reduced to the level of contact and persuasion.

This new situation has a real bearing upon our own policy of economic assistance. We may well find ourselves in the difficult position of competing against a fairly secretive competitor, and be dependent upon the beneficiary for our information or misin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formation about the score (as in the case of Egypt and the Aswan Dam). We can of course withdraw from the scene or make it an all-or-none issue, but neither course is likely to improve our international relations. In the last analysis, the consequence of the new Soviet offensive should be to improve the performance of the competitors. So long as we were the main source of economic aid, we could function with a kind of positive and magisterial assurance. But now, even more than before, we must review our methods and procedures to see whether or not we can do a better job of it.

We still have substantial assets in our hands. We can outbid the Soviet bloc with economic goods and services whenever we wish to do so. In one area, that of foodstuffs, we have surpluses where they are hard pressed. In fact, our recent programs for agricultural disposal have indicated one promising way of contributing to economic development. Unfortunately, the fact that our internal political discussion of this problem has been in terms of getting rid of surpluses rather than contributing to economic development has created the notion in the beneficiary countries that they are performing a service for us rather than receiving assistance. And the fact that the citizens in the recipient country pay for the products in their local currency conceals the fact that our action is creating a fund for economic development which would otherwise not be available to the government. Perhaps this is merely a matter of public education, both at home and abroad. Since our own reports are in terms of how much surplus we have managed to dispose of, how can we expect the program to be put in its proper perspective? The agricultural disposal program suggests that the weakness in our assistance programs is less in what they are than in how they are done and what they are believed to be.

The centralized character of Soviet operation gives it certain advantages in developing the assistance aspect of foreign policy. There is no public debate involving the antecedents, present performance and future prospects of the prospective beneficiary. There is no framework fixed by legislation within which each operating act must fit. There is no limitation with respect to the period of time to be covered by a commitment. And people and goods can be coöpted without due process of law. To be sure, we are convinced that the development of individualism, the review of public policy by the people and their representatives, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operation of government within a process of checks and balances are all essential to democracy. That this may lead to delays, unfortunate publicity and inflexibility is a price we have always been willing to pay in dealing with domestic problems. But it does raise difficulties for the detailed operation of foreign policy, and we should be ingenious enough to find ways and means of reducing the obstacles which we continually place in our own way.

It does not now appear that the new programs will place the Soviet Union in a position within the next few years to take over political control through economic domination, except possibly in the case of Afghanistan. Yet it is still quite likely that the new policies may strengthen its political position and possibly weaken that of the Western countries. However, this is clearly the objective of the new total policy and not merely of the new "aid through trade" programs.

In the ideological competition, Soviet policy now looks toward a great expansion in contacts. Trade and technical assistance will contribute added opportunities for Communist enthusiasts to spread their ideas. That more Communist propaganda will be loose in the world adds to the danger. However, the important impact of the new economic programs may be less in terms of the personnel which goes along with them than in the encouragement that these programs will give to those already in the country with a tendency to lean toward the left.

If our basic concern is to make it possible for the underdeveloped countries to maintain their independence, giving them freedom to design their own future in so far as any nation is ever able to do so, we must be concerned not only about political ties but also about economic independence. This involves two considerations—enough economic progress so that internal pressures do not force them to turn to a dictatorship of the extreme right or left, and sufficient economic alternatives so that they do not become exposed to economic coercion. These are not negative goals, but essential bases for the development of free nations. Perhaps the most important objective for American policy must be to convince the underdeveloped countries that our interest is not in using them as pawns in the cold war, but rather in supporting their freedom and assisting in their own development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOUTH VIET NAM FINDS ITSELF

By William Henderson

WHEN the Geneva Agreement of 1954 terminated the fighting in Indochina on the basis of the partition of Viet Nam along the seventeenth parallel, most observers felt that the Communists had won a striking victory. Their conquest of the North, with somewhat more than half of Viet Nam's 26 million people, most of its mineral deposits and the bulk of its modest industrial establishment, represented the most important Communist territorial advance since the collapse of Nationalist China and posed an ominous challenge to all of Southeast Asia. South Viet Nam, war-weary and desolated, was conceded little chance of survival. Laos and Cambodia would then be outflanked and the whole region placed in imminent danger. This at least was the implication of the famous "domino theory" propounded by President Eisenhower in the spring of 1954, when the United States was still considering active military intervention in Indochina.

To the extent that the theory had validity after Geneva, the key to the salvation of Southeast Asia—with its vast population, incalculable wealth in natural resources and critical strategic position—was South Viet Nam. There the situation could scarcely have been worse. The authority of the local government hardly extended beyond the environs of its capital. Its leadership appeared incapable of constructive action, incapacitated as much by inexperience as by the incubus of the continued presence of the French. Everywhere the population was sullen and resentful, bitterly disillusioned by military defeat after a long, costly and unpopular war. The army could not be counted on. The police were controlled by an organized band of gangsters known as the Binh Xuyen, which ruled Saigon and ran its lucrative vice rackets. Great stretches of the countryside were in the hands of two politico-religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, which disposed of formidable armed strength and governed their territories as autonomous states within the state.

There were also the Communists. While the Geneva Agreement called for the withdrawal of all Viet Minh forces from the South, in fact several thousand trained political and military cadres were left behind. Besides ubiquitous efforts at infiltration, the Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munists dominated many rural districts and also maintained some organized military units in the South. The economy was in chaos. Long years of warfare had disrupted most productive activity, and inflation was rampant. Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of refugees poured into South Viet Nam from the North, hopelessly overtaxing the inadequate facilities of the Saigon government to cope with them.

It is against this somber background that the record of the two years since Geneva should be judged. The general expectation was that South Viet Nam would quickly succumb to Communist pressures. If the tactics of subversion failed, nation-wide elections scheduled for July 1956 by the Final Declaration at Geneva would surely produce the same result. The efficacy of totalitarian control techniques in the North, where a majority of the population lived, guaranteed a Communist victory at the polls. In any case South Viet Nam, deeply divided within itself, seemed certain to sink into the abyss of bloody internecine strife ending in complete collapse.

Yet none of this came to pass. Far from collapsing, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, which took office early in July 1954 in the darkest days of Geneva, has made remarkable progress in putting its house in order and establishing the bases of stability and future progress. Today South Viet Nam is very much in business, and barring the catastrophe of a third world war in the foreseeable future, is likely to remain in business. The achievements of Diem's government won international recognition of an impressive sort when the July 1956 elections, which it had adamantly opposed, were indefinitely postponed by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The Viet Minh, although it had based its propaganda on the certainty of the elections and its triumph in them, had no alternative but to accept this decision. In short, a wholly unexpected political miracle has occurred in South Viet Nam.

II

How are we to account for this? Certainly the principal credit should be given to President Ngo Dinh Diem himself. Diem has shown himself a man of courage and determination, capable of ruthless decision and forceful action when the occasion called for it. His reputation as an implacable Vietnamese nationalist enabled him to rally enough support to consolidate his position in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the face of bitter opposition from the sects, the Communists and even the French. In the early days after Geneva, Diem was often characterized as a bumbling political innocent lost in the labyrinthine mazes of Vietnamese politics. No doubt he often appeared hesitant and indecisive, but in those days there was nothing and no one on whom he could rely, neither the army nor the police, neither the government nor any significant segment of popular opinion. As the record shows, he learned quickly.

History may yet adjudge Diem as one of the great figures of twentieth century Asia. Descended from an old Annamese mandarin family, he was groomed for greatness by his father, who was convinced that the son would one day be the savior of his country. At an early age he rose to an exalted position at the Court of Hué, but resigned while still in his early thirties in protest against continued French domination. Thereafter he wandered in the political wilderness for more than two decades. Since his name was well known and universally respected, his services were sought by both French and Communists in the early postwar years. He declined a place in Ho Chi Minh's government after the war, and several times rejected French offers to head the anti-Communist régime they were sponsoring at Saigon. When in June 1954 the French and Bao Dai again turned to him as the only possible alternative after the débâcle of Dien Bien Phu, he finally accepted on condition of a grant of full powers from the ex-Emperor and the French promise of complete independence.

From the beginning Diem has ruled virtually as a dictator. South Viet Nam is today a quasi-police state characterized by arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, strict censorship of the press and the absence of an effective political opposition. Diem and his colleagues have always insisted that these are temporary measures made necessary by the desperate circumstances in which the régime has had to function. But there is little evidence that they have much understanding or sympathy for real democracy. Diem betrays marked irritation when queried about the abridgment of civil liberties in South Viet Nam. His conversation reflects an archaic, mandarin temperament. While unquestionably devoted to the welfare of his countrymen, whom he usually refers to as the "little people," he envisages the rôle of government as essentially paternalistic.

A devout Christian, Diem is a lonely, austere man. Early vows of celibacy and a strong sense of personal destiny, combined with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an iron constitution, have enabled him to give himself to his work with passionate devotion. In personal encounter he can be a charming person. His only known recreation is conversation, and discussions with the President quickly turn into monologues. He is fascinating to listen to. His appraisal of events during the last two years is devoid of the tiresome cloak of false modesty. He knows that he made the difference, and the knowledge has given him confidence in his ability to cope with the future. That future is bound to be difficult, and it is one of the impressive things about Diem that he realizes he has only started on the road.

Despite his undoubted personal qualities, however, and the large element of luck that enters into every successful political enterprise, Diem could never have survived without American support. We cannot claim credit for selecting Diem or having pushed him into office, but we have since been his most ardent and effective champion. American funds have sustained Diem's government from the beginning. Allocations of United States aid totalled $320,300,000 in the fiscal year 1954–55 and $196,500,000 in 1955–56. Estimates for the current fiscal year are of the same general magnitude. American aid equals about 65 percent of South Viet Nam's total budget. We finance most of the military budget and three quarters of the country's imports. Almost the entire program of refugee relief and rehabilitation is being paid for with American funds.

Scarcely less important has been our diplomatic backing. United States support was a decisive factor in keeping Diem afloat during his first year in office. It is true that we played a less distinguished rôle at the time of the showdown with the Binh Xuyen. General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower's special ambassador in Saigon at the time, is known to have wavered in his evaluation of Diem's prospects during that moment of supreme danger. But fortunately the State Department, ignoring French pressure, decided not to alter its course. Since May 1955 our support has been unshakeable. The United States fully endorsed Diem's position in refusing to go through with the nationwide elections on unification scheduled at Geneva; and their indefinite postponement sharply reduced popular fears of an imminent Communist takeover in the South. This whole episode was an important factor in rallying public opinion behind the Diem régime. The mantle of protection afforded by the Manila Pact was also thrown over South Viet Nam (as well as Laos and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambodia); and American officers, putting to use the experience gained in Korea, are training the South Vietnamese army.

We must also concede the part played by shifts in Communist world strategy. South Viet Nam does not yet have the military capability of defending itself successfully against a determined attack from the North; and despite our commitments under the Manila Pact, it will always be uncertain whether the United States would intervene militarily in Indochina if the Communists renewed open aggression. But they have not done so. Nor have they made a serious attempt to subvert South Viet Nam from within, although in the early months of the Diem government such an effort might well have succeeded.

III

Diem's first task after assuming office was to gain control over the Vietnamese army. A prolonged crisis in the fall of 1954, in which the United States gave Diem decisive support, resulted in the withdrawal of the pro-French Chief of Staff, General Nguyen Van Hinh, and his replacement by Le Van Ty, Diem's own choice for the job. Thereafter the army gave its loyalties increasingly to the Diem government rather than to Bao Dai, the ex-Emperor of Annam who was still titular Chief of State, or to the French, and thus provided Diem with the power essential for the struggle that was already shaping up with the sects.

A showdown was not long in coming. Recognizing the extreme danger of a pitched battle, Diem manœuvred skillfully to divide and destroy the sects one by one. A major break occurred in March 1955 when the Chief of Staff of the Cao Dai army, General Nguyen Thanh Phuong, was induced by bribery and other means to "rally" to the national cause with most of his units. But the Binh Xuyen had to be crushed by force. An initial flurry of skirmishing in Saigon late in March was ended by French intervention. When fighting broke out again at the end of April, Diem this time defied the French and ordered the national army, now almost completely loyal to him, to destroy the bandit sect. In a brief but bloody struggle, which devastated part of central Saigon, the Binh Xuyen were defeated and fled in disorder to the dense swamps south of the city. Subsequent operations eliminated them as a significant factor in Vietnamese politics. At the height of the crisis an attempted coup by General Nguyen Van Vy, acting under orders from Bao Dai, who correctly assessed the trend

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of events as fatal to his own position in Viet Nam, failed when the national army remained steadfast in its support of Diem.

There remained only the Hoa Hao to be dealt with. While some elements came over to the government side, protracted operations were necessary against their two strongest generals, Tran Van Soai and Le Quang Vinh (alias Ba Cut). The military forces at Diem's disposal were now so overwhelming, however, that the results were a foregone conclusion. Shrewdly accepting the inevitable, General Soai eventually made the best deal he could with the government and "rallied" in March 1956. A month later Ba Cut was captured while fleeing with the remnant of his forces in the extreme southwestern corner of the country. He was quickly brought to trial as a rebel, found guilty and guillotined in July. His death marked the end of the sects as important political forces in South Viet Nam. Their authority over large parts of South Viet Nam has been eliminated and their military power destroyed. Some scattered sect units are still holding out in the maquis, but they no longer constitute a serious threat.

Diem has also contained the menace of Communism. The exact strength of the Communists in South Viet Nam is a matter of speculation. After May 18, 1955, the date on which all Viet Minh forces were supposedly withdrawn from the South, the Communists continued to exercise effective political authority in many rural areas. They had extensively infiltrated the government apparatus, the police and armed forces; and they enjoyed considerable support, or at least acquiescence, among large segments of the rural population. Apparently in keeping with the overriding dictates of Communist world strategy, however, the Communists in South Viet Nam played a fairly passive rôle after Geneva. Although they gave sporadic assistance to the sects, they did not themselves engage in widespread guerrilla operations. Where possible they maintained their positions in the countryside. They carried on persistent clandestine propaganda and made halfhearted efforts to sabotage the two elections held by the Diem government. But otherwise they bided their time.

As the Diem régime waxed in strength and confidence, it gave increasing attention to rooting out the Communist danger. All the techniques of political and psychological warfare, as well as pacification campaigns involving extensive military operations, have been brought to bear against the underground. Some of the methods employed, such as anti-Communist denunciation rallies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and self-criticism meetings, smack of practices which the Communists themselves perfected long ago; and it is clear that the usual democratic safeguards have not always been upheld. The consensus is that this all-out effort has been reasonably effective. Infiltration within the various organs of government and armed forces is apparently under control, and real progress has been made in extending the effective authority of the régime in rural districts formerly subject to the Communists. Perhaps the best evidence of this is that the ordinary peasant is beginning to turn against the cadres and give information to the government even in areas long under Communist influence. Today the Communists could still cause a lot of trouble in South Viet Nam. They could isolate extensive if fairly remote areas in the event of a renewed outbreak of civil war. But barring outside aid in the form of an invasion from the North, it is doubtful if they could any longer seriously challenge the authority of the Diem régime over most of its territory.

IV

Diem also got rid of the French. In a sense this was the most critical problem of all, for without the achievement of complete independence his long-run prospects were hopeless. If Diem was ever to rival Ho Chi Minh as an authentic champion of the Vietnamese people he had to end any semblance of French control in the South, as Ho had successfully done in the North. Even after Geneva the French sought to salvage something of their political and military position in South Viet Nam. Their support of Diem was always lukewarm at best. For many months they continued to intrigue with the sects, to which they had given extensive economic and military support in the past; and their covert propaganda against Diem at times reached savage proportions. Doubtless they would have been glad to see his government collapse and replaced by a more tractable régime. At the height of the Binh Xuyen crisis in April 1955 Premier Faure openly tried to torpedo Diem. He gave up only when events in Saigon outran his policy and after the United States, overcoming grave apprehensions of its own, decided to continue its support of Diem.

Thereafter the French were finished. When Diem demanded that France withdraw its armed forces from South Viet Nam in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement, Paris quickly complied. The release of French advisers and other per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sonnel by the Saigon administration was hastened and today only a handful remain. Even the training of the Vietnamese army has been turned over entirely to the Americans. South Viet Nam's present connection with the French Union is obscure. Although the relationship has not been formally terminated, Vietnamese representation has been withdrawn from the High Council of the Union and is not likely to be renewed. The French economic stake in South Viet Nam remains very substantial, of course, despite a considerable net withdrawal of investments since Geneva. An exodus of French nationals has also taken place, and today only about 20,000 remain in the South, of whom fewer than 7,000 are Occidentals. On the other hand, French cultural influence will undoubtedly persist for a long time.

Franco-Vietnamese relations have recently begun to recover somewhat from the nadir they reached at the time of the Binh Xuyen crisis and thereafter. Responsible Vietnamese are slowly coming to realize that France has at last accepted as irrevocable the loss of its political paramountcy in the South. Dramatizing its recognition of the new era, France recently changed the title of its representative in Saigon from high commissioner, a term offensive to Vietnamese sensibilities because of its colonial overtones, to ambassador. Many perplexing problems remain, such as France's continued and inexplicable flirtation with the Viet Minh régime at Hanoi. But the prospect of a future Franco-Vietnamese rapprochement should not be ruled out.

Diem's first year in office was necessarily devoted almost entirely to his tenacious struggle for survival. Correspondingly less attention could be given to economic and social matters, but some important steps were taken none the less. South Viet Nam established its own national bank on January 1, 1955. Direct contacts were inaugurated with the international trading community, and normal political relationships with the outside world were also broadened. A land reform program was promulgated, calling for sweeping rent reductions rather than land redistribution. Tentative steps were also taken toward rehabilitating the war-devastated economy, and inflation was brought under control.

Perhaps the most difficult economic and social problem confronting the harassed Diem government during its first year was the wholly unexpected flood of refugees that streamed into the South after Geneva. A movement of refugees was foreseen and provided for at Geneva, but was not expected to reach very great

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proportions. As it developed, more than 850,000 individuals, including Vietnamese military personnel, fled the North in the year after Geneva. The reception of this enormous number of destitute persons would have taxed the facilities of any government. Yet after a brief period of confusion, the challenge was met and somehow surmounted. France and the United States provided air and sea transport for the initial movement southward. Makeshift facilities were improvised for preliminary reception of the refugees, who were then redistributed as quickly as possible to hastily built temporary villages. There was no outbreak of epidemic diseases, no starvation and little if any unrest.

The satisfactory emergency handling of the refugee crisis reflected great credit on the struggling Vietnamese government, where failure might have brought about its collapse. Of course, the main problem of permanent resettlement and rehabilitation has still to be met. But even here significant progress has been made during the past year. Despite inevitable mistakes, lassitude and some corruption in the implementation of long-range programs, it is not unreasonable to expect that the whole problem will be substantially liquidated by the end of 1958. The vast influx of refugees may eventually turn out, in fact, to have been a blessing in disguise. Their numbers have added significantly to the total population, and thus helped to redress the unfavorable balance with the Communist North; and their skills and industry, mostly agricultural, could add much to a land that is not suffering from overpopulation.

V

In the last year several important steps have been taken toward reorganizing the constitutional structure of the government and broadening its political base. A popular referendum in October 1955 resulted in the deposition of Bao Dai as Chief of State and the establishment of a republic with Ngo Dinh Diem as first President. Bao Dai had never attracted much support as a nationalist leader; and his equivocal rôle during the first year of Diem's rule, culminating in the abortive Vy coup, sealed his fate. The referendum, which registered a majority of 98 percent against the ex-Emperor, simply formalized a foregone conclusion. But Diem's ability to stage the referendum, and win such a thumping majority without the exercise of undue official coercion, enormously enhanced his prestige both at home and abroad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Less than six months later, with the sect problem now well in hand, Diem felt strong enough to conduct elections for a Constituent Assembly. The elections of March 4, 1956, have been widely criticized, and certainly many of the practices employed by the government were highly questionable. The whole weight of government support, including its efficient propaganda machine, was thrown behind officially sponsored candidates. Many individual candidacies repugnant to the government were terminated under official pressure. The press remained closely muzzled during the brief campaign period, and opportunities for public rallies and speech-making, especially on the part of non-government candidates, were severely restricted. Most of the principal opposition parties refused to campaign under these circumstances and boycotted the elections.

Criticism of these practices should, however, be placed in the proper political setting. South Viet Nam is not Great Britain or the United States. Its people have no experience of normal democratic processes. After more than a decade of turmoil, which brought to an end a long period of colonial domination, there was a crying need to establish in an orderly fashion a political structure resting on a reasonably convincing popular base. The elections did serve this essential purpose. Where they fell short of customary democratic practice, Diem argued that circumstances did not permit him to risk real electoral freedom. Moreover, while the government won a heavy majority in the new Assembly, a number of candidates lacking the imprimatur of the régime were also successful.

The constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly provides for a presidential system of government in which unusually extensive powers are conferred on the chief executive. While these powers could easily be perverted to the uses of dictatorship, the system undoubtedly conforms to present-day political and economic realities in South Viet Nam. The government controlled the deliberations of the Assembly from the beginning. There was nevertheless some lively debate at its sessions, which were open to the public. If the discussions did not often explore fundamentals, at least they reflected a seriousness of purpose on the part of the delegates that was not entirely expected. In July, a provisional draft was submitted to the President. After lengthy consideration Diem proposed a series of modifications to the text, most of which were quickly accepted by the Assembly. The com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pleted document was then returned to Diem for final approval and promulgation, these powers having been entrusted to him rather than the Assembly by the terms of the Bao Dai referendum; and on October 26, 1956, it was proclaimed the supreme law of the land. Diem continues as President for a five-year term, while the Constituent Assembly now becomes the regular legislature for the next three years.

One of Diem's major objectives has been to develop broad popular support for his government. He has directed his appeal primarily at the masses rather than the intelligentsia, who he correctly assumed would be alienated by the dictatorial character of his régime, and on the whole he has had considerable success. While his record accounts for this more than anything else, Diem has also resorted to many of the time-tested techniques of modern totalitarianism. Public adulation of the President, for example, has reached startling proportions; and although Diem professes to be embarrassed by all the fuss, he has done little to stop it. A constant barrage of propaganda is laid down through the controlled press and radio. "Spontaneous" demonstrations are staged with distressing frequency. There is even a strength-through-joy youth movement that stirs unhappy memories of the Nazi past.

The government has also sponsored development of a nationwide political grouping known as the National Revolutionary Movement. Today it is the only effective mass political organization in the country. It claims not to be a political party in the ordinary sense, but rather to transcend all other parties; and one wonders whether its real objective is not to swallow its competitors, however weak and ineffectual they may be. There is no significant legal political opposition in South Viet Nam today, and probably none would be tolerated. The chief figures in the régime have little comprehension of the indispensable function of a loyal opposition in a democratic political system. Thus the honest oppositionist is left with no alternatives but clandestine activity or political quietism.

VI

While the constitutional base was thus being secured, much effort was also devoted to improving the administrative machinery of the state. South Viet Nam inherited a grossly outmoded colonial government and lacked the trained administrators and technicians necessary to make it work. The result was heart-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

breaking inefficiency in the face of almost overwhelming problems. Fortunately there has been some awareness of the dangers inherent in this situation. Large-scale technical assistance has been accepted from the United States to reorganize the administrative structure from top to bottom. A National Institute of Administration has been established, advantage is being taken of foreign educational opportunities, and as rapidly as possible expert administrators are being trained. Special attention has been given to reorganizing and training the municipal and national police forces. Corruption has also kept within bounds. The technical capacity and perhaps even more important the esprit de corps of the civil service have been gradually improving in consequence of these and other measures. One evidence is that the area of effectiveness of the South Vietnamese government has been steadily expanding both geographically and functionally. It is increasingly turning its attention to the elaboration and implementation of programs of economic and social reconstruction, with greater prospects for success than ever before.

The Diem régime has still to prove itself in these fields. South Viet Nam faces problems of economic backwardness and social upheaval which are common to most of Southeast Asia. They are perhaps no more acute here than elsewhere. But popular expectations of change are already high, and they are rising rapidly. Today only a small minority in the South favors the Communists. But as time goes on comparisons are bound to be made with progress in the North, where the Viet Minh are putting forth tremendous efforts to hasten economic development and social reorganization. Unless the Diem government can successfully meet the fundamental demands of Viet Nam's economic and social revolution, its achievement of political stability and constitutional consolidation in the South may in the long run prove ephemeral.

South Viet Nam thus represents a continuing challenge for American policy in the Far East. Whether we like it or not, this exposed salient of the free world has become a showcase for what American friendship, support and material aid can do in Asia. So far a respite has been gained and a solid basis laid for the future. It is a profound and legitimate interest of the United States that the structure of a stable, prosperous and democratic society be erected on the foundations that have already been prepared.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOO SLOW OR TOO FAST?

Political Change in African Trust Territories

By Vernon McKay

CARTOGRAPHERS who attempt to keep the political map of Africa up to date during the next decade will find it a busy and frustrating task. Four new nations—Libya, the Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia—have already appeared across the northern belt of Africa, and the former Italian colony of Eritrea is now federated with independent Ethiopia. Next in line for similar changes is the middle belt of tropical Africa which includes not only the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Uganda but also the seven diverse trust territories administered by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Italy under United Nations supervision.

The speed of this political transformation provides new perspective on a wide range of problems, and it raises anew the question of whether Africa is going too slow or too fast. Too slow or too fast for what? Too slow to satisfy African aspirations? Or too fast to create economically viable and politically stable states? How can the principle of self-determination be effectively applied in a continent so varied that its peoples speak 800 languages? To what extent will irredentist and expansionist movements arise among peoples separated from their kinsmen by arbitrary boundary lines? How far will Communist influence spread when the restraining power of colonial governments is no longer available to curtail it? And what can the West do to ease the transition from the old Africa to the new? Questions like these reveal the need for a United States policy that looks ahead and beyond the end of colonialism in Africa.

II

The plebiscite supervised by the United Nations in British Togoland on May 9, 1956, was an unprecedented first step toward the achievement of the final goal of the international trusteeship system in leading colonial peoples to self-government or independence. It prepared the way for British Togoland to join the Gold Coast when it becomes the independent state of Ghana on March 6, 1957. Barring the unexpected, this precedent will soon be followed in the British Cameroons, which will join the new Nigeria

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when the regional quarrels now retarding Nigeria's advance to independence are settled or at least temporarily compromised.

The two neighboring trust territories, French Togoland and French Cameroons, are also moving rapidly toward self-government although their future status is not as clear, partly because of the changing views of their peoples and partly because of the bad relations between France and the U.N. General Assembly on the colonial issue. It is still uncertain whether the Togolanders and Cameroonians will be willing to achieve self-government in a new form of association with France or whether they will ultimately insist on complete independence. At the moment, however, it seems that a majority of Togolanders prefer autonomy within the French Union to either independence or trusteeship status. In a complicated referendum on October 28, 1956, they were given the opportunity to vote either for (a) a new Statute giving them greater self-government within the French Union, and the end of trusteeship, or (b) the maintenance of trusteeship. Valid ballots were cast by 315,532 voters for the new Statute and the end of trusteeship, while only 22,266 voted for the maintenance of the trusteeship. It should be noted, however, that an opposition minority boycotted the referendum, and that the loaded wording of the questions may have influenced some voters to choose the first alternative even if they had no objection to trusteeship; a voter who chose the second alternative, the maintenance of trusteeship, had no way of expressing approval of the political reforms in the new Statute.

The General Assembly will no doubt refuse to terminate the trusteeship agreement at present, despite the wishes of a majority of the inhabitants, because of the arbitrary character of the French procedure. In sharp contrast to the British in their Togoland plebiscite, the French denied the United Nations a voice in framing the questions and shaping the plebiscite arrangements. Although France requested the Trusteeship Council to send observers to the referendum, the Council rejected the invitation because of this arbitrary behavior.

Africans in the three trust territories on the eastern side of the continent have far less training and experience in government than those of the West Coast. By an oddity of history, however, Italian Somaliland is none the less to become the independent state of Somalia on December 2, 1960, under the terms of a unique trusteeship agreement between Italy and the General

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Assembly which set a ten-year time limit for the achievement of independence. Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi may therefore be the only trust territories left in Africa after 1960. Moreover, a much faster rate of political change is about to supplant the slow pace of the past in Tanganyika, and a series of notable policy statements by Belgian parliamentarians, intellectuals and churchmen during 1956 foreshadows political innovations in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.

The seven trust territories in Africa contain about 20,000,000 people or 10 percent of the continent's population and 802,744 square miles or 7 percent of its area. Six of them were German colonies for a generation before the First World War, and it is not uncommon today to hear Africans speak favorably of German rule, a roseate image of the past that is in part a subconscious protest against their present rulers. All seven territories have thriving urban centers with many Western-educated Africans, as well as underdeveloped hinterlands inhabited by many diverse tribes of non-literate farmers or herdsmen. The annual discussion of their problems in the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly enables the outside world to influence the policies of the colonial Powers not only in trust territories but indirectly in other territories as well. Each year it brings to light a mass of detailed information from reports of the administering authorities, reports of the Trusteeship Council's Visiting Missions, thousands of written petitions from trust-territory inhabitants, many oral hearings of Africans, and regular discussions in the Council and Assembly. Observers who have kept up with this continual flow of information for the past decade have had a fine opportunity to watch year by year the remarkable political, economic, social and educational progress of the trust territories.

In the political field, these annual reviews have revealed a steady increase in the number of Africans holding responsible government posts; the widespread development of local government through municipal, district and provincial councils; an increase in the powers of local legislatures; a tremendous extension of the right to vote; and the mushrooming of political parties. Let us examine these political changes territory by territory.

III

British Togoland, a narrow strip of land about 320 miles long and averaging 40 miles in width, had in mid-1954 an estimated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

population of 423,000, divided among 23 tribal groups. Its early achievement of self-government is made possible by British policy in the Gold Coast, for British Togoland is administered as an integral part of that territory and has shared its rapid constitutional advance since 1950. It was the scene of intense political excitement during 1956 when the voters, under a system of universal suffrage with secret ballot, twice assembled at the polls. On May 9, in a plebiscite supervised by a United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner with a team of 23 Secretariat officials, 93,095 Togolanders cast their ballots in favor of union of their country with an independent Gold Coast, while 67,492 voted for separation from the Gold Coast and continuation of trusteeship for the time being. A majority in the predominantly Ewe-speaking south, however, voted against union with the Gold Coast. Reassembling on July 19 for the country's second general election (the first was in 1954), the voters reaffirmed their desire for union with the Gold Coast by an even greater majority.

In his detailed report to the United Nations, the Plebiscite Commissioner relates that the voting was featured by "good order and high sense of responsibility, and people literally flocking to the booths at the early hours of the morning." Since a majority of the voters were illiterate, the unionist and separationist groups each campaigned by publicizing a colored symbol to identify its views. When a properly registered voter appeared at a polling booth, he was given a ballot paper with an official mark on it, and his thumb was marked with ink to prevent him from voting again that day. He then took his ballot paper behind a screen where he found two sealed ballot boxes and dropped it, in secret, in the box marked with the colored symbol of his choice. According to the Plebiscite Commissioner, there were practically no "voting offences," which were punishable by £ 100 fine or one year imprisonment and included attempts "to influence the voting by oaths, fetish or gong-gong."

The meaning of the complicated questions was explained to the people in the energetic campaigning of new political parties. The territory's four political associations are largely the outgrowth of a decade of agitation over the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. The All-Ewe Conference was founded in the Gold Coast in 1945 as a cultural organization to campaign for the unification of the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. In 1951, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Togoland Congress was organized to campaign for the unification of the two Togolands. The other two parties are Togoland branches of Gold Coast organizations: the Convention People's Party of Prime Minister Nkrumah, and the Northern People's Party.

During the past decade politics in French Togoland has also revolved around the Ewe and Togoland unification movement. With 50,000 square miles (larger than Pennsylvania) and over a million people, divided among 28 tribal groups, French Togoland has about two and a half times the area and population of its British-administered neighbor. It is also poor, however, and the Trusteeship Council's 1955 Visiting Mission considered that the territory's future progress would be best assured by its association with a larger unit. An "autonomous republic" within the French Union since August 1956, French Togoland has become a pilot project for the implementation of the Overseas Reform Act adopted by the French Parliament on June 23. Although numerous legislative powers are still reserved to the French Parliament, Togoland now has an African Prime Minister and a Legislative Assembly to be elected hereafter for five-year terms by direct, universal suffrage. French territories, unlike the British and Belgian colonies, also elect a small number of representatives to the metropolitan Parliment.

The number of registered voters steadily increased for a decade under a unique system in which the vote was granted to persons having any one of 13 (later increased to 16) qualifications, including mothers of two children who are living or who "died for France." Under the repeated urging of the Trusteeship Council, however, universal suffrage was granted in the 1956 reform. Four political organizations have sprung up in the south and one in the north. Two of them are anti-French in their political orientation while one in the north and one in the south wish to maintain an association with France. A fifth group seeks to achieve a balance between the opposing forces. Bitterness between the rival parties in French Togoland has on several occasions erupted in violence.

British Cameroons, with an area about the size of Maine and a population of 1,460,000, consists of two strips of territory which are geographically separated as well as quite different from each other in peoples, languages and historical traditions. Just as British Togoland has shared in the Gold Coast's march to inde-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendence British Cameroons has benefited from similar political changes in neighboring Nigeria. In accordance with its request as expressed at a constitutional conference in 1953, the Northern Cameroons is becoming a part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, while the Southern Cameroons is developing a separate regional government with its own House of Assembly as well as representation in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives.

A 1954 Order in Council extended the franchise to all British subjects or British protected persons over 21 who pay taxes and who have a residency qualification in, or are native of, a constituency. The excitement of new political opportunities has inspired the establishment of four parties in the Southern Cameroons. The dominant party is the Kamerun National Congress which has 17 members in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly. With one of the smaller parties, it favors federation with Nigeria, while the two remaining parties want to secede and ultimately amalgamate with an independent French Cameroons. Thus, the Togoland unification movement has inspired a similar effort in the Cameroons, although the latter shows no signs of attaining the strength of the Togoland movement.

The French Cameroons is a triangular area larger than the State of California, with a population of 3,200,000, including such peoples as the Christianized Bamiléké in the south, the pagan Kirdi in the mountainous center, and the Islamized Fulani in the north. Its political evolution after a relatively slow postwar start has picked up new speed in the last 18 months. The 1956 introduction of universal suffrage will increase the number of eligible voters from 757,000 to an estimated 1,500,000. Among the many political organizations that have sprung up since 1946, the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* is the best known, not because of its numerical strength, which is small, but because of its extremism. Its leaders appear to get their inspiration if not their orders from French Communist Party headquarters in Paris, although its followers are probably motivated more by nationalist than Communist sentiments. In May 1955, riots precipitated by the U.P.C. resulted in a number of deaths and the party was subsequently outlawed.

Shortly after the adoption of the Overseas Reform Act in June 1956, however, a new Governor amnestied the U.P.C. leaders. Meanwhile, Mr. Soppo Priso, President of the Territorial Assembly, who was formerly considered a moderate by the French, had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

already begun an attempt to unite a number of parties in a national union movement, possibly to forestall the revival of the U.P.C. As a rallying point, Soppo Priso surprisingly launched a campaign against the Overseas Reform Act and called for a special assembly to negotiate a new political settlement with France. As in other revolutionary situations, politics in the Cameroons continues to move to the left. In the past, France has controlled its African territories partly by its ability in educating a small élite with a high degree of French culture. As education spreads, however, the large number of half-educated Africans are unlikely to develop the same attachment to France.

IV

In eastern Africa, Italian Somaliland is an arid country of 50,000 square miles and 1,270,000 people, about 70 percent of whom are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists whose fights over water holes for their cattle have been among the matters of concern to the Trusteeship Council. Its meager resources, barring the possible discovery of oil, seriously limit its future. In recent years, about half its revenues have come from an Italian subsidy, and both the United Nations and the Somali leaders are now worried about the territory's financial position when it becomes an independent state in 1960, as provided in the trusteeship agreement between Italy and the General Assembly.

Italy has pushed rapidly ahead to train Somalis to govern themselves, and the 1954 Visiting Mission was much impressed by the "high degree of political party activity throughout the territory." The most striking political development in 1956 was the election in February to fill the 70 seats in a new Legislative Assembly with power to make the territory's laws. In 45 municipalities the people voted directly for their candidates, while in 616 *shirs* or tribal councils 772,183 voters elected delegates who cast their votes for the candidates in a secret ballot on election day. The next Legislative Assembly will be chosen in 1958 entirely by direct elections with male suffrage. To head this new political system the Italians have appointed a Somali Government of six ministers, including 34-year-old Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa, who has appeared on numerous occasions in the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly as an oral petitioner.

Intense interest in politics has produced 20 political parties and groups, although six of them recently united in the Somali

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic Party which won three seats in the 1956 elections. The dominant party, winner of 43 seats, is the Somali Youth League, a cultural organization which went into politics at the end of the war. The 1954 Visiting Mission felt that the concern expressed by political parties over specific problems, their intense desire to see development measures get under way, and their desire to collaborate with the administration to this end have made parties "a highly useful means of introducing and fostering measures for political, social and economic development." Of considerable interest as a possible foretaste of things to come in Africa's emerging states is a recent request to the Trusteeship Council by 25 Somalis for help in persuading the Italian administration to authorize the establishment of a "Moslem Somali Communist Party." A Somali irredentist movement is also in the cards since one of the main principles of the Somali Youth League is the unification of all the Somalis now living in Ethiopia, Kenya and the three Somalilands.

British-administered Tanganyika tops all the trust territories in both area and population. More than 8,000,000 people inhabit its 362,000 square miles (the size of Texas and Arizona combined), but it has vast arid spaces along with pockets of population and productive land. With a total European population of 22,500, it is the only trust territory whose problems are complicated by the presence of European settlers, about 3,000 of whom hope to maintain permanent homes in the pleasant highlands of the interior. Race relations in the territory, which also contains 90,000 Asians, have thus far been relatively good, partly because Tanganyika does not yet have political campaigns and elections like those of the West African territories. The Legislative Council is composed of 61 members, all of whom are either government officials or are appointed by the Governor. The Governor relies on 31 of them to support government policy, and the remaining 30 are appointed on a controversial "parity" formula—ten Africans, ten Asians and ten Europeans. The Government is attempting to develop the territory along inter-racial lines and has explained that while parity is not a permanent feature it was designed to last for a considerable period and is a necessary transitional provision based on the contribution each race can make to the development of Tanganyika. Most United Nations Members, however, believe that Tanganyika should be developed as a "primarily African state," and they continually urge the admin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istering authority to increase the number of African representatives in the Legislative Council.

Political advancement has been slow in Tanganyika for a variety of reasons, including the benevolent paternalism of an administration which believes that slow and steady progress is a sound principle. A new era, however, has already dawned in Tanganyika politics. In April 1956, the Governor announced that in 1958 direct elections on a common roll would be held for certain seats in the Legislative Council, presumably still under the parity formula. While this decision is only a small beginning, it has given new life to Tanganyika political organizations. The Tanganyika African National Union, which organized 29 registered branches between January 1955 and April 1956 (six others were refused registration), is rapidly growing. Its President, Julius Nyerere, is another of the increasing number of oral petitioners who have come to the United Nations. Its hopes were raised by the 1954 Visiting Mission which expressed the belief, with one of its four members dissenting, that self-government was "within the reach of the people of Tanganyika much earlier" than the 20 to 25 years the Mission had suggested for Ruanda-Urundi. Its chief rival for African allegiance is the United Tanganyika Party, a multi-racial group which the Government evidently hopes to build up as a counter-attraction.

The most densely populated territory in all of Africa is Ruanda-Urundi, whose more than 4,200,000 inhabitants live in an attractive highland area smaller than the State of West Virginia. Belgian policy has achieved notable successes in economic and social development but, in sharp contrast with British and French policy, has withheld political rights and experience from the inhabitants and has kept them away from higher education. In Ruanda-Urundi, this authoritarian system is facilitated by an indigenous society in which a small aristocratic class, the tall Watusi high-jumping warriors of movie fame, seeks to preserve its privileged position. Thus far the Belgian system has worked relatively well. The real test of its quality, however, may lie in the future. If pressure for political advance pushes the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi into self-government much earlier than the Belgians anticipate, the indigenous peoples will have had far less training and experience in modern politics and government than the Africans in British and French territories.

Partly as a result of pressure from the United Nations,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, the Belgians have begun to appoint Africans to responsible government posts and to reform local government. They have also opened two universities in the Congo, which is linked in an administrative union with Ruanda-Urundi. Moreover, a remarkable evolution in Belgian and Congolese thinking about the political future came to light in 1956. In February the Social Christian Party concluded that the time had come for Belgium to start the political education of the Congolese, and a member of the faculty of the University Institute for Overseas Territories at Antwerp published a booklet proposing a plan for the political emancipation of the Congo in 30 years. At the end of June a special congress of the Socialist Party endorsed eventual autonomy for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. And on July 1 a declaration of Catholic bishops expressed general approval of the right of the inhabitants of a country to take part in the conduct of their public affairs. At the same time, and quite startling for the Congo, a small group of educated Congolese published in an African periodical called *Conscience Africaine* a manifesto calling for a plan for political emancipation. Finally, in August, a cultural association of the Bacongo people named the Abako criticized the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto for its moderation and urged the development of African political parties.

V

Although the political excitement in the trust territories is a part of the general awakening of postwar Africa, the United Nations is responsible for intensifying this agitation. Six of the African trust territories have been toured three times by Visiting Missions of the Trusteeship Council, and Italian Somaliland on two occasions. These visits are great events in Africa and they convey to the people, as the League could never do, the idea that the outside world wants them to advance. The Missions are deluged with many thousands of oral requests and written communications, and thousands of other complaints are sent directly to the Trusteeship Council. The full enormity of this mass of petitions became apparent to the Trusteeship Council at its spring session in 1956 when an estimated 35,000 communications from the French Cameroons arrived in New York, and the Council was informed by the Secretariat that the normal processing of these documents would be such a vast undertaking that it would be almost impossible to recruit the staff required.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United Nations has also stirred up political activity by granting a growing number of African requests for oral hearings before the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly. By mid-1956, 22 African organizations had sent petitioners to the Trusteeship Council and 47 to the General Assembly. Although the petitioners rarely get what they ask for, their trips stimulate much excitement at home and often pay the petitioners handsome political rewards. Two of them have since become prime ministers and others have built up large political followings. They were also quick to learn that they have more protagonists in the Assembly than in the Council, and practically all of them now come to the Assembly where they can tell their stories to representatives of 79 nations instead of 14.

A decade of trusteeship has highlighted many problems of both Africa and the United Nations. Perhaps the best illustration of these problems is found in the history of the Ewe and Togoland unification movements, a baffling issue that has gone through three stages in the United Nations and has graphically demonstrated some of the limitations on the application of the principle of self-determination.

First of all, the movement which originated as an effort to unify the Ewe-speaking peoples of the southern sections of French Togoland, British Togoland and the Gold Coast has been so volatile that it has dramatized the meaning and extent of change itself in Africa today. Togoland is in such a state of flux that the people themselves, to say nothing of the United Nations, do not understand all its implications. When it became clear that a majority of Togolanders opposed Ewe unification, the Ewe leaders found it expedient to join forces with a new movement to unite the two Togolands. Then the attraction of Gold Coast independence began to pull British Togoland westward, thereby nullifying the Togoland unification movement. The confusing experience of the United Nations with the problem is one of the factors that has dampened its interest in the budding unification movement in the two Cameroons.

Secondly, the Togoland experience has illustrated the complexity of a variety of problems common to most of Africa. It has revealed the differences between the ambitious educated leaders of the coastal regions and urban centers and the more conservative tribesmen of the hinterland. It has made the United Nations begin to reflect on the problem of financing the develop-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of small countries with meager resources. And it has jolted the anti-colonial Members with the discovery that universal suffrage can produce unexpected results in non-literate societies. When the right to vote was limited to an educated electorate of only 8,000, an anti-French party dominated French Togoland politics. When the electorate was expanded to bring in the hinterland peoples, the pro-French party rose to power.

In the third place, Togoland developments are significant because of the precedents they have set for other territories. When neighboring Dahomey heard about the new status granted French Togoland, its Territorial Assembly adopted a resolution in September 1956 asking for the same concessions. In the Gold Coast, the Mamprusi paramount chief, objecting to the projected incorporation of the Northern Territories into an independent Gold Coast, reminded the Governor that the people of British Togoland had at least been given "an opportunity . . . to decide their own fate by means of a plebiscite." When plebiscites under United Nations supervision are held in other trust territories the impact of this precedent will no doubt spread.

A fourth lesson the trusteeship experience has emphasized is that Africa is loaded with potential unificationist and irredentist movements. All over the continent arbitrary political boundaries cut across ethnic and linguistic lines. As Togoland shows, unification movements sometimes set frustrating and unrealizable goals that produce rivalry and bitterness and even bloodshed among Africans. By providing a forum in which unificationist demands can be publicized and win the support of at least a few Members, the United Nations helps to incite such demands.

Finally, a decade of controversy over colonial questions has revealed the depth of the emotions which divide the colonial and anti-colonial Powers, and has weakened the United Nations by shaking the confidence and coöperation of its Members. The colonial Powers now regard the United Nations as a "necessary evil" and they fight any extension of its activities as a slippery slope to something worse. The controversy has also exposed the mixed motives of the anti-colonial Members: a sincere desire to help colonial peoples; a deeply emotional resentment of the "Daddy-knows-best" paternalism from which they recently suffered themselves; a carefully calculated plan, abetted by certain officials in the United Nations Secretariat, to extend the colonial machinery and functions of the United Nations as far as possible

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without arousing the administering authorities to boycott the machinery; and a vicarious enjoyment in using the symbol of colonialism as a stick with which the underdogs of the world can beat the top dogs over the head.

The emotional and sometimes intemperate partisanship of many United Nations Members has led some observers to call for a return to the idea of impartial experts embodied in the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. It is an impractical idea, however, because it disregards the profound changes in the composition and political climate of the society of nations since the days of the League. Impartial experts would be unable to insulate themselves from this new political climate without being ignored. Moreover, even if the recommendations of the Mandates Commission experts were less resented than those of the Trusteeship Council politicians, it does not necesarily follow that they were more effective. The occasional biting edge in trusteeship recommendations provokes emotional reactions, but it has an indirect psychological effect in provoking the colonial Powers to move faster, if only to show that criticisms in the United Nations are often unfair.

VI

The depth of these conflicting emotions on the colonial issue is partly responsible for the dilemma that confronts the United States in shaping a policy toward Africa. Our present policy is highly frustrating because it dissatisfies the American people, disappoints our friends in the Arab-Asian-African world, and irritates our European allies. It is condemned by some critics as no policy at all, and by others as a "crisis" policy that goes into operation only on the eve of disaster. Although seldom specific as to what they have in mind, these critics often plead for a "dynamic" policy. They seem to assume that because our present policy pleases no one, a better policy must be available.

The United States does have an African policy, or at least a policy on colonialism, tortuously elaborated since 1950 in statements by Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles, and three Assistant Secretaries of State in charge of African affairs. As one of the outstanding and constantly recurring issues of foreign policy, the colonial question is under continual examination at lower government levels and more and more frequently at the top. The policy which has come out of these deliberations is veiled in am-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

biguity and expressed in generalities that have lost their glitter, but its essence is that the United States supports the goal of self-government or independence for all peoples who have the desire and the capacity to maintain it. In government circles this is called a balanced or middle-of-the-road policy of constructive moderation. The public calls it fence-sitting. There is an element of truth in both descriptions.

Whatever it is called, it is certainly not "dynamic." But it is a definite policy, even if ambiguous, and extraordinarily difficult and painful to carry out. It seeks to maintain a balance between our interest in supporting the traditional principle of self-determination and our interest in defending the free world against the threat of Soviet imperialism. Both are moral goals even if they sometimes conflict. The facts cited in this article indicate that the pace of Africa's advance toward self-determination is already phenomenal, at least in certain territories. If Africa were static, the argument for faster progress would carry more weight. As the social anthropologists are continually pointing out, however, African society is in a state of transition in which the restraints and disciplines of the old social order are breaking down. What is now needed in much of Africa is not faster political advance but a still greater effort to build economic and educational foundations for the social cohesion necessary to make freedom meaningful.

A policy with this objective will not win the United States much popularity but it is at least worthy of respect. In any case we cannot win the support of the Arab-Asian-African world simply by abandoning the middle of the road on the colonial question. The issues that divide the West and the non-Western world are far deeper. The West would still be white and industrial and relatively rich, while the non-Western world would still be colored and agricultural and poor. This is a dilemma we must learn to live with. As long as the United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world, it can win few popularity contests, to say nothing of the enemies it makes on issues like Israel and Suez.

The above considerations would still be valid even if the United States did not need military bases, strategic materials and a strong Western defense in Europe. But we do need these things, and the European colonial Powers are still our most valuable allies against the Soviet threat despite our break with them over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Egyptian crisis. Moreover, their belief in the superiority of their own methods of liquidating colonialism is so emotional that their solidarity with us against Soviet imperialism would further weaken if we pushed them too far on the colonial issue. The United States cannot effectively exercise the leadership that history has placed on its shoulders if it ignores or runs roughshod over an important element of its following.

The outmoded colonial relationship is rapidly coming to an end in Africa, and the timing of the transition will be little affected in any case by American policy. Obviously, however, this is no time for complacency. Within the limitations outlined above, there is ample room for improvement of our African policy on three fronts—at home, in Africa and in the United Nations. At home, we must try to develop the right general attitude toward Africa. Both government and private organizations should improve their knowledge of Africa and expand their machinery for dealing with African affairs. Our approach to Africa would be more effective if the American people could be made to realize that Africans are not inferior, but only different. We must also learn that the future of Africa will be shaped by the Africans, either in coöperation or conflict with their European rulers, and that our power to influence the course of events is limited. We must expect surprises and learn to roll with the punches, and to understand that today's policy may be out of date tomorrow. And we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that Africa's emerging states are unlikely to be very democratic or even politically stable. Finally we can enhance our prestige in Africa and the Arab-Asian world by a more vigorous fight against racial discrimination at home and a more systematic effort to advance our own territories to self-government, including statehood for Alaska and Hawaii.

In Africa, the two best opportunities for the United States lie in the expansion of economic aid and technical assistance, and in the further development of educational exchange. In addition to helping African colonies to the fullest practicable extent, we should explore the possibility of a dramatic program of economic aid and educational exchange for Africa's growing number of independent states. We should not be deterred by the fact that financial aid is not always fully appreciated by its recipients. Educational exchange also has outstanding potentialities. The more Africans there are who know Americans as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personal friends, the more difficult it will be for Africa to conjure up an impersonal image of the United States as a financial octopus. The exchange-of-persons program should be expanded not only by the Government but through private efforts by philanthropic foundations and by organizations like the People-to-People movement launched in September 1956.

In the United Nations, the United States should have the imagination and generosity to channel a larger proportion of its economic aid through U.N. organs despite their limitations. On the heated colonial issue, the Government should do everything possible to establish and maintain a policy that is not only moderate and constructive but "independent," that is to say, a policy that sets us apart from both the colonial and anti-colonial blocs and, in particular, keeps us from being stereotyped as a supporter of colonialism. At the same time we should try to judge each issue more on its merits and less on the desire either to court popularity or to pose as the arbitrator and compromiser of all colonial disputes. An effective step in this direction was the recent United States proposal for the establishment of intermediate targets and dates for the political advancement of trust territories, a proposal which aroused angry protests from our European allies but helped to reëstablish our independent position without really damaging their legitimate interests. A more clearly delineated and better recognized independent policy would also give the United States more flexibility to adapt itself to future surprises. As Africa has already proved, American policy must be geared for quick change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE IN ITALY

By Ugo La Malfa

WHEN Fascism fell in Italy, the old Italian Socialist Party, survivor of many vicissitudes since its founding in 1892, reappeared upon the political scene bound by a "joint action" agreement with the Communists. The pact had been drawn up first in France in 1934, at a critical point in the struggle of the anti-Fascist underground and on the eve of the creation of the French Popular Front. The aim was to assure the future unity of the working class to which both Socialists and Communists appealed on the basis of Marxist principles. After the war, the agreement continued to function smoothly enough so long as all the anti-Fascist parties hung together in the Italian governments stemming from the Committee of National Liberation and so long as the Western Powers continued to be on good terms with Soviet Russia. In October 1946 it was officially reaffirmed.

But gradually the structure of Italian political life became more complex. Each of the parties assumed a function of its own, and at the same time the rift between Russia and the West widened. Now there was less harmony within the Socialist Party regarding coöperation with the Communists. One group held that an organic bond with them was essential in the interest of the working class; another, represented by two periodicals, *Critica sociale* and *Iniziativa socialista,* took a stand for independence of action and accused Pietro Nenni, the leader of the first group, of having subordinated the interests of the party to the strategic designs of the Soviet Union. At the party convention in January 1947 the second group, led by Giuseppe Saragat, cut itself away. Saragat resigned from the presidency of the Constitutional Assembly and organized the Right-Wing Socialists, now the Italian Social Democratic Party; Nenni left the vice-presidency of the Cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though retaining leadership of the group which continued under the Socialist name.

At first Premier Alcide De Gasperi did not alter the make-up of the government, in which all the anti-Fascist parties from Liberals to Communists were represented. But in May 1947 he set up a cabinet which excluded both the Nenni Socialists and the Communists. These together proceeded to form an opposition. By

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the following December, De Gasperi's cabinet was composed of Christian Democrats, Liberals, Republicans and Social Democrats—a governing coalition which has continued to this day. In the elections of April 1948, Nenni's Socialists presented a "Popular Front" list in partnership with the Communists; his group won 48 seats, the Social Democrats 33. The Christian Democrats secured an absolute majority and continued to enjoy it for the next five years.

The disagreements of the two Socialist parties meanwhile were accentuated by conditions abroad. The Social Democrats accused the Nenni Socialists of subservience to international Communism, while they, in turn, were attacked for their support of the all-powerful and clerically-oriented Christian Democrats and the interests of the capitalist West.

As early as 1953 I saw signs that Nenni was modifying his view of the whole political setup. The first such sign was his party's abandonment of the Popular Front platform of the 1948 elections and the adoption of the slogan, "Socialist alternative." The phrase implied an intention to participate in the give-and-take of the democratic process in a manner to some extent independent of the Communist Party. The agreement for "joint action" remained, but the action was no longer to be led by the two parties together or by the Communists alone; the Socialists had assumed a measure of initiative. This independent stand was so well received that in the 1953 elections the Nenni Socialists increased the number of their seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 48 to 75, while the governing coalition lost ground; the Social Democrats, most unfortunately, dropped from 33 seats to 19.

In these 1953 elections the Italian public clearly showed that it was looking for a party in opposition to the Christian Democrats —a party not allied to the Communists (as the Socialists were in 1948) but truly independent enough to provide, in Nenni's apt slogan, a "Socialist alternative." Meanwhile, as Nenni's party gingerly inched away from the Communists, thereby winning an immediate reward, the non-clerical, left-wing parties (the Republicans and Social Democrats) gave signs of moving toward the Socialists, or at least of drawing away from the Christian Democrats—and for somewhat the same reasons. Some Republican and Social Democratic leaders felt that to continue to collaborate with the Christian Democrats in a position of marked inferiority would gradually drive their membership into the arms of Nenni.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second sign of Nenni's independence came at the Socialist Party convention at Turin in April 1955, where he launched two more trial balloons. He spoke of an "opening to the Left" and of the possibility of "conversation with the Catholics." Quite aside from his gift for phraseology, there were grounds for belief that the Socialist Party was moving still further away from the Communists and nearer to the democrats. In view of the strong anti-Communist position of the Christian Democrats, Nenni could not expect them to come to terms with him, nor could he believe that his own party was any more ready than they to find a middle ground. Nevertheless, the Socialist Party was taking a fundamentally political step, even if the phrase "opening to the Left" was meant to be applied primarily to social questions. Although the "joint action" agreement was not abrogated, the position taken at the Socialist convention on several issues was strikingly new. The Atlantic Pact and the Western European Union were accepted as alliances which could not be broken. In the domestic economy, it was acknowledged that there was a basis for collaboration in the Vanoni plan, a ten-year economic program to which all the democratic parties are dedicated. There was assurance of respect for religion, modified only by a plea against "extremism and discrimination."

The initial response of the Christian Democrats and other democratic parties to the Socialist advances was very guarded. Later the Socialists' "open-door" policy was strengthened by the support which they gave on various occasions to the Segni government, successor to that of Scelba. This support and the coalition's tacit acceptance of it have established a fluid state of affairs which may, if good fortune attends, lead to a widening of the country's democratic foundations.

The "Socialist alternative" of 1953 and the "conversation with the Catholics" of 1955 were only forerunners of the turn taken by the Italian Socialist Party after the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in February 1956 and the publication of the famous Khrushchev report. What was the effect of these events on the differentiation of the Italian Socialist and Communist parties and the effort to bring all Italian Socialists together?

In the March issue of his party organ, *Mondo operaio,* Nenni said that the accusations against Stalin were concerned "not only with the man but also with the events in which he played so large a rôle." He wondered "in what new forms Soviet democracy will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

express itself in the future, not only within the Party but in the structure of the State." Regarding his own party, Nenni concluded that "the parliamentary government of which there has been so much talk implies recognition not only of a numerical law, based on majority and minority and the legitimate attempt to attain a majority, but also of democratic legality, as sanctioned by the Constitution, on the part of both the majority in power and the opposition."

In the June issue of the same publication, which came out after the Khrushchev report, the discussion was still more lively and the democratic attitude of the Italian Socialist Party became still more clear. We read that "Collective leadership is certainly preferable to that of one man, but though this is an improvement over one-man rule, whether tyrannical or enlightened, it is not a guarantee of democracy." The whole problem of Soviet society and of the peoples' democracies which have copied Soviet institutions is "the necessity of democratization, the circulation of ideas, in a word, political liberty. Every last vestige of wartime Communism must be eliminated from the laws and customs of the State. New means must be found to establish the citizen's right to enjoy political liberty without there hanging over his head the accusation of being an enemy of the people, a deviationist or a saboteur. In this way the Soviet crisis concerns not only the 'errors' of Stalin but the whole Soviet system, as it was shaped by factors which are now in the process of rapid transformation."

The Social Democratic Party did not remain indifferent to Nenni's words. As early as June 1955 the left wing of the party had shown itself well disposed toward a new alignment. Now the entire party, under the influence of its young secretary, Matteo Matteotti, began to ponder the question of socialist unification. Right in the middle of the furor aroused by the debunking of Stalin, the party leadership issued an appeal to all socialists to join forces, independently of Communism.

Just at the time of these events, local elections were held all over Italy and their results gave a further impetus to unification. The Socialist Party made gains, although not as large as Nenni had predicted, while the Social Democrats recovered several hundred thousand votes which they had lost in 1953. For the first time the Communists suffered a loss. One result was particularly symptomatic: the Social Democrats polled 400,000 more votes in the provincial elections, where the Socialists and Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munists presented a joint ticket, than they did in the municipal elections, where the Nenni Socialists presented a list of their own. It was plain that many people voted for the Socialists only on condition that they were fully independent.

Since these 1956 local elections were held on the basis of proportional representation (in contrast to the former majority system and the joint list presented by the four parties of the democratic coalition), only in rare cases could local governments be made up solely of parties represented in the national government. In the big cities, particularly, it was necessary to include either the Socialists or the right-wing groupings, Neo-Fascists and Monarchists. Since the Socialists offered to coöperate, the Republican and Social Democratic members of the coalition could hardly turn them down, in spite of the fact that the attitude of the Christian Democrats had stiffened. It was comparatively easy to accept the Socialists, however, on the condition that no Communists should be brought into the deal.

In view of the fact that the elections had given "unmistakable signs of Socialist unity," the leaders of the Social Democratic Party voted on June 1 in favor of including Nenni Socialists in executive bodies at the municipal and provincial level. A few days later Matteotti and Nenni held a public and official meeting, and the possibility of unification took on a concrete character despite all the obstacles in its way. In the American *New Leader* Saragat set forth his view of the problems of unification and of the clarifications which must be obtained from Nenni before further progress could be made. If the Socialist Party undertakes the rapprochement from a democratic standpoint, he wrote, then the cause of democracy will be well served. But if the terms are hazy and based on a watered-down Communist ideology, then this cause will suffer a setback from which it may never recover.

On August 25, there was another step forward when Nenni invited Saragat to a personal meeting at Pralognan in the Aosta valley. After the meeting Saragat stated that positive gains had been made. "In the course of our conversation we examined the fundamental points of both foreign and domestic policies based on socialist and democratic premises. On all the problems which we considered we found convergent points of view." Nenni issued statements of a similar tenor, although certain reservations were made in the days that followed.

Meanwhile international interest was aroused. After Mario

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Zagari of the Social Democratic left wing had been to Paris and London, and the French senator, Pierre Commin, had paid a visit to Italy, the president of the Socialist International asked Commin to undertake an "exploratory mission" to Rome. He was to study ways and means of unifying the two Italian socialist parties and to report his findings at a meeting of the executive board to be held in London on September 20. Commin's visit to Rome was the occasion for important personal meetings. In a subsequent interview published in the French *Populaire* he declared that "most of the active members of both parties are convinced of the necessity of unification and believe that it is the object of widespread public demand as the means of achieving a new national policy." It was his impression that "Nenni was resolutely and sincerely in favor of such unification." Commin transmitted these same positive conclusions to the London executive board meeting. A three-man committee was appointed to pursue the matter.

The Pralognan meeting and Senator Commin's visit were followed by deliberations in both party organizations. The Social Democrats showed that they were definitely open to the idea of unification. The resolutions passed by the Socialists reflected internal differences between Nenni's point of view and that of certain leaders either more closely attached to their former point of view or more cautious about adopting a new one.

This generally promising state of affairs was marred by one disturbing factor: the incomprehensible error made by Nenni's party in renewing its "joint action" agreement with the Communists. The story of this renewal is somewhat obscure. Some say that it was forced upon Nenni by surprise at the last minute; others say that it was his own idea, but that by modifying the agreement he intended to reassure the Social Democrats rather than to alarm them. The agreement is indeed a tenuous one and explicitly states that "the new situation implies for both parties forms of collaboration different from those established by the 1946 agreement." However, the reaction to the text when it was published on October 5 was most unfavorable. For a few days it seemed that the process of unification had come to a halt, but it was revived by a series of clarifications and rectifications and by Nenni's tenacious activity within his own party. The doubts and difficulties to be overcome nevertheless seem more formidable now than they did during the hopeful period immediately after the Pralognan meeting and Senator Commin's visit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

If we now look at the problem of socialist unification in the setting of the general political picture in Italy we are able to draw some important conclusions.

It is plain that Italian democracy suffers from having too narrow a choice. There is a strong government party, the Christian Democrats, and a powerful opposition made up of Nenni's Socialists and the Italian Communist Party. The Republicans, Social Democrats and Liberals, which belong to the governmental majority, have little strength in parliament and are generally considered to be Christian Democratic satellites. Moreover, we must not forget that in the Italian Risorgimento there was a struggle between democratic and nationalist groups on the one side and the Papacy and ecclesiastical organizations on the other. On this issue strong popular feelings still persist. As a result, collaboration between the secular parties and the Christian Democratic government is not looked on with favor. A substantial segment of public opinion wishes that there were some secular force strong enough to counterweigh the Christian Democrats and give the national political life a better balance. Nenni's electoral successes in recent years are due to the hopes he held out in this direction. And socialist unification, followed by an accord among all the left-wing secular parties (Republicans, Radicals and Socialists), is looked forward to just because it would bring about a real balance of power in the place of the present single-party predominance.

Another factor in the political equation is the Communist crisis resulting from the extraordinary turn of events in Soviet Russia and in Eastern Europe. Although there are no signs of any real weakening of the Italian Communist Party, it is certain that the debunking of Stalin has hit the Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, very hard and cramped his Party's political initiative. The intellectuals who contributed so much to the Party's prestige during the anti-Fascist struggle and immediately after liberation are in a state of confusion and mistrust. They are no longer certain that the Communist form of government is superior to democracy, and like their more alert Party colleagues in the working class, they are speculating about the future of liberty. Events in Jugoslavia, Poland and Hungary have given them food for profound thought.

To imagine that such misgivings will throw them into the arms of the Christian Democrats would be an obvious error; their edu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cation and development have been along completely secular lines. On the other hand, the secular democratic parties, weakened by years of collaboration with the Christian Democrats, do not hold a strong attraction for them. The creation of a unified Socialist Party might very well drive the Communists out of business and rally young people in general and intellectuals in particular to the democratic way. This would be especially true if the party represented all the left-wing secular forces, offering the prospect of a modern democratic movement such as the New Deal in the United States or the Labor Party Government in England.

We must not forget that, in spite of their hedging and backsliding, Nenni and his followers have shown considerable independence of the Communists and have outlined, however sketchily, a new political line. If Nenni's efforts in this direction fail and unification does not take place, then he must lose face and his party will fall back on a close alliance with the Communists. In this case the Socialists and not the Communists would be weakened, for by their abortive insubordination the Socialists will have thrust themselves into a definitely inferior position. It may be thought that a defeat of Nenni would be advantageous to Saragat. But anyone familiar with the Italian political situation knows that the advantage would be very small. Most of the votes now cast for Nenni's party would go either to the Communists or to some new socialist party totally subservient to them. The stakes of the game thus are very high.

Such are the factors in favor of socialist unification. Let us now examine those which are either opposed or imponderable. The international situation is one of the steepest hurdles in the way. All the parties in the government coalition favor Atlantic ties, European union and a decidedly Western orientation. The Socialist Party, while recently accepting the Atlantic Pact and admitting Italy's place in the European community, had consistently supported first a policy of neutralism and then of relaxed tension between the Eastern and Western blocs. In the matter of European union, the Socialists have shifted from complete opposition to a willingness to consider the possibility. They are ready to take part in the Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community and they have been disposed to ratify the Euratom treaty on condition that there be supranational control of atomic energy turned to peaceful use. But how far and through what arduous parleying can such different and often opposite points of view be reconciled?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the domestic field the differences are of a simpler kind. After the crisis precipitated by the downgrading and disgrace of Stalin, the Socialist Party made an explicit profession of democratic ideas and a denial of Communistic ones. If the Socialists come to power they are unlikely to repudiate the position they have now taken. It could hardly be expected, however, that they would show the same attitude toward their former colleagues as that of the democratic parties. Is it possible to find a meeting-ground on this point?

During Senator Commin's visit and in the course of more recent discussions, the trade-union problem has proved particularly thorny. There are at present three large labor organizations: the C.G.I.L., composed of Communists and Socialists; the C.I.S.L., of predominantly Catholic character; and the U.I.L., composed of Social Democrats and Republicans. The Socialists have demanded that in case of political unification these three unions should be merged into one. But because in a single union the Communist apparatus would be in a position to exert majority control, the C.I.S.L. and U.I.L. have refused to coöperate. Surely Nenni's party might yield a point here and allow Socialist workers to join the union of their choice.

Economic and social problems are the least difficult of all. The Socialist Party has abandoned its maximum demands and is ready to support the Vanoni plan, which is the basis of the government's program for social and economic development.

Unification is no simple matter and the problems that hinge upon it have no easy solution. But even taking into account all the ponderable and imponderable risks involved, it is my opinion (and one which I have expressed in the Chamber of Deputies, the press and before the Republican Party, of which I am a member) that Socialist unification and the union of all the left-wing secular parties are deserving of help and support. Ever since 1953, as I have shown above, Nenni has followed a new road. It is not likely that he will abandon it. Nor do I believe that he has acted out of purely tactical considerations, in the service or for the benefit of the Communist Party. If Tito holds his own and if Gomulka retains power in Poland, it is unthinkable that Nenni, a Socialist, should show himself less enterprising than they. On the other hand, Nenni's defeat would mean the engulfment of the largest group of Italian socialists and a great Communist victory. This we must do all we can to prevent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"THE UNANIMOUS REVOLUTION"

Russia, February 1917

By Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart

NOVEMBER 7 of this year marks the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and for a long time past the Soviet Government has been making vast preparations to celebrate the event. No expense has been spared, and poets, dramatists and authors have been exhorted to create new and inspiring masterpieces for the occasion. Known universally as the October Revolution, because the old Russian calendar, 13 days behind our own, was then in force, the Bolshevik triumph has eclipsed the memory of the February Revolution of the same year which brought to an end the rule of the Tsars and was almost bloodless. Spontaneous in its outburst and achieved in the authentic spirit of freedom, it was called the "unanimous revolution" by Walter Mallory, an American who was in Russia at the time. It is an admirable title which should pass into history. Nevertheless, the men who made the February Revolution are buried in the dust of forgotten books. Even Kerensky is little more than a name which crops up occasionally in a general knowledge quiz. In Great Britain, at least, the younger generation is scarcely aware that in 1917 there were two Russian revolutions, that the hopes of the world were with the first and that very few foreigners and even fewer Russians believed that the second could last more than a month or two.

How could the virtual unanimity which attended the overthrow of Tsardom degenerate so quickly into endless verbiage and a creeping paralysis of inaction?

It is the purpose of this article to answer this question. I had exceptional opportunities of observing the February Revolution. As a young vice-consul I had experienced and enjoyed two and a half years of the prewar Tsarist Russia. I had acquired a knowledge of the Russian language and had made the acquaintance of many Russian Liberals and Socialists. By May 1915, I was left in charge of the British Consulate General in Moscow until September 1917. In a dispatch to the Foreign Office, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, wrote: "There is scarcely any consular post of the same impor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tance as Moscow at the present moment. It is the industrial and, in a certain broad sense, the political capital of Russia."

To this correct estimate should be added the fact that Moscow and St. Petersburg had always been rivals and that during the war Moscow regarded itself as the democratic and patriotic capital and St. Petersburg as the reactionary capital and the seat of a government, all of whose members could not be regarded as patriotic.

The answer to the question raised above must inevitably be influenced by the temperament of the Russian people in wartime. Without dwelling on the history of the revolution it is nevertheless necessary to note the psychological effect of victory and defeat on a people like the Great Russians, volatile in character, then largely illiterate, and highly susceptible to the wildest rumors.

In Moscow great enthusiasm marked the opening of the war. The ukase of the Tsar prohibiting the sale of vodka and, indeed, of all alcoholic beverages, made impossible any repetition of the drunken orgies which had been a feature of previous Russian mobilizations, and the fine marching and rousing singing of the soldiers going off to the front remain the pleasantest of nostalgic memories. Few, if any, of the men who were to lead the October Revolution were in Russia at the time. Lenin and Trotsky were in voluntary exile abroad. Stalin was serving a long sentence in Siberia. Moreover, military fortune favored the Russians at the start, and, while the French and British armies were in retreat, the journalists of the West lavished the highest praise on what they called the invincible Russian steamroller.

It was heady wine for the Russians, whose strategic skill was not equal to their bravery and whose equipment and transport were greatly inferior to those of the Germans. When reverses came, it was soon clear that the exuberance of the Russian temperament in victory was heavily counterbalanced by its gloom in defeat. It had no golden mean. It was either up in the heights or down in the depths of despair, although it must be admitted that almost to the end morale at the front was far higher than in the great cities like St. Petersburg and Moscow. By and large, however, the Russian character in war seemed to conform with Kluchevsky's famous dictum: "There is no people in Europe more capable of a tremendous effort for a short space of time than the Great Russian; there is also no people less accustomed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to regular, sustained, unceasing labor than this same Great Russian."

Neither in St. Petersburg nor in Moscow was there any standard of public opinion. Brave men of good family went to the front. Others shirked military service without blame or personal sense of shame. Night life was never gayer than during the war years, and money was squandered recklessly as if the spender felt that tomorrow it would be valueless. Many men and women worked heroically and tirelessly for the war effort, and, when the supply of shells and arms broke down hopelessly, the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities began to produce munitions with far greater efficiency than the Imperial War Ministry had ever shown. These two democratic institutions combined and were known as "Zemgor." The leader of the Zemstvo Union was Prince Lvov, and M. Michael Chelnokov, Mayor of Moscow, was head of the Cities Union. Both men were intimate friends of mine and supplied me throughout the war with invaluable information. Both men were sturdy patriots who were determined to continue the war to a victorious end. Nevertheless, by the middle of 1915 I had lost what little faith I had in the Russian steamroller and had become increasingly preoccupied by the possibility, and even probability, of revolution, not after the war as most people expected, but during it.

As in most wars, fortune swayed. Even with inferior weapons the Russians could always beat the Austrians, whose armies contained many Slav elements. But the victories grew smaller and the defeats heavier. There were, too, black days for the rear, and the blackest day of all perhaps was September 7, 1915, when the people of Russia were informed that the Grand Duke Nicholas had been relieved of the Supreme Command and that the Emperor himself was determined to assume the leadership of the armies. This decision followed hard on a mass of resolutions, passed by the leading town councils of Russia, declaring that in order to win the war a ministry enjoying the confidence of the people and the country must be formed immediately. On his assumption of the Supreme Command the Emperor dissolved the Duma. On this occasion my diary contains this entry: "It is difficult to see how any good is to result from this move. The Emperor will lose greatly in popularity from it. . . . At the final sitting of the Duma there were scenes. The Progressives and the Social Democrats left the Chamber. During the reading of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Emperor's ukase Kerensky, the Trudovik deputy, is said to have cried 'Down with the Government' and even to have raised his voice against the Emperor."

September 1915 was, in my opinion, the turning-point in the war for Russia. From then onwards there was to be a progressive pessimism which took the form of an ever-widening belief that under the Emperor Nicholas II and the existing form of government the war could not be won. With the conviction of defeat the war became more and more unpopular. The workers expressed their discontent by spasmodic strikes. The intelligentsia and the middle classes passed more and more resolutions demanding a government which enjoyed the confidence of the people. Another trouble center was created by the older classes of reservists who not only disliked being called up, but had nothing to do on account of the breakdown of the railways. The complete failure of transport not only crippled the armies in the field but created a famine of meat and fuel in the great cities. Rumor ran rife throughout the country. Inevitably it was concentrated on Rasputin and the Empress, who became known even in the remotest villages as "the German." As the Emperor seemed always to dismiss the good ministers and to retain the worst, he helped to create the legend that the throne and the reactionaries had sold the country to the Germans.

In the not very serious strikes and demonstrations which took place from time to time the people shouted for the recall of the Duma, but the feeling against the Emperor himself among the ordinary people was far more dangerous to the régime than the speeches of a hundred Dumas and a thousand progressive members of Parliament. Indeed, one of the most ardent advocates of the recall of the Duma was General Klimovitch, the reactionary Prefect of Moscow, who informed me that "the members of the progressive bloc were not serious at all and that, if the Duma were recalled, it would allow them to talk and, as soon as they began to talk, they would quarrel among themselves." I felt that there was all too much truth in his remarks.

Just how far the Emperor was aware of the growing discontent has never been satisfactorily shown. He was greatly under the influence of the Empress who herself was dominated by Rasputin. But alone in his military headquarters at Moghilev he made a good impression on Chelnokov, the Moscow Mayor, who was no courtier of kings. In reply to Chelnokov, who had brought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with him to Moghilev a patriotic resolution from the City of Moscow, the Emperor said: "I agree with everything in this resolution. Peace will not be made until complete victory is achieved, and achieved it will be. You are right, too, in expressing your gratitude to the army. We all should go down on our knees before it." He then asked the Mayor about the situation in Moscow, and Chelnokov told him that there was neither fuel nor sufficient food because the railways were run so badly. The Emperor replied: "If people are cold and have no food one must not be too severe with them. Everything that I can possibly do will be done."

Alas, the good intentions were never put into action, and discontent grew apace. As early as March 1916, a man called Rievski was arrested on the charge of plotting against the life of Rasputin. In cross-examination he declared that he was acting on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior, and more ministers were dismissed. The only reaction of the Russian people was regret that Rievski had not succeeded.

By the end of 1916 resolutions demanding the removal of Rasputin and the nomination of a government enjoying the confidence of the nation were being passed by the *maréchaux de noblesse* in all the provinces of Russia. Discontent had gone full circle. On December 29, 1916, Rasputin was assassinated by Prince Yusopov, supported and aided by the young Grand Duke Dimitri Pavlovitch and M. Purishkevitch, a deputy of the Right. The Empress, for she was now the real ruler of Russia, reacted to this coup against the throne by persuading the Tsar to install an ultra-reactionary government and to prorogue the Duma which had been recalled on November 14. It was now clear that all was propitious for the "unanimous revolution."

Before it came, an immense inter-Allied delegation, composed of high-ranking ministers and senior generals, arrived in Russia. It brought to the Russian people the hope that by some last-minute action the fallen fortunes of Russia might be repaired. The delegation visited both St. Petersburg and Moscow. It suffered endless entertainment. Patiently it took reams of evidence. It listened to all, but mainly to the "high-ups" in St. Petersburg. In the end it decided that there would be no revolution. Before the ink was dry on the delegates' reports, the "unanimous revolution" had begun.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

In its early days the revolution, which arose haphazard from bread-riots in St. Petersburg, seemed truly unanimous. There was a little bloodshed in the capital, none at all in Moscow, and in both cities the crowds in the streets were friendly and good-tempered. In spite of the bitterly cold weather it was a revolution made in a holiday spirit. The big day in St. Petersburg was Monday, March 12, although the new Provisional Government was not announced until the night of March 14. It was headed by Prince Lvov, the head of the Zemstvo Union whom I knew well.

Moscow was a little slower in accepting the revolution. On Monday the news of the dissolution of the Duma aroused storms of disgust, and a meeting of the municipal authorities appointed a committee to deal with the situation. There was, however, no general celebration. This took place on the Tuesday, most of which I spent in the streets. The weather was bitterly cold, but the sun was shining from the bluest of skies. On my way to the Town Duma, the home of the Moscow Municipality, I passed through the square which houses the famous Bolshoi Theatre. It was crowded with troops and citizens radiant with enthusiasm and hobnobbing together. As I made my way through the vast crowd, someone recognized me. A great cheer was raised for Britain, sending up with it a cloud of hot breath like smoke into the icy air.

It was an orderly and good-humored crowd, and it generously helped me to the entrance of the red-bricked Duma where I hoped to find my friend Michael Chelnokov, the Moscow Mayor. At first I was bewildered by the chaos inside the building. In the once splendid reception rooms men who had doubtless not been to bed for two nights were sleeping on sofas and on coats on the floor. Soon I realized what had happened. The Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries had won the upper hand. Chelnokov told me that he was fighting for his life as Mayor. The next day the Provisional Government appointed him Commissioner for Moscow, but I felt even then that his reign was nearly over. Ironically enough, he introduced me to his eventual successor, a pleasant Social-Revolutionary called Rudniev.

All the Socialists whom I met were pleasant and friendly. They wanted big reforms, including all the freedoms, but there was none of the defeatist spirit which had been noticeable for months in St. Petersburg. On the evening of Thursday, March 15, I wrote

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in my diary: "In Moscow things are gradually straightening out, but Chelnokov's position, although improved, is still very difficult. He is a strong man, but not tactful enough with the workmen. The first stage of the revolution has been a wonderful success. I fear, however, the subsequent settling down."

On Saturday together with the other Allied Consular representatives I was present at an impressive review on the Red Square where General Gruzinov, President of the Moscow Zemstvo, took the march past of over 30,000 troops. The police had wisely made themselves scarce. The people themselves kept order. Strangers embraced in the streets and shouted "Long Live Liberty!"

Many educated Russians who saw these scenes hoped and believed that something spiritual and almost saintly, something inspiringly great, had happened in those days of March 1917. From the defeat of despotism a better and stronger Russia would arise. Apart from the unhappy reactionaries who had been imprisoned, there were in this early period few Russians who realized that the peaceful revolution marked the collapse of all discipline and that defeat—and something worse than defeat—now stared a sorely tried people in the face.

In the first 24 hours two things had happened which were soon to destroy the initial unanimity of the revolutionaries. First, the revolution had been made in the streets, for the people had forestalled the cautious Duma composed of landowners, intellectuals and professional men. The revolution had therefore two heads: the Duma and the Soviets. The people had been led mainly by the Socialists. Yet in the new Provisional Government there was only one Socialist, Alexander Kerensky, who was then only Minister of Justice. Secondly, in a country of which 80 percent of the people were totally illiterate and which had been ruled autocratically for centuries, all the freedoms were released at once. Among those freed from the jails were not only political prisoners but also the worst criminals.

At the same time the political exiles began to hurry back like homing pigeons. Stalin, the first to arrive, was in Petrograd before the end of March. In April came Lenin, who arrived with the connivance of the German authorities, and in May appeared an irate Trotsky who had come from Canada and had received a British visa after his fingerprints had been taken! Within ten days of the revolution three Socialist newspapers had appeared

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Moscow: *Vperiod,* the organ of the Mensheviks; *Trud,* the socio-revolutionary organ; and *Sotsial-Demokrat,* the organ of the Bolsheviks. The last-named was anti-war, and its earliest number contained a bitter attack on England. The Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries would also have liked to stop the war, but realized that it could not be brought to an end without a complete rupture with the Allies. They therefore satisfied their conscience by admitting the necessity of a defensive war.

On Sunday, March 25, I watched an immense Socialist demonstration. Again the order was exemplary. My diary entry for that evening ran as follows: "Finished a long analysis of the revolutionary movement for the Embassy. Tried to give a fair view, but the situation is so unclear that any attempt to prophesy is difficult. It seems impossible that the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the Socialist elements can end without bloodshed. When this will come, no one can say. The outlook for the war is not good."

In point of fact, the outlook for the war had been gravely darkened by Prikaz No. 1, an order issued by the Petrograd Soviet which encouraged the soldiers not to salute their officers and to report on their reliability.

There is no need to describe again in detail the tragedy of the various Provisional Governments which held office during the eight months from March to November 1917. As Lenin was to say later, the period between the two revolutions was characterized by something quite original, and that was the duality of power. "In what," he said, "did this duality consist? In the fact that side by side with a provisional government of the bourgeois there existed another government, as yet weak and embryonic, but existing undeniably in a reality and possessing the ability to grow. This other government was the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." The analysis is accurate but oversimplified. The reality of the embryonic government to which Lenin referred was his own ability to profit by the delays and indecisions of his well-intentioned but inexperienced opponents and his skill in exploiting the war-weariness of the Russian people.

Between the first Provisional Government of Prince Lvov and the first Petrograd Soviet there was, at first, no great division over policy. It is true that the Provisional Government was composed almost entirely of Liberals, whereas the Soviet consisted entirely of Socialists. On the other hand, the Mensheviks and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social-Revolutionaries were predominant in the Soviet. For the first two months and more the Bolsheviks seemed and were on paper an insignificant minority. Alexander Kerensky, in addition to his work as Minister of Justice, was the chief link between the Government and the Soviet.

Having been forestalled by the street in the actual making of the revolution, the first Provisional Government was perhaps too conservative and, above all, too academic to face a country in which—temporarily at least—everyone seemed to have become his own master. It gave freedoms, but it also made promises to its Allies in the war. The international obligations contracted by the Tsarist Government would be strictly observed. The peasants would get the land, but they must wait until all the necessary plans had been formed. There was no time for plans. The ministries in Petrograd were crowded from morning till late evening by supplicants, little political busybodies from the provinces, and prattlers of all kinds who wished to make themselves important. After all, the ministries were no longer the Tsar's: they were the people's. So were the Ministers.

I remember vividly my first meeting with Alexander Kerensky. I had to come now more frequently to Petrograd because several of the new Ministers and most of the deputies of the Soviet could speak no language but Russian. I had been invited to lunch with Kerensky at the Ministry of Justice. On the stairs and in the hall before the Minister's room there was a milling crowd of sailors, soldiers, students, workers and peasants of both sexes. The doorkeeper stated that the chances of seeing Kerensky were nonexistent. Nevertheless, the luncheon date was kept, for just as I was about to depart in despair, Kerensky came striding up the stairs. He looked desperately tired. His slightly Mongolian face was sallow and there were great lines under his eyes. But his mouth was firm and his handshake strong. His hair, worn *en brosse,* and his quick, jerky manner of speaking gave an impression of energy. He was then only 36. We lunched in the private apartments of the Minister, and places were laid for about 20 or 30 people of his entourage who came and went as they pleased. I sat next to him and opposite to Madame Breshko-Breshkovzkaia, the Mother of the Revolution. There was wine for me, but only milk for Kerensky who had had serious kidney-trouble. Throughout luncheon he exuded good nature and asked questions which he answered himself. His pride in the revolution was unbounded.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"You want of course to know what we are doing? Well, we are doing what you did years ago, but we are trying to do it better—without the Cromwell or the Napoleon." Already he appeared to resent a little the pressure being put on Russia by the Allies. "How would Lloyd George like it if a Russian were to come to tell him how to manage the English people?"

Since that luncheon I have maintained a long friendship with Alexander Kerensky and have admired his constancy and courage in the long years of exile. I helped him to escape from Russia in 1918, and I have interpreted for him on various occasions when he has been engaged in talk with English statesmen like Lloyd George.

I also interpreted for him at his first meeting with Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador. Inevitably, the British Government was interested in Russia's remaining in the war. Inevitably, too, Sir George had to carry out the instructions of his Government. But never did I hear him as much as mention the word pressure in relation to Alexander Kerensky. He was far too polite and experienced a diplomatist to leave any Foreign Minister with the impression that he had been subjected to pressure. High policy during the Kerensky period was concerned mainly with the war, and the best proof of Sir George's tact is the tribute which Kerensky pays to him in his memoirs. He exonerates the British Ambassador from all blame, nor did Kerensky himself protest against Russia's continuation of the war until the Allies forced him to undertake a costly offensive.

In my opinion Sir George understood the February Revolution much better than most of his staff, especially the military staff. Not so brilliant as Paléologue, the French Ambassador, he had infinitely more understanding. After his death in 1924, he was accused by various Russian aristocrats of having encouraged the revolution. This criticism was malicious and ill-informed.

Much the same chaos and crowded anterooms that I had found in Kerensky's Ministry of Justice existed in all the other ministries, and, while the Ministers of the Provisional Government were trying to prepare vast reforms in a studious and orderly fashion, the Bolsheviks were promising bread, inciting the peasants to seize the land and urging the soldiers to desert or, as Lenin said, "to make peace with their legs."

Early in May 1917, there were anti-war manifestations in Petrograd, and the two strongest pro-war Ministers, Guchkov and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Miliukov, had to go. Two well-intentioned Mensheviks entered the Government, and Kerensky, who could move crowds by his oratory, became Minister of War. For a short period he seemed to stem the disorder at the front, but all the cards were against him, and he himself became the victim of the false hopes which his short-lived success had aroused.

Towards the end of July the Bolsheviks made a disorderly and uncontrolled attack on the Government in Petrograd, and Prince Lvov gave way as Prime Minister to Kerensky. Lenin was then in hiding, but many of the Bolshevik leaders including Trotsky could have been arrested and tried for treason. This, however, was not the way of political life in 1917. After centuries of enforced silence every man was allowed to say what he liked.

As the summer passed into autumn, the voice of Bolshevism became more strident, and the power of the Provisional Government weakened. Kerensky was harassed on all sides. The Allies, interested only in the continuation of the war, urged him to start offensives which merely hastened his ruin. Anglo-French Socialists, who knew nothing of Russia, were sent out from Paris and London to encourage him, while the Anglo-French representatives at the front tacitly or actively encouraged Russian generals to restore order. Their efforts merely created more followers of Lenin whose cry of Bread, Peace and Land was making thousands of new disciples daily.

The crowning disaster of the "unanimous revolution" was the attempted coup d'état of General Kornilov. It was a catastrophic example of the Russian genius for destruction. Kornilov had been a most successful commander in the field, and his so-called "Savage Division" had won many successes. The General had sound but not easily applicable measures for restoring discipline and had recently superseded Brusilov as Commander-in-Chief. Kerensky had a high opinion of his military qualities and was prepared to give him military control of the Petrograd military district, but not of the city itself. By September the frightened bourgeoisie had begun to look on him as the savior of Russia, and Kornilov's ambition swelled. Described by Brusilov as a man with the heart of a lion and the head of an ass, he understood nothing of politics and seemed to suffer from the same hesitations which characterized the period. Instead of marching on Petrograd himself, he sent his cavalry under General Krymov to seize the city and arrest the Government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The attempt failed dismally. There was not even a fight, for Kornilov's troops at once began to fraternize with the emissaries and soldiers sent out by the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. General Krymov committed suicide.

This fiasco, perhaps the stupidest folly in all history, opened the gates to Bolshevism. The masses wanted a Bolshevik Government because it promised immediate peace. The Right wanted it because it was cocksure that the Bolsheviks could not survive more than a few weeks. The unfortunate Liberal Center, which had been the hope of a democratic Russia, had lost all its friends.

The Tsar committed suicide by too much reaction. The Russian Liberals and Right-Wing Socialists committed suicide by too much freedom. Although Lenin turned society upside down, he restored to Russia the iron discipline, the secret police, the terror and the silent tongue to which she had been accustomed ever since there was a Russia.

On November 10, 1917, three days after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Government published a decree suppressing the anti-Bolshevik press. The decree also stated that these measures were only temporary and would be lifted "as soon as the new régime took root." Apparently the régime has never taken root, for today, 40 years after, the ban has not been lifted.

III

How was it that a revolution, which in its initial stages commanded the support and enthusiasm of the vast majority of the Russian people, collapsed almost without resistance before the onslaught of a few hundred determined fanatics? The "ifs" of history are more attractive in retrospect than at the moment when history is being made, and the one explanation of the Russian failure that no one can deny is that wartime is a difficult period in which to set up and maintain a democratic régime.

Several of the factors which made for the democratic collapse have already been mentioned in this article: the fact that the street forestalled the Duma in making the revolution; the fatal dual power which existed from the start; the leniency of too much liberty after the severity of too much reaction; the failure to deal with what was high treason on the part of the Bolsheviks; and the weakness of the Russian character marked by an amazing predilection, noticeable even under Communism, for an endless spate of words in preference to the simplest deed. (Stalin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was not a Russian!) To these factors of failure must be added the limited knowledge of the embassies of the Great Powers, whose ambassadors and staff were restricted in their acquaintanceship to the very narrow circle of society prescribed by the Imperial Court.

At various times since 1917 historians and eyewitnesses of the two revolutions of that year have speculated on what might have happened if the Dardenelles had been forced and Russia had been amply furnished with the sorely needed armaments, transport and food which were supplied to her in such bounteous measure during the Second World War or, again, if the United States had entered the war a year sooner.

It is possible that both or either of these hypotheses might have checked the war-weariness of the Russians and, by ending the war a year earlier, might have postponed the "unanimous revolution" to a postwar period in which it might have survived. These speculations, however, are fanciful, because the attempt to force the Dardanelles ended in failure and there was never any great probability of the United States entering the war at any earlier date.

There remains the argument: What might have happened if the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov or of Alexander Kerensky had been able to get out of the war on terms acceptable to its Allies? This is by far the most attractive and interesting "if" of the Russian revolutions, if only because several people realized at the time that probably the only way of saving the democratic régime would be to let it slide out of the war on the best terms possible.

The terms might not have been unendurable by Russia or by her Allies. At the time, Germany was nearer defeat than the outside world suspected and Kühlmann was already feeling his way towards a peace of compromise. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey were nearing their last gasp. Peace would certainly have helped the democratic régime in Russia, for loyalty to the Allies and failure to end the war quickly did more than anything else to bring down the Provisional Government of 1917.

Today hindsight may tempt the historian to advance this theory. But the spirit of the times did not permit such foresight or, indeed, such leniency. In wartime the strong men are renowned more for stubborn unreason and dogged resistance than for sagacity, and the urgent crisis of the day leaves little time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for thought of the morrow. After the February Revolution of 1917 the diplomatic endeavors of both France and Great Britain were directed to keeping Russia in the war at almost any cost. Although both France and Britain owed much to the Russian military effort in the early days of the war, the French were bitter almost from the start of the February Revolution. British diplomacy, exercised by the gentle and sympathetic Sir George Buchanan, was more suave in manner, but its purpose was the same: to cajole or bully Russia into continuing the war.

Not only Miliukov but also Kerensky respected the Tsarist treaties pledging no separate peace until after victory. Miliukov was forced to resign by the Soviets for insisting too much on the prosecution of the war, and the failure of the Brusilov offensive, ordered by Kerensky at the instigation of the Allies, was the beginning of the end.

Just how far French and British officialdom was implicated in the fatal Kornilov *coup de force* is difficult to say; the sympathy was indirect, and actual support was withheld. But there is little doubt that French and British officers at the Russian front did nothing to discourage an exploit which they felt might restore discipline in the Russian armies, and Winston Churchill had high hopes that the venture would succeed.

I am not able to state with certainty whether Kerensky ever raised the question of peace in 1917. He must have thought of it, as he thinks and writes of it to this day. In June 1931 I introduced Kerensky to Lord Beaverbrook.

"Would you have mastered the Bolsheviks if you had made a separate peace?" asked Lord Beaverbrook.

"Of course," said Kerensky. "We should be in Moscow now."

"Then why," said Lord Beaverbrook, "didn't you do it?"

"We were too naïve," was the reply. But the real answer should have been: "We were too decent." And as A. J. P. Taylor, the Oxford historian, wrote of the late Jan Masaryk: "Decency is not enough against Communism."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB

By Louis Morton

IT is now more than ten years since the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima and revealed to the world in one blinding flash of light the start of the atomic age. As the meaning of this explosion and the nature of the force unleashed became apparent, a chorus of voices rose in protest against the decision that had opened the Pandora's box of atomic warfare.

The justification for using the atomic bomb was that it had ended the war, or at least ended it sooner and thereby saved countless American—and Japanese—lives. But had it? Had not Japan already been defeated and was she not already on the verge of surrender? What circumstances, it was asked, justified the fateful decision that "blasted the web of history and, like the discovery of fire, severed past from present"?[1]

The first authoritative explanation of how and why it was decided to use the bomb came in February 1947 from Henry L. Stimson, wartime Secretary of War and the man who more than any other was responsible for advising the President.[2] This explanation did not answer all the questions or still the critics. During the years that have followed others have revealed their part in the decision and in the events shaping it. These explanations have not ended the controversy, but they have brought to light additional facts bearing on the decision to use the bomb. With this information and with the perspective of ten years, it may be profitable to look again at the decision that opened the age of atomic warfare.

II. THE INTERIM COMMITTEE

The epic story of the development of the atomic bomb is by now well known.[3] It began in 1939 when a small group of eminent scientists in this country called to the attention of the United States Government the vast potentialities of atomic energy for military purposes and warned that the Germans were already carrying on experiments in this field. The program initiated in October of that year with a very modest appropriation and later

[1] James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, "Scientists Against Time" (Boston: Little, Brown, 1946), p. 419.

[2] Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's*, February 1947. The article is reproduced with additional comments in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, "On Active Service in Peace and War" (New York: Harper, 1948), chapter 13, and in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1947.

[3] The best semi-technical account of the development of the bomb is by H. D. Smyth, "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945). An excellent short account is in Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 419–450. The best popular accounts are W. L. Laurence, "Dawn Over Zero" (New York: Knopf, 1946) and J. W. Campbell, "The Atomic Story" (New York: Holt, 1947). For a graphic account of the establishment of the Los Alamos Laboratory, see the testimony of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer in U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, *Transcript of Hearings Before Personnel Security Board in the Matter of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 12 April–6 May 1954* (Washington: G.P.O., 1954), p. 12–15, 28–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expanded into the two-billion-dollar Manhattan Project had only one purpose —to harness the energy of the atom in a chain reaction to produce a bomb that could be carried by aircraft if possible, and to produce it before the Germans could.[4] That such a bomb, if produced, would be used, no responsible official even questioned. "At no time from 1941 to 1945," declared Mr. Stimson, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by another responsible member of the Government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war." And Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer recalled in 1954 that "we always assumed if they [atomic bombs] were needed, they would be used."[5]

So long as the success of the project remained in doubt there seems to have been little or no discussion of the effects of an atomic weapon or the circumstances under which it would be used. "During the early days of the project," one scientist recalled, "we spent little time thinking about the possible effects of the bomb we were trying to make."[6] It was a "neck-and-neck race with the Germans," the outcome of which might well determine who would be the victor in World War II. But as Germany approached defeat and as the effort to produce an atomic bomb offered increasing promise of success, those few men who knew what was being done and who appreciated the enormous implications of atomic energy became more and more concerned. Most of this concern came from the scientists in the Metallurgical Laboratory at Chicago, where by early 1945 small groups began to question the advisability of using the weapon they were trying so hard to build.[7] It was almost as if they hoped the bomb would not work after it was completed.

On the military side, the realization that a bomb would probably be ready for testing in the summer of 1945 led to concrete planning for the use of the new weapon, on the assumption that the bomb when completed would work. By the end of 1944 a list of possible targets in Japan had been selected, and a B-29 squadron was trained for the specific job of delivering the bomb.[8] It was also necessary to inform certain commanders in the Pacific about the project, and on December 30, 1944, Major-General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan District, recommended that this be done.[9]

Even at this stage of development no one could estimate accurately when the bomb would be ready or guarantee that, when ready, it would work. It is perhaps for this reason—and because of the complete secrecy surrounding the project—that the possibility of an atomic weapon never entered into the deliberations of the strategic planners. It was, said Admiral William Leahy, "the best kept secret of the entire war" and only a handful of the top civilian

[4] The one exception was the Navy's work in the field of atomic energy as a source of power for naval vessels. *Hearings Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy,* Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., S.R. 179, pt. 3, p. 364–389, testimony of Dr. Ross Gunn.

[5] Stimson, *Harper's,* p. 98; *Oppenheimer Hearings,* p. 33.

[6] *Senate Hearings,* pt. 2, p. 302, testimony of Dr. John A. Simpson.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 303; *Oppenheimer Hearings,* p. 33; Leo Szilard, "A Personal History of the Bomb," in *The Atlantic Community Faces the Bomb,* University of Chicago Roundtable, No. 601, Sept. 25, 1949, p. 14.

[8] Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), v. 5, p. 705–708.

[9] "Memo, Groves for CofS, 30 Dec. 1944, sub: Atomic Fission Bombs," printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta-Yalta, 1945* (Washington: G.P.O., 1955). Hereafter cited as *Malta-Yalta Conferences.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and military officials in Washington knew about the bomb.[10] As a matter of fact, one bright brigadier-general who innocently suggested that the Army might do well to look into the possibilities of atomic energy suddenly found himself the object of the most intensive investigation.[11] So secret was the project, says John J. McCloy, that when he raised the subject at a White House meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1945 it "caused a sense of shock, even among that select group."[12]

It was not until March 1945 that it became possible to predict with certainty that the bomb would be completed in time for testing in July. On March 15, Mr. Stimson discussed the project for the last time with President Roosevelt, but their conversation dealt mainly with the effects of the use of the bomb, not with the question of whether it ought to be used.[13] Even at this late date, there does not seem to have been any doubt at the highest levels that the bomb would be used against Japan if it would help bring the war to an early end. But on lower levels, and especially among the scientists at the Chicago laboratory, there was considerable reservation about the advisability of using the bomb.[14]

After President Roosevelt's death, it fell to Stimson to brief the new President about the atomic weapon. At a White House meeting on April 25, he outlined the history and status of the program and predicted that "within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history."[15] This meeting, like Stimson's last meeting with Roosevelt, dealt largely with the political and diplomatic consequences of the use of such a weapon rather than with the timing and manner of employment, the circumstances under which it would be used, or whether it would be used at all. The answers to these questions depended on factors not yet known. But Stimson recommended, and the President approved, the appointment of a special committee to consider them.[16]

This special committee, known as the Interim Committee, played a vital rôle in the decision to use the bomb. Secretary Stimson was chairman, and George L. Harrison, President of the New York Life Insurance Company and special consultant in the Secretary's office, took the chair when he was absent. James F. Byrnes, who held no official position at the time, was President Truman's personal representative. Other members were Ralph A. Bard,

[10] Admiral William D. Leahy, "I Was There" (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 434.

[11] Ray S. Cline, "United States Army in World War II. The War Department. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division" (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1951), p. 347–348n.

[12] John J. McCloy, "The Challenge to American Foreign Policy" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 42. See also Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, "Fleet Admiral King" (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 620–621; James F. Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly" (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 257.

[13] Stimson, in *Harper's*, p. 98, prints the memorandum he prepared on this conversation. King and Whitehill, *op. cit.*, p. 621, indicates the status of the project and optimism of the period. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[14] *Senate Hearings*, pt. 2, p 303 ff, testimony of Dr. Simpson.

[15] Stimson's memorandum of this meeting is printed in *Harper's*, p. 99–100.

[16] *Ibid.*; Harry S. Truman, "Year of Decisions" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), p. 10–11; William Hillman, ed., "Mr. President" (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1952), p. 249; Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 259. President Truman actually learned first about the bomb from Byrnes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Under Secretary of the Navy, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, and Drs. Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton and James B. Conant. Generals Marshall and Groves attended at least one and possibly more of the meetings of the committee.[17]

The work of the Interim Committee, in Stimson's words, "ranged over the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military, and scientific aspects."[18] During the first meeting the scientific members reviewed for their colleagues the development of the Manhattan Project and described vividly the destructive power of the atomic bomb. They made it clear also that there was no known defense against this kind of attack. Another day was spent with the engineers and industrialists who had designed and built the huge plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford. Of particular concern to the committee was the question of how long it would take another country, particularly the Soviet Union, to produce an atomic bomb. "Much of the discussion," recalled Dr. Oppenheimer who attended the meeting of June 1 as a member of a scientific panel, "revolved around the question raised by Secretary Stimson as to whether there was any hope at all of using this development to get less barbarous [*sic*] relations with the Russians."[19]

The work of the Interim Committee was completed June 1, 1945,[20] when it submitted its report to the President, recommending unanimously that:

1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings.
3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon. (One member, Ralph A. Bard, later dissented from this portion of the committee's recommendation.)

"The conclusions of the Committee," wrote Stimson, "were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost."[21]

Among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project were many who did not agree. To them, the "wave of horror and repulsion" that might follow the sudden use of an atomic bomb would more than outweigh its military advantages. "It may be very difficult," they declared, "to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such

[17] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 100; Byrnes, p. 259; *Oppenheimer Hearings*, p. 34.

[18] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 100.

[19] *Oppenheimer Hearings*, p. 34, 257, testimony of Dr. Oppenheimer and Dr. Compton; Byrnes, p. 260-261; Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 100-101.

[20] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 101; Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 419. Byrnes mistakenly states that the Interim Committee made its recommendations on July 1 (Byrnes, p. 261).

[21] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 101. The same idea is expressed by Sir Winston Churchill, "Triumph and Tragedy" (Cambridge: Houghton, 1953), p. 638–639.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons abolished by international agreement."[22] The procedure these scientists recommended was, first, to demonstrate the new weapon "before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations on the desert or a barren island," and then to issue "a preliminary ultimatum" to Japan. If this ultimatum was rejected, and "if the sanction of the United Nations (and of public opinion at home) were obtained," then and only then, said the scientists, should the United States consider using the bomb. "This may sound fantastic," they said, "but in nuclear weapons we have something entirely new in order of magnitude of destructive power, and if we want to capitalize fully on the advantage their possession gives us, we must use new and imaginative methods."[23]

These views, which were forwarded to the Secretary of War on June 11, 1945, were strongly supported by 64 of the scientists in the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory in a petition sent directly to the President. At about the same time, at the request of Dr. Arthur H. Compton, a poll was taken of the views of more than 150 scientists at the Chicago Laboratory. Five alternatives ranging from all-out use of the bomb to "keeping the existence of the bomb a secret" were presented. Of those polled, about two-thirds voted for a preliminary demonstration, either on a military objective or an uninhabited locality; the rest were split on all-out use and no use at all.[24]

These views, and presumably others, were referred by Secretary Stimson to a distinguished Scientific Panel consisting of Drs. Arthur H. Compton, Enrico Fermi, E. O. Lawrence and J. Robert Oppenheimer, all nuclear physicists of the first rank. "We didn't know beans about the military situation," Oppenheimer later said. "We didn't know whether they [the Japanese] could be caused to surrender by other means or whether the invasion [of Japan] was really inevitable. . . . We thought the two overriding considerations were the saving of lives in the war and the effect of our actions on the stability of the postwar world."[25] On June 16 the panel reported that it had studied carefully the proposals made by the scientists but could see no practical way of ending the war by a technical demonstration. Almost regretfully, it seemed, the four members of the panel concluded that there was "no acceptable alternative to direct military use."[26] "Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort," wrote Stimson, ". . . than a warning or demonstration followed by a dud—and this was a real possibility." With this went the fear, expressed by Byrnes, that if the Japanese were warned that an atomic bomb would be exploded over a military target in Japan as a demonstration, "they might bring our boys who were prisoners of war to that area."[27] Furthermore, only two bombs would be available by August, the

[22] "Report of the Committee on Social and Political Implications," signed by Professor James Franck of the University of Chicago and submitted to the Secretary of War, June 11, 1945, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 1, 1946, p. 3.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 3–4.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 1; Szilard, *op. cit.*, p. 15. See also P. M. S. Blackett, "Fear, War, and the Bomb" (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949), p. 114–116.

[25] *Oppenheimer Hearings*, p. 34.

[26] Quoted in Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 101. The Scientific Panel was established to advise the Interim Committee and its report was made to that body.

[27] *Ibid.*; Byrnes, p. 261.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number General Groves estimated would be needed to end the war; these two would have to obtain the desired effect quickly. And no one yet knew, nor would the scheduled ground test in New Mexico prove, whether a bomb dropped from an airplane would explode.[28]

Nor, for that matter, were all those concerned certain that the bomb would work at all, on the ground or in the air. Of these doubters, the greatest was Admiral Leahy, who until the end remained unconvinced. "This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done," he told Truman after Vannevar Bush had explained to the President how the bomb worked. "The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives."[29]

Thus, by mid-June 1945, there was virtual unanimity among the President's civilian advisers on the use of the bomb. The arguments of the opponents had been considered and rejected. So far as is known, the President did not solicit the views of the military or naval staffs, nor were they offered.

III. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

The military situation on June 1, 1945, when the Interim Committee submitted its recommendations on the use of the atomic bomb, was distinctly favorable to the Allied cause. Germany had surrendered in May and troops from Europe would soon be available for redeployment in the Pacific. Manila had fallen in February; Iwo Jima was in American hands; and the success of the Okinawa invasion was assured. Air and submarine attacks had virtually cut off Japan from the resources of the Indies, and B-29s from the Marianas were pulverizing Japan's cities and factories. The Pacific Fleet had virtually driven the Imperial Navy from the ocean, and planes of the fast carrier forces were striking Japanese naval bases in the Inland Sea. Clearly, Japan was a defeated nation.

Though defeated in a military sense, Japan showed no disposition to surrender unconditionally. And Japanese troops had demonstrated time and again that they could fight hard and inflict heavy casualties even when the outlook was hopeless. Allied plans in the spring of 1945 took these facts into account and proceeded on the assumption that an invasion of the home islands would be required to achieve at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan—the announced objective of the war and the basic assumption of all strategic planning.[30]

Other means of achieving this objective had been considered and, in early June, had not yet been entirely discarded. One of these called for the occupation of a string of bases around Japan in order to increase the intensity of air bombardment. Combined with a tight naval blockade, such a course would, many believed, produce the same results as an invasion and at far less cost in lives.[31] "I was unable to see any justification," Admiral Leahy

[28] *Ibid.*; *Oppenheimer Hearings*, p. 163, testimony of General Groves.

[29] Truman, p. 11. Leahy in his memoirs frankly admits this error.

[30] For an account of the strategic plans evolved for the defeat of Japan, see *The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945* (Department of Defense Press Release, September 1955), p. 28, 62–67, *passim*; Cline, chapter 17; Leahy, p. 383–385; Craven and Cate, p. 702, *passim*.

[31] The alternatives to invasion were outlined by General Marshall for MacArthur in a message of April 12, 1945, reproduced in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 54–55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

later wrote, ". . . for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan. I feared the cost would be enormous in both lives and treasure." Admiral King and other senior naval officers agreed. To them it had always seemed, in King's words, "that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops."[32]

The main arguments for an invasion of Japan—the plans called for an assault against Kyushu (Olympic) on November 1, 1945, and against Honshu (Coronet) five months later—are perhaps best summarized by General Douglas MacArthur. Writing to the Chief of Staff on April 20, 1945, he declared that this course was the only one that would permit application of the full power of our combined resources—ground, naval and air—on the decisive objective. Japan, he believed, would probably be more difficult to invade the following year. An invasion of Kyushu at an early date would, moreover, place United States forces in the most favorable position for the decisive assault against Honshu in 1946, and would "continue the offensive methods which have proved so successful in Pacific campaigns."[33] Reliance upon bombing alone, MacArthur asserted, was still an unproved formula for success, as was evidenced by the bomber offensive against Germany. The seizure of a ring of bases around Japan would disperse Allied forces even more than they already were, MacArthur pointed out, and (if an attempt was made to seize positions on the China coast) might very well lead to long drawn-out operations on the Asiatic mainland.

Though the Joint Chiefs had accepted the invasion concept as the basis for preparations, and had issued a directive for the Kyushu assault on May 25, it was well understood that the final decision was yet to be made. By mid-June the time had come for such a decision and during that period the Joint Chiefs reviewed the whole problem of Japanese strategy. Finally, on June 18, at a meeting in the White House, they presented the alternatives to President Truman. Also present (according to the minutes) were Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.[34]

General Marshall presented the case for invasion and carried his colleagues with him, although both Admirals Leahy and King later declared they did not favor the plan. After considerable discussion of casualties and of the difficulties ahead, President Truman made his decision. Kyushu would be invaded as planned and preparations for the landing were to be pushed through to completion. Preparations for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would be made until preparations had reached the point

[32] Leahy, p. 384–385; King and Whitehill, p. 598. See also H. H. Arnold, "Global Mission" (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 595–596; Major-General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, "MacArthur, 1941-1951" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 287–288.

[33] This message is reproduced in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 55–57.

[34] Forrestal says in his *Diaries* that neither he nor Stimson was present, while McCloy's definite recollection is that Stimson was present but Forrestal was not. A summary of this meeting is contained in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 77–85. See also McCloy, p. 42–43; Walter Millis, ed., "The Forrestal Diaries" (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 70–71; Leahy, p. 383–385; King and Whitehill, p. 598, 605–606.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"beyond which there would not be opportunity for a free choice."[35] The program thus approved by Truman called for:

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas and the Philippines.
2. Assault of Kyushu on November 1, 1945, and intensification of blockade and air bombardment.
3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date March 1, 1946.[36]

During the White House meeting of June 18, there was discussion of the possibility of ending the war by political means. The President displayed a deep interest in the subject and both Stimson and McCloy emphasized the importance of the "large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt."[37] There was discussion also of the atomic bomb, since everyone present knew about the bomb and the recommendations of the Interim Committee. The suggestion was made that before the bomb was dropped, the Japanese should be warned that the United States had such a weapon. "Not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary," recalled Mr. McCloy, "thought well of a bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one could be certain, in spite of the assurances of the scientists, that the 'thing would go off.' "[38]

Though the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland was considered a prerequisite to Japan's surrender, it did not follow that Japanese forces elsewhere, especially those on the Asiatic mainland, would surrender also. It was to provide for just this contingency, as well as to pin down those forces during the invasion of the home islands, that the Joint Chiefs had recommended Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

Soviet participation was a goal long pursued by the Americans.[39] Both political and military authorities seem to have been convinced from the start that Soviet assistance, conceived in various ways, would shorten the war and lessen the cost. In October 1943, Marshal Stalin had told Cordell Hull, then in Moscow for a conference, that the Soviet Union would eventually declare war on Japan. At the Tehran Conference in November of that year, Stalin had given the Allies formal notice of this intention and reaffirmed it in October 1944. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed on the terms of Soviet participation in the Far Eastern

[35] McCloy, p. 41. See also sources cited in preceding note.

[36] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 90; Leahy, p. 385; King and Whitehill, p. 606; *Malta-Yalta Conferences*, p. 388–400, 827–832.

[37] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 83; Joseph C. Grew, "Turbulent Era," Walter Johnson, ed. (Boston: Houghton, 1952), v. 2, chapter 36; McCloy, p. 42–43; letter, McCloy to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, June 18, 1956.

[38] McCloy, p. 43. See also Millis, p. 70–71.

[39] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .* provides an excellent official summary of this subject and reproduces the most important documents. The subject is also well covered in Ernest R. May, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945," *Pacific Historical Review*, May 1955, p. 153–174. See also John R. Deane, "The Strange Alliance" (New York: Viking, 1947); Statement of W. Averell Harriman in *MacArthur Hearings*, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1951), pt. 5, p. 3328–3342; William H. McNeill, "America, Britain and Russia, Their Coöperation and Conflict, 1941-1946" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war. Thus, by June 1945, the Americans could look forward to Soviet intervention at a date estimated as three months after the defeat of Germany.

But by the summer of 1945 the Americans had undergone a change of heart. Though the official position of the War Department still held that "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives,"[40] few responsible American officials were eager for Soviet intervention or as willing to make concessions as they had been at an earlier period.[41] What had once appeared extremely desirable appeared less so now that the war in Europe was over and Japan was virtually defeated. President Truman, one official recalled, stated during a meeting devoted to the question of Soviet policy that agreements with Stalin had up to that time been "a one-way street" and that "he intended thereafter to be firm in his dealings with the Russians."[42] And at the June 18 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, Admiral King had declared that "regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg them to come in."[43] Though the cost would be greater, he had no doubt "we could handle it alone."

The failure of the Soviets to abide by agreements made at Yalta had also done much to discourage the American desire for further coöperation with them. But after urging Stalin for three years to declare war on Japan, the United States Government could hardly ask him now to remain neutral. Moreover, there was no way of keeping the Russians out even if there had been a will to do so. In Harriman's view, "Russia would come into the war regardless of what we might do."[44]

A further difficulty was that Allied intelligence still indicated that Soviet intervention would be desirable, if not necessary, for the success of the invasion strategy. In Allied intelligence, Japan was portrayed as a defeated nation whose military leaders were blind to defeat. Though her industries had been seriously crippled by air bombardment and naval blockade and her armed forces were critically deficient in many of the resources of war, Japan was still far from surrender. She had ample reserves of weapons and ammunition and an army of 5,000,000 troops, 2,000,000 of them in the home islands. The latter could be expected to put up a strong resistance to invasion. In the opinion of the intelligence experts, neither blockade nor bombing alone would produce unconditional surrender before the date set for invasion. And the invasion itself, they believed, would be costly and possibly prolonged.[45]

[40] Letter, Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945, reproduced in Grew, v. 2, p. 1458, and in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 70–71.

[41] For expressions of this view, see Deane, *op. cit.*, p. 263–265; Leahy, p. 318, 339; Byrnes, p. 207–209; Millis, p. 78; King and Whitehill, p. 606.

[42] Millis, p. 50, minute by Charles E. Bohlen dated April 23, 1945; Truman, p. 72.

[43] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 85.

[44] Statement to Leahy quoted in Leahy, p. 369. See also Harriman statement, *MacArthur Hearings*, pt. 5, p. 3341; War Department memorandum of 21 May 1945, quoted in Grew, v. 2, p. 1458.

[45] *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 85–88; OPD Study by Brigadier-General George A. Lincoln, dated 4 June 1945, quoted in Cline, p. 344. See also Leahy, p. 343, 346–347; Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 101–102; Willoughby and Chamberlain, p. 286; *Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area*, GHQ, SWPA, v. 1, p. 397–404.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to these intelligence reports, the Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity, or some miracle, they hoped, would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe," declared an intelligence estimate of June 30, ". . . that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction, and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms."[46] It appeared also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might offer. Clearly these conditions, to have any chance of acceptance, would have to include retention of the imperial system.[47]

How accurate were these estimates? Judging from postwar accounts of Japan, they were very close to the truth. Since the defeat at Saipan, when Tojo had been forced to resign, the strength of the "peace party" had been increasing. In September 1944 the Swedish Minister in Tokyo had been approached unofficially, presumably in the name of Prince Konoye, to sound out the Allies on terms for peace. This overture came to naught, as did another the following March. But the Swedish Minister did learn that those who advocated peace in Japan regarded the Allied demand for unconditional surrender as their greatest obstacle.[48]

The Suzuki Cabinet that came into power in April 1945 had an unspoken mandate from the Emperor to end the war as quickly as possible. But it was faced immediately with another problem when the Soviet Government announced it would not renew the neutrality pact after April 1946. The German surrender in May produced another crisis in the Japanese Government and led, after considerable discussion, to a decision to seek Soviet mediation. But the first approach, made on June 3 to Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, produced no results. Malik was noncommittal and merely said the problem needed further study.[49] Another overture to Malik later in the month also came to naught.

At the end of June, the Japanese finally approached the Soviet Government directly through Ambassador Sato in Moscow, asking that it mediate with the Allies to bring the Far Eastern war to an end. In a series of messages between Tokyo and Moscow, which the Americans intercepted and decoded, the Japanese Foreign Office outlined the position of the government and instructed Ambassador Sato to make arrangements for a special envoy from the Emperor who would be empowered to make terms for Soviet mediation. Unconditional surrender, he was told, was completely unacceptable, and

[46] G-2 memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, p. 347. The same study was presented to the Combined Chiefs and is reproduced in part in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 85-88.

[47] *Ibid.* This view is presented by Karl T. Compton in an article entitled, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1946, p. 54–60.

[48] Robert J. C. Butow, "Japan's Decision to Surrender" (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 40, 54–57. Other accounts of the situation in Japan are Toshikazu Kase, "Journey to the Missouri" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "Japan's Struggle to End the War" (Washington: G.P.O., 1946); Takushiro Hattori, "Complete History of the Greater East Asia War" (Japan: Masu Shobo Co., 1953), v. 4.

[49] Butow, p. 90–91, 125–131; Hattori, p. 274, 312–316; "Japan's Struggle to End the War," p. 6–7; Kase, p. 193–194.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time was of the essence. But the Russians, on one pretext and another, delayed their answer until mid-July when Stalin and Molotov left for Potsdam. Thus, the Japanese Government had by then accepted defeat and was seeking desperately for a way out; but it was not willing even at this late date to surrender unconditionally, and would accept no terms that did not include the preservation of the imperial system.

Allied intelligence thus had estimated the situation in Japan correctly. Allied invasion strategy had been reëxamined and confirmed in mid-June, and the date for the invasion fixed. The desirability of Soviet assistance had been confirmed also and plans for her entry into the war during August could now be made. No decision had been reached on the use of the atomic bomb, but the President's advisers had recommended it. The decision was the President's and he faced it squarely. But before he could make it he would want to know whether the measures already concerted would produce unconditional surrender at the earliest moment and at the lowest cost. If they could not, then he would have to decide whether circumstances warranted employment of a bomb that Stimson had already labeled as "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history."

IV. THE DECISION

Though responsibility for the decision to use the atomic bomb was the President's, he exercised it only after careful study of the recommendations of his senior advisers. Chief among these was the Secretary of War, under whose broad supervision the Manhattan Project had been placed. Already deeply concerned over the cost of the projected invasion, the political effects of Soviet intervention and the potential consequences of the use of the atomic bomb, Stimson sought a course that would avoid all these evils. The difficulty, as he saw it, lay in the requirement for unconditional surrender. It was a phrase that might make the Japanese desperate and lead to a long and unnecessary campaign of attrition that would be extremely costly to both sides.[50] But there was no way of getting around the term; it was firmly rooted in Allied war aims and its renunciation was certain to lead to charges of appeasement.

But if this difficulty could be overcome, would the Japanese respond if terms were offered? The intelligence experts thought so, and the radio intercepts from Tokyo to Moscow bore them out.[51] So far as the Army was concerned there was much to be gained by such a course. Not only might it reduce the enormous cost of the war, but it would also make possible a settlement in the Western Pacific "before too many of our allies are committed there and have made substantial contributions towards the defeat of Japan."[52] In the view of the War Department these aims justified "any concessions which might be attractive to the Japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the Pacific are not adversely affected."[53]

[50] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 102; Cline, p. 345; Millis, p. 68-70.

[51] Millis, p. 74–77; Ellis M. Zacharias, "Secret Missions" (New York: Putnam, 1946), p. 335.

[52] OPD Compilation for the Potsdam Conference, quoted in Cline, p. 345.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 345–346.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The problem was to formulate terms that would meet these conditions. There was considerable discussion of this problem in Washington in the spring of 1945 by officials in the Department of State and in the War and Navy Departments. Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, proposed to the President late in May that he issue a proclamation urging the Japanese to surrender and assuring them that they could keep the Emperor. Though Truman did not act on the suggestion, he thought it "a sound idea" and told Grew to discuss it with his cabinet colleagues and the Joint Chiefs. On June 18, Grew was back with the report that these groups favored the idea, but that there were differences on the timing.[54]

Grew's ideas, as well as those of others concerned, were summarized by Stimson in a long and carefully considered memorandum to the President on July 2.[55] Representing the most informed military and political estimate of the situation at this time, this memorandum constitutes a state paper of the first importance. If any one document can be said to provide the basis for the President's warning to Japan and his final decision to use the atomic bomb, this is it.

The gist of Stimson's argument was that the most promising alternative to the long and costly struggle certain to follow invasion was to warn the Japanese "of what is to come" and to give them an opportunity to surrender. There was, he thought, enough of a chance that such a course would work to make the effort worthwhile. Japan no longer had any allies, her navy was virtually destroyed and she was increasingly vulnerable to air attack and naval blockade. Against her were arrayed the increasingly powerful forces of the Allies, with their "inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources." In these circumstances, Stimson believed the Japanese people would be susceptible to reason if properly approached. "Japan," he pointed out, "is not a nation composed of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people. . . ." But any attempt, Stimson added, "to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy. . . ."

A warning to Japan, Stimson contended, should be carefully timed. It should come before the actual invasion, before destruction had reduced the Japanese "to fanatical despair" and, if the Soviet Union had already entered the war, before the Russian attack had progressed too far.[56] It should also emphasize, Stimson believed, the inevitability and completeness of the destruction ahead and the determination of the Allies to strip Japan of her conquests and to destroy the influence of the military clique. It should be a

[54] Truman, p. 416–417. A detailed account of Grew's efforts can be found in Grew, v. 2, chapter 36.

[55] The memorandum is reproduced in Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 102-104. For the background of the memorandum, see Grew, v. 2, chapter 36; Millis, p. 68–70; Byrnes, p. 206, 262; McCloy, p. 42–43; Stimson and Bundy, p. 624.

[56] In his diary, under the date June 19, Stimson wrote: "The last-chance warning . . . must be given before an actual landing of the ground forces in Japan, and fortunately the plans provide for enough time to bring in the sanctions to our warning in the shape of heavy ordinary bombing attack and an attack of S-1 [the atomic bomb]." Stimson and Bundy, p. 624.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strong warning and should leave no doubt in Japanese minds that they would have to surrender unconditionally and submit to Allied occupation.

The warning, as Stimson envisaged it, had a double character. While promising destruction and devastation, it was also to hold out hope to the Japanese if they heeded its message. In his memorandum, therefore, Stimson stressed the positive features of the warning and recommended that it include a disavowal of any intention to destroy the Japanese nation or to occupy the country permanently. Once Japan's military clique had been removed from power and her capacity to wage war destroyed, it was Stimson's belief that the Allies should withdraw and resume normal trade relations with the new and peaceful Japanese Government. "I personally think," he declared, "that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chance of acceptance."

Not once in the course of this lengthy memorandum was mention made of the atomic bomb. There was no need to do so. Everyone concerned understood clearly that the bomb was the instrument that would destroy Japan and impress on the Japanese Government the hopelessness of any course but surrender. As Stimson expressed it, the atomic bomb was "the best possible sanction," the single weapon that would convince the Japanese "of our power to destroy the empire."[57]

Though Stimson considered a warning combined with an offer of terms and backed up by the sanction of the atomic bomb as the most promising means of inducing surrender at any early date, there were other courses that some thought might produce the same result. One was the continuation and intensification of air bombardment coupled with surface and underwater blockade. This course had already been considered and rejected as insufficient to produce surrender, though its advocates were by no means convinced that this decision was a wise one. And Stimson himself later justified the use of the bomb on the ground that by November 1 conventional bombardment would have caused greater destruction than the bomb. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that the atomic bomb was considered to have a psychological effect entirely apart from the damage wrought.[58]

Nor did Stimson, in his memorandum, consider the effect of the Soviet Union's entry into the war. By itself, this action could not be counted on to force Japan to capitulate, but combined with bombardment and blockade it might do so. At least that was the view of Brigadier-General George A. Lincoln, one of the Army's top planners, who wrote in June that "probably it will take Russian entry into the war, coupled with a landing, or imminent threat of landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them [the Japanese] of the hopelessness of their position."[59] Why, therefore, was it not possible to issue the warning prior to a Soviet declaration of war against Japan and rely on that event, together with an intensified air bombardment, to produce the desired result? If together they could not secure Japan's surrender, would

[57] Stimson, *Harper's*, p. 101, 104.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[59] Quoted in Cline, p. 344.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there not still be time to use the bomb before the scheduled invasion of Kyushu in November?[60]

No final answer to this question is possible with the evidence at hand. But one cannot ignore the fact that some responsible officials feared the political consequences of Soviet intervention and hoped that ultimately it would prove unnecessary. This feeling may unconsciously have made the atom bomb solution more attractive than it might otherwise have been.[61] Some officials may have believed, too, that the bomb could be used as a powerful deterrent to Soviet expansion in Europe, where the Red tide had successively engulfed Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In an interview with three of the top scientists in the Manhattan Project early in June, Mr. Byrnes did not, according to Leo Szilard, argue that the bomb was needed to defeat Japan, but rather that it should be dropped to "make Russia more manageable in Europe."[62]

It has been asserted also that the desire to justify the expenditure of the two billion dollars spent on the Manhattan Project may have disposed some favorably toward the use of the bomb. Already questions had been asked in Congress,[63] and the end of the war would almost certainly bring on a full-scale investigation. What more striking justification of the Manhattan Project than a new weapon that had ended the war in one sudden blow and saved countless American lives? "It was my reaction," wrote Admiral Leahy, "that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so did other people involved."[64]

This explanation hardly does credit to those involved in the Manhattan Project and not even P. M. S. Blackett, one of the severest critics of the decision to use the bomb, accepted it. "The wit of man," he declared, "could hardly devise a theory of the dropping of the bomb, both more insulting to the American people, or more likely to lead to an energetically pursued Soviet defense policy."[65]

But even if the need to justify these huge expenditures is discounted—and certainly by itself it could not have produced the decision—the question still remains whether those who held in their hands a weapon thought capable of ending the war in one stroke could justify withholding that weapon. Would they not be open to criticism for failing to use every means at their disposal to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible, thereby saving many American lives?

And even at that time there were some who believed that the new weapon

[60] For an exposition of this view, see Blackett, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Great Mistakes of the War" (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 100–101.

[61] See, for example, Byrnes, p. 208; Stimson and Bundy, p. 637; Leahy, p. 419; Blackett, chapter 10; Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," *Saturday Review of Literature,* June 15, 1946, p. 5–8.

[62] Szilard, p. 14–15.

[63] Byrnes, p. 257–258; Hillman, p. 247. The Truman Committee had already made inquiries, but its investigators were called off at the request of Mr. Stimson. Truman, p. 10.

[64] Leahy, p. 441. For a statement of the same argument, but with a refutation, see *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* May 1, 1946, p. 4.

[65] Blackett, p. 138.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would ultimately prove the most effective deterrent to war yet produced. How better to outlaw war forever than to demonstrate the tremendous destructive power of this weapon by using it against an actual target?

By early July 1945 the stage had been set for the final decision. Stimson's memorandum had been approved in principle and on July 4 the British had given their consent to the use of the bomb against Japan.[66] It remained only to decide on the terms and timing of the warning. This was the situation when the Potsdam Conference opened on July 17, one day after the bomb had been successfully exploded in a spectacular demonstration at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The atomic bomb was a reality and when the news reached Potsdam there was great excitement among those who were let in on the secret. Instead of the prospect of long and bitter months of fighting the Japanese, there was now a vision, "fair and bright indeed it seemed" to Churchill, "of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks."[67]

President Truman's first action was to call together his chief advisers—Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, King and Arnold. "I asked for their opinion whether the bomb should be used," he later wrote. The consensus was that it should.[68] Here at last was the miracle to end the war and solve all the perplexing problems posed by the necessity for invasion. But because no one could tell what effect the bomb might have "physically or psychologically," it was decided to proceed with the military plans for the invasion.

No one at this time, or later in the conference, raised the question of whether the Japanese should be informed of the existence of the bomb. That question, it will be recalled, had been discussed by the Scientific Panel on June 16 and at the White House meeting with the JCS, the service Secretaries and Mr. McCloy on June 18. For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to whether the bomb would work, it had then been decided that the Japanese should not be warned of the existence of the new weapon. The successful explosion of the first bomb on July 17 did not apparently outweigh the reasons advanced earlier for keeping the bomb a secret, and evidently none of the men involved thought the question needed to be reviewed. The Japanese would learn of the atomic bomb only when it was dropped on them.

The secrecy that had shrouded the development of the atomic bomb was torn aside briefly at Potsdam, but with no visible effect. On July 24, on the advice of his chief advisers, Truman informed Marshal Stalin "casually" that the Americans had "a new weapon of unusual destructive force." "The Russian Premier," he recalled, "showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.' "[69] One cannot but wonder whether the Marshal was preoccupied at the moment or simulating a lack of interest.

[66] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 639. For the coördination between the British and Americans on the development of the atomic bomb, see Smyth, *op. cit., passim*; Churchill, "The Hinge of Fate" (Boston: Houghton, 1950), p. 377–381; Truman, p. 418; Leahy, p. 265, 432. General Groves opposed this coördination and testified so later. *Oppenheimer Hearings,* p. 175.

[67] Churchill, "Triumph and Tragedy," p. 638.

[68] Hillman, p. 248; Truman, p. 415. General Eisenhower was at Potsdam and his advice, Truman says, was asked. The various participants differ in their recollections of this meeting. King and Whitehill, p. 621; Arnold, p. 585.

[69] Truman, p. 416. See also Byrnes, p. 263.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the military side, the Potsdam Conference developed nothing new. The plans already made were noted and approved. Even at this late stage the question of the bomb was divorced entirely from military plans and the final report of the conference accepted as the main effort the invasion of the Japanese home islands. November 15, 1946, was accepted as the planning date for the end of the war against Japan.[70]

During the conference, Stalin told Truman about the Japanese overtures—information that the Americans already had. The Marshal spoke of the matter also to Churchill, who discussed it with Truman, suggesting cautiously that some offer be made to Japan. "Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and the President," he later wrote, "were evidently searching their hearts, and we had no need to press them. We knew of course that the Japanese were ready to give up all conquests made in the war." That same night, after dining with Stalin and Truman, the Prime Minister wrote that the Russians intended to attack Japan soon after August 8—perhaps within two weeks of that date.[71] Truman presumably received the same information, confirming Harry Hopkins' report of his conversation with Stalin in Moscow in May.[72]

All that remained now was to warn Japan and give her an opportunity to surrender. In this matter Stimson's and Grew's views, as outlined in the memorandum of July 2, were accepted, but apparently on the advice of the former Secretary of State Cordell Hull it was decided to omit any reference to the Emperor.[73] Hull's view, solicited by Byrnes before his departure for Potsdam, was that the proposal smacked of appeasement and "seemed to guarantee continuance not only of the Emperor but also of the feudal privileges of a ruling caste." And should the Japanese reject the warning, the proposal to retain the imperial system might well encourage resistance and have "terrible political repercussions" in the United States. For these reasons he recommended that no statement about the Emperor be made until "the climax of Allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war."[74] Thus, the final terms offered to the Japanese in the Potsdam Declaration on July 26 made no mention of the Emperor or of the imperial system. Neither did the declaration contain any reference to the atom bomb but simply warned the Japanese of the consequences of continued resistance.[75] Only those already familiar with the weapon could have read the references to inevitable and complete destruction as a warning of atomic warfare.[76]

The receipt of the Potsdam Declaration in Japan led to frantic meetings to decide what should be done. It was finally decided not to reject the note but to await the results of the Soviet overture. At this point, the military

[70] Combined Chiefs of Staff Report to the President and Prime Minister, 24 July 1945, quoted in Cline, p. 346, and reproduced in *The Entry of the Soviet Union . . .*, p. 89–91.

[71] Truman, p. 396; Churchill, "Triumph and Tragedy," p. 642. See also Byrnes, p. 205; Leahy, p. 420.

[72] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins" (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 902; Leahy, p. 383.

[73] "Memoirs of Cordell Hull" (New York: Macmillian, 1948), v. 2, p. 1591–1594; Byrnes, p. 205–207; Stimson and Bundy, p. 626–627; Grew, v. 2, p. 1424–1427.

[74] Hull, v. 2, p. 1593.

[75] The text of the declaration is printed in Stimson and Bundy, and in Butow, Appendix C.

[76] For expressions of this view, see Baldwin, p. 91–92; McCloy, p. 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

insisted that the government make some statement to the people, and on July 28 Premier Suzuki declared to the press that Japan would ignore the declaration, a statement that was interpreted by the Allies as a rejection.[77]

To the Americans the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration confirmed the view that the military was still in control of Japan and that only a decisive act of violence could remove them. The instrument for such action lay at hand in the atomic bomb; events now seemed to justify its use. But in the hope that the Japanese might still change their minds, Truman held off orders on the use of the bomb for a few days. Only silence came from Tokyo, for the Japanese were waiting for a reply from the Soviet Government, which would not come until the return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam on August 6. Prophetically, Foreign Minister Tojo wrote Sato on August 2, the day the Potsdam Conference ended, that he could not afford to lose a single day in his efforts to conclude arrangements with the Russians "if we were to end the war before the assault on our mainland."[78] By that time, President Truman had already decided on the use of the bomb.

Preparations for dropping the two atomic bombs produced thus far had been under way for some time. The components of the bombs had been sent by cruiser to Tinian in May and the fissionable material was flown out in mid-July. The B-29s and crews were ready and trained, standing by for orders, which would come through the Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, General Spaatz. Detailed arrangements and schedules were completed and all that was necessary was to issue orders.[79]

At General Arnold's insistence, the responsibility for selecting the particular target and fixing the exact date and hour of the attack was assigned to the field commander, General Spaatz. In orders issued on July 25 and approved by Stimson and Marshall, Spaatz was ordered to drop the "first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki." He was instructed also to deliver a copy of this order personally to MacArthur and Nimitz. Weather was the critical factor because the bomb had to be dropped by visual means, and Spaatz delegated to his chief of staff, Major-General Curtis E. LeMay, the job of deciding when the weather was right for this most important mission.

From the dating of the order to General Spaatz it has been argued that President Truman was certain the warning would be rejected and had fixed the date for the bombing of Hiroshima even before the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration.[80] But such an argument ignores the military necessities. For operational reasons, the orders had to be issued in sufficient time "to set the military wheels in motion." In a sense, therefore, the decision was made on July 25. It would stand unless the President changed his mind. "I had

[77] This incident has given rise to a controversy best understood by a linguist. It is covered in detail in Kazuo Kawaii, "Mokusatsu," *Pacific Historical Review*, November 1950, p. 409–414; and William J. Coughlin, "The Great Mokusatsu," *Harper's*, March 1953, p. 31-40.

[78] Kase, *op, cit.*, p. 222.

[79] For an account of these preparations, see Craven and Cate, p. 713–725.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 714. The relevant documents, including a letter from President Truman to Professor Cate, are reproduced on p. 696–697, 712–713. See also Leahy, p. 430–431, and Truman's letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, published in *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1947, p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made the decision," wrote Truman in 1955. "I also instructed Stimson that the order would stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable."[81] The rejection by the Japanese of the Potsdam Declaration confirmed the orders Spaatz had already received.

V. THE JAPANESE SURRENDER

On Tinian and Guam, preparations for dropping the bomb had been completed by August 3. The original plan was to carry out the operation on August 4, but General LeMay deferred the attack because of bad weather over the target. On August 5 the forecasts were favorable and he gave the word to proceed with the mission the following day. At 0245 on August 6, the bomb-carrying plane was airborne. Six and a half hours later the bomb was released over Hiroshima, Japan's eighth largest city, to explode 50 seconds later at a height of about 2,000 feet. The age of atomic warfare had opened.[82]

Aboard the cruiser *Augusta* on his way back to the United States, President Truman received the news by radio. That same day a previously prepared release from Washington announced to the world that an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and warned the Japanese that if they did not surrender they could expect "a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth."[83]

On August 7, Ambassador Sato in Moscow received word at last that Molotov would see him the next afternoon. At the appointed hour he arrived at the Kremlin, full of hope that he would receive a favorable reply to the Japanese proposal for Soviet mediation with the Allies to end the war. Instead, he was handed the Soviet declaration of war, effective on August 9.[84] Thus, three months to the day after Germany's surrender, Marshal Stalin had lived up to his promise to the Allies.

Meanwhile, President Truman had authorized the use of the second bomb —the last then available. The objective was Kokura, the date August 9. But the plane carrying the bomb failed to make its run over the primary target and hit the secondary target, Nagasaki, instead.[85] The next day Japan sued for peace.

The close sequence of events between August 6 and 10, combined with the fact that the bomb was dropped almost three months before the scheduled invasion of Kyushu and while the Japanese were trying desperately to get out of the war, has suggested to some that the bombing of Hiroshima had a deeper purpose than the desire to end the war quickly. This purpose, it is claimed, was nothing less than a desire to forestall Soviet intervention into the Far Eastern war. Else why this necessity for speed? Certainly nothing in the military situation seemed to call for such hasty action. But if the purpose

[81] Truman, p. 420–421.

[82] For a vivid account of the bombing see Merle Miller and Abe Spitzer, "We Dropped the A-Bomb" (New York: Crowell, 1946); Laurence, *op. cit.*, p. 207–211. Two other dates can be said to open the atomic age: December 2, 1942, when Enrico Fermi succeeded in establishing a chain reaction; and July 16, 1945, when the test bomb was exploded in New Mexico.

[83] The statement is published in *The New York Times,* August 7, 1945. See also Leahy, p. 430; Byrnes, p. 209.

[84] Butow, p. 153–154; *The New York Times,* August 9, 1945.

[85] Craven and Cate, p. 714–723; Laurence, p. 228–243; Miller and Spitzer, p. 89–124.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was to forestall Soviet intervention, then there was every reason for speed. And even if the Russians could not be kept out of the war, at least they would be prevented from making more than a token contribution to victory over Japan. In this sense it may be argued that the bomb proved a success, for the war ended with the United States in full control of Japan.[86]

This theory leaves several matters unexplained. In the first place, the Americans did not know the exact date on which the Soviet Union would declare war but believed it would be within a week or two of August 8. If they had wished to forestall a Soviet declaration of war, then they could reasonably have been expected to act sooner than they did. Such close timing left little if any margin for error. Secondly, had the United States desired above everything else to keep the Russians out, it could have responded to one of the several unofficial Japanese overtures, or made the Potsdam Declaration more attractive to Japan. Certainly the failure to put a time limit on the declaration suggests that speed was not of the essence in American calculations. Finally, the date and time of the bombing were left to Generals Spaatz and LeMay, who certainly had no way of knowing Soviet intentions. Bad weather or any other untoward incident could have delayed the attack a week or more.

There is reason to believe that the Russians at the last moved more quickly than they had intended. In his conversations with Harry Hopkins in May 1945 and at Potsdam, Marshal Stalin had linked Soviet entry with negotiations then in progress with Chinese representatives in Moscow.[87] When these were completed, he had said, he would act. On August 8 these negotiations were still in progress.

Did the atomic bomb accomplish its purpose? Was it, in fact, as Stimson said, "the best possible sanction" after Japan rejected the Potsdam Declaration? The sequence of events argues strongly that it was, for bombs were dropped on the 6th and 9th, and on the 10th Japan surrendered. But in the excitement over the announcement of the first use of an atomic bomb and then of Japan's surrender, many overlooked the significance of the Soviet Union's entry into the war on the 9th. The first bomb had produced consternation and confusion among the leaders of Japan, but no disposition to surrender. The Soviet declaration of war, though not entirely unexpected, was a devastating blow and, by removing all hope of Soviet mediation, gave the advocates of peace their first opportunity to come boldly out into the open. When Premier Suzuki arrived at the palace on the morning of the 9th, he was told that the Emperor believed Japan's only course now was to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The militarists could and did minimize the effects of the bomb, but they could not evade the obvious consequences of Soviet intervention, which ended all hope of dividing their enemies and securing softer peace terms.[88]

[86] Blackett, p. 137.

[87] Sherwood, p. 902; Edward R. Stettinius, "Roosevelt and the Russians" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1949), p. 91.

[88] The story of the last few days of the war in Japan is told in considerable detail in Butow; "Japan's Struggle to End the War;" U.S.A.A.F., "Mission Accomplished" (Washington: G.P.O., 1946). On the American side, the chief sources are Byrnes, p. 209–211; Leahy, p. 434–445; Millis, p. 82–85; Stimson and Bundy, p. 626–667; Deane, p. 277–278.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this atmosphere, the leaders of Japan held a series of meetings on August 9, but were unable to come to agreement. In the morning came word of the fate of Nagasaki. This additional disaster failed to resolve the issues between the military and those who advocated surrender. Finally the Emperor took the unprecedented step of calling an Imperial Conference, which lasted until 3 o'clock the next morning. When it, too, failed to produce agreement the Emperor told his ministers that he wished the war brought to an end. The constitutional significance of this action is difficult for Westerners to comprehend, but it resolved the crisis and produced in the cabinet a formal decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration, provided it did not prejudice the position of the Emperor.

What finally forced the Japanese to surrender? Was it air bombardment, naval power, the atomic bomb or Soviet entry? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that Japan would have surrendered by the end of the year, without invasion and without the atomic bomb.[89] Other equally informed opinion maintained that it was the atomic bomb that forced Japan to surrender. "Without its use," Dr. Karl T. Compton asserted, "the war would have continued for many months."[90] Admiral Nimitz believed firmly that the decisive factor was "the complete impunity with which the Pacific Fleet pounded Japan," and General Arnold claimed it was air bombardment that had brought Japan to the verge of collapse.[91] But Major-General Claire Chennault, wartime air commander in China, maintained that Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war brought about the surrender of Japan and would have done so "even if no atomic bombs had been dropped."[92]

It would be a fruitless task to weigh accurately the relative importance of all the factors leading to the Japanese surrender. There is no doubt that Japan had been defeated by the summer of 1945, if not earlier. But defeat did not mean that the military clique had given up; the Army intended to fight on and had made elaborate preparations for the defense of the homeland. Whether air bombardment and naval blockade or the threat of invasion would have produced an early surrender and averted the heavy losses almost certain to accompany the actual landings in Japan is a moot question. Certainly they had a profound effect on the Japanese position. It is equally impossible to assert categorically that the atomic bomb alone or Soviet intervention alone was the decisive factor in bringing the war to an end. All that can be said on the available evidence is that Japan was defeated in the military sense by August 1945 and that the bombing of Hiroshima, followed by the Soviet Union's declaration of war and then the bombing of Nagasaki and the threat of still further bombing, acted as catalytic agents to produce the Japanese decision to surrender. Together they created so extreme a crisis that the Emperor himself, in an unprecedented move, took matters into his own hands and ordered his ministers to surrender. Whether any other set of circumstances would have resolved the crisis and produced the final decision to surrender is a question history cannot yet answer.

[89] "Japan's Struggle . . .," p. 13. See also Arnold, p. 598.
[90] Compton, *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1946, p. 54.
[91] Arnold, p. 598. Nimitz's statement is quoted in Baldwin, p. 93.
[92] *The New York Times*, August 15, 1945, quoting an interview with Chennault.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N.Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

THE BIG THAW. By C. L. SULZBERGER. New York: Harper, 1956, 275 p. $4.00.

Based in good part on his Foreign Affairs columns in *The New York Times*, Mr. Sulzberger's essay is a nice combination of reporting, interviewing and reflection. As the title suggests, this is a survey of post-Stalinist Russia, the Soviet orbit, and Titoist Jugoslavia (the section on the latter is particularly interesting). While Soviet purposes may remain the same—"I came, I thawed, I conquered"—the consequences, in Mr. Sulzberger's view, are more dangerous to the Communist system than to ourselves.

AMERICAN-ASIAN TENSIONS. EDITED BY ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1956, 239 p. $3.75.

A useful symposium of studies dealing with areas of tension in U.S.-Asian relations. India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and Egypt have been selected for particular investigation.

TARGET: THE WORLD. EDITED BY EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 362 p. $5.00.

An extensive survey of Communist propaganda activities—leading themes, techniques and agencies—throughout the world in 1955.

AN ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF MARXISM. By JOSEF MACEK. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1956, 147 p. $5.00.

An essay, by a Czech economist now at the University of Pittsburgh, addressed less to the question of "what Marx really meant" than to how Marx was understood, especially by later Leninists and Stalinists.

DE LA SAINTE-ALLIANCE AU PACTE ATLANTIQUE. VOLUME II: LE VINGTIÈME SIÈCLE, 1898–1954. By FERNAND L'HUILLIER. Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1955, 479 p. Swiss Fr. 26.90.

The second volume of this general history of international relations since 1815 deals with the collapse of the European Concert and the era of the two world wars. The story is carried up to 1954.

LE ORIGINI DIPLOMATICHE DEL PATTO D'ACCIAIO. By MARIO TOSCANO. Florence: Sansoni, 1956, 414 p. L. 3000.

A revised and extended edition of this valuable monograph—first appearing in 1948—by a leading Italian scholar.

GALLIPOLI. By ALAN MOOREHEAD. New York: Harper, 1956, 384 p. $4.50.

Mr. Moorehead, who enjoys a well-deserved reputation as a war correspondent and novelist, here turns to a history of the heroic and tragic Dardanelles campaign of 1915. It is an absorbing narrative, vivid and exciting: "a strange light plays over the Gallipoli landing."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC POLICY DURING A DECADE. By Admiral Elis Biörklund. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956, 148 p. $3.50.

A Swedish admiral discusses and criticizes the various efforts and plans to achieve control of atomic weapons in the decade since 1945. A serious but not technical inquiry.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. New York: Funk, 1956, 666 p. $6.00.

In the third and last volume of this major work General Fuller covers the period from the battles of the American Civil War to the Battle for Leyte Gulf in 1944. Nearly half the book is devoted to the Second World War.

THE WAR POTENTIAL OF NATIONS. By Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, 310 p. $5.00.

In this study of the theory of war potential, the author, a professor in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, goes beyond the categories of economic and military potential to include such components as "the will to fight" and "administrative capacity."

THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Lothar Kotzsch. Geneva: Droz, 1956, 310 p. Swiss Fr. 25. (New York: Lounz, $7.00.)

A rather wearing analysis, in singularly contorted language.

THE MEN BEHIND THE SPACE ROCKETS. By Heinz Gartmann. New York: McKay, 1956, 185 p. $3.95.

GUIDED MISSILES IN WAR AND PEACE. By Nels A. Parson, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 161 p. $3.50.

Gartmann's book is a popular history of the development of rockets, largely before the German V-2. The second is a helpful and not particularly technical introduction to guided missiles and their use.

DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN UND DIE NICHTMITGLIEDER. By Josef Soder. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1956, 283 p. DM. 24.

A monograph on the relationship, in international law, between the United Nations and those states which are not members of the organization.

LATIN AMERICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By John A. Houston. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1956, 345 p. $2.75. (Columbia University Press, distributor.)

A discussion of the activities of the 20 Latin American Republics in the U.N.—their rôle in the development of the organization and the areas of particular interest and concern to them. This is the eighth volume in a series of United Nations Studies sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

LA SUISSE ET LES NATIONS UNIES. By Jacqueline Belin. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1956, 139 p. $3.00.

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED NATIONS. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1956, 322 p. $3.00.

DENMARK AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Max Sørensen and Niels J. Haagerup. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment), 1956, 154 p. $3.00.

Three volumes in a series of studies initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and dealing with the respective national experiences in inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national organizations and especially in the United Nations. Further titles to follow, plus two concluding volumes of summary and analysis.

ELECTIONS AND ELECTORS. By J. F. S. Ross. London: Eyre, 1955, 480 p. 42/. (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Essential Books, $6.75.)

Studies, by the author of "Parliamentary Representation," on the significance and methods of elections, and the possibilities of electoral reform. A most valuable examination of this important subject, relating mainly but not exclusively to the British system.

GESELLSCHAFT UND DEMOKRATIE IN DER ZEITWENDE. By Hans-Edgar Jahn. Cologne: Greven, 1955, 405 p. DM. 19.80.

A somewhat heavy-going discussion of the requirements for democracy in the present age, with special reference to Germany, and the need to avoid the "materialistic-existentialistic" or "atheistic-Communistic" pitfalls.

TRANSNATIONAL LAW. By Philip C. Jessup. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956, 113 p. $3.00.

In these Storrs Lectures, delivered at the Yale Law School in February 1956, Professor Jessup deals, as the title suggests, with the growing body of international legal problems that lie beyond the agreements entered into between states, or, as he puts it, "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers."

RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION. Edited by Walter Schätzel and Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1956, 408 p. DM. 30.

An international symposium of essays on a wide variety of topics: collected as a *Festschrift* for Hans Wehberg.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY. By Richard N. Gardner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 423 p. $6.75.

A thorough, scholarly and well-written study in, as the author calls it, "international economic diplomacy:" a history of recent Anglo-American collaboration on behalf of multilateralism—the Bretton Woods organization, the Anglo-American Loan Agreement, the International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The author's concluding enumerations of errors in national policy are of much more than local interest.

GRUNDPROBLEME DES INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS. By Georg Erler. Göttingen: Schwartz, 1956, 215 p. DM. 19.80.

An able study of the development of the relatively new field of international economic law.

WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT. Edited by Henry J. Struth. New York: Palmer Publications, 1955, 488 p. $20.00.

An annual handbook of statistical and other information on the world's petroleum operations.

DIE KOHLENWIRTSCHAFT DER WELT IN ZAHLEN, 1955. Essen: Verlag Glückauf, 1955, 223 p. DM. 18.

This very useful compilation brings together basic statistics on coal production, trade, prices, productivity, etc., for a large number of countries. Coverage ranges from 1900 to mid-1955 and there are convenient comparative tables.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS. By Philip C. Newman. New York: Praeger, 1956, 500 p. $14.00.

This second part of what is intended to be a two-volume work is a casebook on government control of business activities in the more advanced industrial countries.

POPULATION GROWTH AND LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION. By Horace Belshaw. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956, 223 p. $4.50.

A contribution, by a former economic advisor to the Government of New Zealand, to the growing body of studies on demography and production in the poorer countries, with special reference to Asia. Industrialization is seen as only one facet of a multi-purpose endeavor to raise the level of consumption.

THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION. By Louise W. Holborn. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Liquidation Board of the International Refugee Organization), 1956, 805 p. $7.20.

A solid and official account of the history and achievements of the I.R.O., from 1946 to its liquidation in 1952. Excellent documentation.

RACE RELATIONS IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE. Edited by Andrew W. Lind. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1956, 488 p. $6.00.

A symposium of papers read at a conference held in Honolulu in 1954.

The Second World War

THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. By Alvin P. Stauffer. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 358 p. $4.00.

THE SIGNAL CORPS: THE EMERGENCY (TO DECEMBER 1941). By Dulany Terrett. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1956, 383 p. $3.50.

Two further volumes in the sub-series on the Technical Services, in the official history, "United States Army in World War II."

THE CANADIANS IN ITALY, 1943–1945. By Lt.-Col. G. W. L. Nicholson. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956, 807 p. $3.50.

This second volume in the "Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War" covers the Italian campaign from the invasion of Sicily to the transfer of the 1st Canadian Corps in the spring of 1945.

IN AFRICA SETTENTRIONALE. LA PREPARAZIONE AL CONFLITTO: L'AVANZATA SU SIDI EL BARRANI (OTTOBRE 1935–SETTEMBRE 1940). Rome: Ministero della Difesa, 1955, 260 p. L. 1700.

An official monograph on the background of the military operations in North Africa.

THE BIG LIE. By John Baker White. New York: Crowell, 1956, 235 p. $4.00.

A rather popular and episodic account of the British use of psychological warfare and planned deceptions in the Second World War.

ISLANDS IN DANGER. By Alan and Mary Wood. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 255 p. $3.50.

An interesting account of the German occupation of the Channel Islands.

KESÄSOTA 1941. By Wolf H. Halsti. Helsinki: Otava, 1956, 627 p. M. 1300.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second of a projected three-volume history of the Finnish War, 1939–45, presenting an excellent survey of developments during the "war of nerves" that followed the end of the winter war of 1939–40.

LE VATICAN ET LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE. By Paul Duclos. Paris: Pedone, 1955, 254 p. Fr. 1200.

A documented survey of the activities of the Vatican—doctrinal and diplomatic—in connection with the Second World War and the problem of peace.

The United States

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945–1955. By William Reitzel and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956, 535 p. $4.50.

The purpose of this useful contribution by the Brookings Institution is to analyze "the official purposes and actions of the United States in its foreign policies and relations during the ten years since the war in order to try to recapture the key decisions that were made and the grounds on which one course of action rather than another was chosen."

THE CRUCIAL DECADE: AMERICA, 1945–1955. By Eric F. Goldman. New York: Knopf, 1956, 298 p. $4.00.

A review and commentary on a singularly confused and irascible ten years of American history which has now, rather surprisingly, become history. The sense of sudden remoteness is not quite as sharp as in Frederick Lewis Allen's "Only Yesterday," but it is there.

DAYS TO REMEMBER: AMERICA 1945–1955. By John Gunther and Bernard Quint. New York: Harper, 1956, 240 p. $5.95.

Pictures and text effectively review a decade not likely to evoke much nostalgia.

THE NEW ISOLATIONISM. By Norman A. Graebner. New York: Ronald Press, 1956, 289 p. $4.00.

In interpreting most of the lively American foreign policy wrangling in the years 1950 to 1955 as an expression of neo-isolationism and unwarranted faith in "invincibility, moralism, and utopianism," Professor Graebner does not do full justice to the complexity of the international challenges in those years, nor to the variety of views which went into the criticism of our postwar foreign policy.

TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION. By Roger Lea MacBride. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1955, 89 p. $1.00.

An essay and analysis advocating treaty-power amendment to assure the ascendancy of the Constitution over any type of international agreement.

THE TORMENT OF SECRECY. By Edward A. Shils. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1956, 238 p. $3.50.

An essay, by the Professor of Social Sciences in the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago, on the background and consequences of American security policies over the last decade, a decade, as the author sees it, "of degrading agitation and numerous unnecessary and unworthy actions."

ARMS AND MEN. By Walter Millis. New York: Putnam, 1956, 382 p. $5.75.

Although Mr. Millis, who has devoted many years to the subject, calls this only a "commentary" on the history of American military policy, it is a most useful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and well-written survey. The last chapter, reviewing the dilemmas arising from thermonuclear power and the attempts to resolve them, is of particular interest.

ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE FOX. By James MacGregor Burns. New York: Harcourt, 1956, 553 p. $5.75.

This addition to the mounting literature on Franklin Roosevelt is a political biography centering chiefly on his first two terms as President. As the title suggests, F.D.R. is seen as an extremely complex character, at times the national leader, at times the shrewd politician. The author, a professor of political science at Williams College, has clearly dug deeply into varied sources to create this portrait of the New Deal era.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE TRIUMPH. By Frank Freidel. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956, 433 p. $6.00.

In this third volume of his important biography Mr. Freidel covers the four years, 1929–32, when F.D.R. was Governor of New York and candidate for the Presidency. Certain themes of the New Deal are seen emerging, yet it is evident that Roosevelt was also playing by ear, and a very keen ear, too.

THE AIR FORCE. By Arnold Brophy. New York: Gilbert Press, 1956, 362 p. $5.00.

Using the device of an imaginary air attack on North America the author surveys the organization and operations of the American Air Force. About a third of the book discusses the various industries providing planes and equipment.

UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICY. By Wytze Gorter. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 230 p. $5.00.

Considering the frequency with which opinions are expressed on United States shipping policy, the lack of thorough and objective studies is remarkable. This is the only up-to-date book on the subject. It concisely describes and trenchantly analyzes postwar American experience with aid to shipping and shipbuilding, examines the performance of the two industries, and discusses possible changes in policy. The relation of shipping policy to defense is a central theme of the book, but the relation of what is done in the maritime industries to the broad aims of American foreign economic policy is not neglected.

Western Europe

EUROPÄISCHE STANDORTSBESTIMMUNG IN POLITIK UND WIRTSCHAFT. By Hans Bachmann. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1955, 185 p. Swiss Fr. 19.80.

In this intelligent and ambitious book, a Swiss economics professor concisely sets forth his appraisal of Europe at mid-century, and then turns to the perspectives of the medium and long-run future. He treats broad themes such as the decline of Europe's world power, the condition of economic liberalism, and man versus the state, and also deals with concrete political problems of Europe's internal and external relations, colonialism, the German question, European unity, and the possibilities of coexistence with the U.S.S.R.

LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Daniel Vignes. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1956, 196 p. Fr. 1300.

A careful and fairly concise account of the organization and work of the European Coal and Steel Community that, on the whole, avoids close analysis or major conclusions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITIQUE SOCIALE ET INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE. By Albert Delpérée. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1956, 293 p. Fr. 1100.

This is the most complete discussion that has been published of the relation of labor problems to European integration. It discusses not only migrat and the free movement of labor (or the lack of it) but also coöperation in matt of social security and the bearing on integration of wages, conditions of work, and national arrangements for relations between labor and employers. The author, a Belgian economist who is chairman of the manpower committee of the O.E.E.C., explores the possibilities of a "European" labor and social policy cautiously and quite realistically, but eschews politics.

THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT. By Stephen Wheatcroft. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 358 p. $6.00.

A detailed study of the economic conditions of the European air transport industry and the steps to be taken to improve them.

FRANCE: 1940–1955. By Alexander Werth. New York: Holt, 1956, 764 p. $6.00.

Mr. Werth, a British journalist with long experience in France, has tackled an enormously difficult subject—the political vicissitudes and development of France since the disaster of 1940. While the book is not lacking in controversial judgments on domestic and foreign affairs, it is a most interesting volume into which has gone a great deal of reading and personal knowledge.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE WELTPOLITIK IM 20. JAHRHUNDERT. By Ludwig Dehio. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1955, 155 p. DM. 8.50.

A most interesting and illuminating collection of essays by the editor of the *Historische Zeitschrift* dealing with modern German historiography, the decline of the European states-system, and Germany's catastrophic rôle in twentieth century history.

VERTRÄGE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND. SERIE A: MULTILATERALE VERTRÄGE. Cologne: Heymann, 1955–56, 4 v. DM. 171.30.

Series A of this important publication by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic includes multilateral treaties of which West Germany has been a signatory since 1949. Series B is to cover bilateral treaties, and subsequent series will assemble prewar treaties involving Germany that are still in force.

DIE PARISER VERTRÄGE. Edited by Heinrich Brandweiner. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956, 965 p. DM-Ost. 22.

The texts, in German, English and French, of the Paris agreements of October 1954 terminating the occupation régime of the Federal Republic and creating the Western European Union.

DOKUMENTE ZUR AUSSENPOLITIK DER REGIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK. Berlin: Rütten, 1954–55, 2 v. DM-Ost. 7.90.

A collection of documents relating to the foreign policy of the "German Democratic Republic" from its foundation in October 1949 to the Warsaw Conference of May 1955.

PARTEIEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK. By Max Gustav Lange and Others. Stuttgart: Ring, 1955, 558 p. DM. 28.80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A substantial work by a number of authors, analyzing the history of the political parties in the Federal Republic up to the election of 1953.

CODETERMINATION IN THE GERMAN STEEL INDUSTRY. By W. Michael Blumenthal. Princeton: Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section, 1956, 114 p. $3.50.

The *Mitbestimmungsrecht* gives labor equal representation with stockholders on boards of directors and puts a labor man in one of three key management positions in German steel firms. This sounds like a radical change in industrial organization. On the basis of a study of ten companies, Mr. Blumenthal shows how modest the effects of this system have actually been. There is perhaps some tendency to see the experience primarily through the eyes of those responsible for making it work —excerpts from interviews provide much color and interest—but a good bit of objective evidence is presented as well. The last word has not yet been said on co-determination but this is a good beginning and the fullest account yet published.

THE RISE AND FALL OF NAZI GERMANY. By T. L. Jarman. New York: New York University Press, 1956, 388 p. $4.95.

An examination, competent and sensible though not particularly original, of the reasons for the Nazi victory in Germany and the eventual catastrophic defeat.

QUELLEN ZUR ENTSTEHUNG DER ODER-NEISSE-LINIE IN DEN DIPLOMATISCHEN VERHANDLUNGEN WÄHREND DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES. Compiled by Gotthold Rhode and Wolfgang Wagner. Stuttgart: Brentano, 1956, 291 p. DM. 10.80.

A collection of documents relating to the background of the establishment of the Oder-Neisse line. A volume in the German series "Die Deutschen Ostgebiete."

OSTDEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFT. By Bruno Gleitze. Berlin: Duncker, 1956, 239 p. DM. 24.

A useful description, with much statistical material, of the prewar economy of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse line. The book has, of course, the purpose of demonstrating the essential economic unity of all German lands.

THE ETHNIC GERMAN REFUGEE IN AUSTRIA 1945 TO 1954. By Tony Radspieler. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 197 p. Guilders 15.

A useful and sympathetic study of the vicissitudes and present situation of the half-million ethnic German refugees from Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe who sought asylum in Austria after the Second World War.

SÜDTIROL IN NOT UND BEWÄHRUNG. Edited by Toni Ebner. Brixen, Bozen: Athesia, 1955, 305 p.

Pieces on the German character of the South Tyrol, in the form of a *Festschrift* for Canon Michael Gamper.

ITALY AND THE ALLIES. By Norman Kogan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 246 p. $4.25.

A concise and able account of the course of Italian politics and foreign relations from Mussolini's overthrow to the present, but with primary emphasis on the period before the peace treaty.

LA DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA IN ITALIA. By Francesco Magri. Milan: Editrice La Fiaccola, 1954–55, 2 v. L. 4500.

An extensive history of the Christian Democratic movement in Italy from its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

origins in the last decades of the nineteenth century to 1953. The author, a journalist and writer, was one of the pioneers of the movement.

Eastern Europe

THE FATE OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE. Edited by Stephen D. Kertesz. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1956, 463 p. $6.25.

A valuable symposium of chapters by 16 well-known experts on the creation of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and its bearing on American foreign policy.

PLANIFICATION ET CROISSANCE ÉCONOMIQUE DES DÉMOCRATIES POPULAIRES. By Jan Marczewski. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956, 2 v. Fr. 2100.

An extensive, scholarly and extremely worthwhile study of postwar economic growth and planning (including an introduction on the inter-war years) in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and East Germany. The first volume is a historical survey, the second a reasonably technical economic analysis.

SATELLITE MENTALITY. By Siegfried Kracauer and Paul L. Berkman. New York: Praeger, 1956, 194 p. $4.00.

A study based on interviews, conducted in 1951–1952, with several hundred escapees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

RUSSIA WITHOUT STALIN. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: Viking, 1956, 264 p. $3.75.

Further views of Russia by the British author of "Russia and the Russians" and "Cracks in the Kremlin Wall." As in his earlier works, Mr. Crankshaw is most satisfactory in reporting what he sees and experiences, perhaps less so in his interpretations.

AN INQUIRY INTO SOVIET MENTALITY. By Gerhart Niemeyer, with the assistance of John S. Reshetar, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1956, 113 p. $2.75.

A stimulating essay, argued somewhat abstractly but concrete enough in its conclusions, on the extent and nature of the irrational component of Communist thinking and of its bearing on their strategy and behavior in international affairs.

DER SOWJETISCHE PROPAGANDASTAAT. By Bruno Kalnins. Stockholm: Tiden, 1956, 276 p.

An analysis, by a Latvian now living in Stockholm, of the theory and practice of propaganda and agitation within the Soviet Union. A serious study.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET STEEL. By M. Gardner Clark. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 400 p. $7.50.

This monograph, one of the studies of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, concerns the growth, location, productivity and prospects of the Soviet iron and steel industry.

THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICES. By Otto Heilbrunn. New York: Praeger, 1956, 216 p. $4.50.

On Soviet espionage, subversion and paramilitary techniques. Not very well organized.

DIE SOWJETISCHE ZWÖLFMEILENZONE IN DER OSTSEE UND DIE FREIHEIT DES MEERES. By Hans-Albert Reinkemeyer. Cologne: Heymann, 1955, 175 p. DM. 24.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An examination, from the point of view of international law, of the Soviet claim to a 12-mile territorial belt in the Baltic Sea.

THE SPIRIT OF RUSSIA. By Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 2 v. $14.00.

A new English edition of the classic study by the great Czech scholar and statesman.

THE UNKNOWN REVOLUTION (KRONSTADT 1921, UKRAINE 1918–21). By Voline. New York: Libertarian Book Club, 1956, 270 p. $3.50.

This second volume of the translation of Voline's "La Révolution Inconnue" ("Nineteen-Seventeen," the first volume, noted here October 1955) deals with the Kronstadt revolt and the Makhnovist movement in the Ukraine.

POLIITTISET MUISTELMANI. By Carl Enckell. Helsinki: Söderström, 1956, 382 p. M. 900.

The first volume of a long-awaited political memoir by a high-ranking Finnish diplomat.

KUIN KALLIOON HAKATTU. By Arvo Tuominen and Others. Helsinki: Tammi, 1956, 155 p. M. 800.

A compilation of essays by party associates and scholars honoring Väinö Tanner, Finland's Social Democratic leader, on his 75th birthday.

PA AIZPUTINĀTĀM PĒDĀM. By Uldis Ģērmanis and Jukums Vācietis. Stockholm: Daugava, 1956, 360 p.

The memoirs of Jukums Vācietis, a Latvian colonel who, for nearly a year, was the first commander-in-chief of the Red Army. An important source on the Russian Revolution, with particular emphasis on the history of the Latvian Rifle Regiments, both before and after 1917. The present edition is a reproduction of the little known two-volume version "Latviešu strēlnieku vēsturiskā nozīme" which was published in Pskov in 1922–24. These memoirs are introduced by Uldis Ģērmanis.

PA DEPORTĒTO PĒDĀM. By Ādolfs Šilde. New York: Grāmatu Draugs, 1956, 304 p. $3.80.

A description of the fate of Latvian deportees in the Soviet Union, based mainly on interviews with some 2,000 former German prisoners-of-war who had returned to Germany since October 1955.

W POLSCE POD SOWIECKIM JARZMEM. By Marek Stanislaw Korowicz. London: Veritas, 1955, 360 p. 15/.

An account of the progressive Sovietization of Poland from 1946 until 1953 when the author, professor of international law, asked for asylum in the United States while attending a U.N. session.

CZASY WOJNY. By Ferdynand Goetel. London: Veritas, 1955, 276 p. 15/.

Wartime memoirs by a Polish publicist. His account includes descriptions of Smigly-Rydz's death in Warsaw in 1942, and of the author's participation in a Polish delegation which inspected the Katyn Forest shortly after the Germans had announced the discovery of the mass graves.

CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH CONFEDERATION AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1940–43. By Piotr S. Wandycz. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1956, 152 p. $2.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A monograph on wartime efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by the Czech and Polish governments-in-exile, to work out a form of political and economic association.

CAPTIVE RUMANIA. Edited by Alexandre Cretzianu. New York: Praeger, 1956, 424 p. $6.00.

A substantial study of the background, process and results of Sovietization in Rumania. All the dozen authors are Rumanians in exile, and many of them have intimate knowledge of their subject.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, 1956. London: Europa Publications, 1956, 918 p. 105/.

A major reference work providing detailed information on each of the Commonwealth members.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: ITS STRUCTURE AND SPIRIT, 1497–1953. By Eric A. Walker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 352 p. $5.00.

A second and extended edition of an excellent one-volume history, which first appeared in 1943.

BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW. By J. Mervyn Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 306 p. $7.20.

This revised edition of a study first appearing in 1947 has been largely rewritten to take account of the British Nationality Act of 1948 which repealed all previous nationality legislation in the United Kingdom.

FEAR GOD AND DREAD NOUGHT. Edited by Arthur J. Marder. London: Cape, 1956, 521 p. 35/.

The second volume of the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone covers Lord Fisher's "years of power, 1904–1914."

THE CODE BREAKERS OF ROOM 40: THE STORY OF ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM HALL, GENIUS OF BRITISH COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE. By Admiral Sir William James. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956, 212 p. $4.50.

Along with some biographical features, this book tells, somewhat episodically, of Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall's important counter-espionage work in the First World War.

BRITISH LABOUR AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1924. By Stephen Richards Graubard. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 305 p. $5.50.

A study of the effect of the Russian Revolution on British labor history. In the author's judgment the Labor Party's response, which emerged in the years 1917–1924, remained constant throughout the inter-war period: friendship to Soviet Russia and its people but hostility toward Moscow's creations, national and international.

DIVIDED WE STAND. By Michael Sheehy. New York: Putnam, 1956, 104 p. $2.75.

A study of Partition and its effect on Irish history since 1912. Critical of Southern Irish political leadership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CANADA LOOKS AHEAD. By Grace Laugharne. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 158 p. $2.25.

A concise and informative sketch of Canada's recent economic development and its potentialities for the future.

ATLANTIC CANADA. By Miriam Chapin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 179 p. $3.50.

A brief, informal portrait of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.

The Middle East

DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST. By J. C. Hurewitz. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956, 2 v. $15.25.

A most useful compilation of documents relating to European diplomacy in and concerning the Near and Middle East from 1535 to the present. The second volume is devoted to the years since the outbreak of the First World War.

FOOD AND INFLATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1940–45. By E. M. H. Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956, 375 p. $6.00.

This study, one of the valuable series under the auspices of the Food Research Institute at Stanford, deals with the effects of World War II on food, agriculture and prices in the lands from Egypt to Persia.

HERITAGE OF THE DESERT. By Harry B. Ellis. New York: Ronald Press, 1956, 311 p. $5.00.

An informative report on the Arab world, its temper and internal schisms, by a correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*.

LES NÉGOCIATIONS ANGLO-ÉGYPTIENNES DE 1950–1951 SUR SUEZ ET LE SOUDAN. By Farag Moussa. Geneva: Droz, 1955, 261 p. Swiss Fr. 18.

A conscientious monograph, by an Egyptian historian, on the negotiations of 1950–51 relating to the Anglo-Egyptian alliance, the Suez Canal and the Sudan.

KUWAIT AND HER NEIGHBOURS. By H. R. P. Dickson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 627 p. 75/. (New York: Macmillan, $12.75.)

KUWAIT WAS MY HOME. By Zahra Freeth. London: Allen and Unwin, 1956, 164 p. 16/. (New York: Macmillan, $3.75.)

Although both volumes are informal—based in some part upon reminiscences—the first, by a former British Political Officer in the Middle East, is the more informative. The second, by his daughter, is much more personal.

OLIVE TREES IN STORM. By Morris S. Lazaron. New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1955, 111 p. $2.75.

A not particularly instructive account of a trip to the Arab states and Israel in 1953.

BIBLE AND SWORD. By Barbara W. Tuchman. New York: New York University Press, 1956, 268 p. $5.00.

An interesting appraisal of the various religious and political interests which historically have influenced the British attitude toward Palestine.

TURKEY IN MY TIME. By Ahmed Emin Yalman. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956, 294 p. $4.00.

A political autobiography covering the Atatürk era and after, by the publisher and editor of the Istanbul paper *Vatan*.

UNITED STATES-PERSIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1883–1921. By

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABRAHAM YESELSON. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1956, 252 p. $5.00.

A monograph based primarily on State Department documents in the National Archives.

MISSION FOR PEACE: POINT 4 IN IRAN. By WILLIAM E. WARNE. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, 320 p. $4.00.

A personal account of Mr. Warne's four years as Country Director for Point 4.

South and Southeast Asia

THE COLOMBO PLAN AND OTHER ESSAYS. By FREDERIC BENHAM. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 89 p. $1.50.

An eminent British economist who is now Henry Price Professor of International Economics at Chatham House, Mr. Benham has spent most of the time since 1942 in official positions in the West Indies and Southeast Asia. The five essays in this small book discuss clearly and cogently such basic problems of economic development as overpopulation, price stabilization, tariff protection, deficit financing, and the ability to absorb foreign aid.

PLANNING FOR AN EXPANDING ECONOMY. By C. N. VAKIL AND P. R. BRAHMANAND. Bombay: Vora, 1956, 404 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $4.50.)

Two Indian economists proceed from a discussion of the issues arising in connection with the Second Five-Year Plan to a more general consideration of capital accumulation in underdeveloped countries.

NEHRU: CONVERSATIONS ON INDIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By TIBOR MENDE. New York: Braziller, 1956, 144 p. $3.00.

The four conversations here reproduced reveal much of interest concerning the Prime Minister's major tenets, their roots, form, ambiguities and intricacies. Although the present volume would have profited from more extended editorial comment, it rewards the careful reading it requires.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: IN DEFENCE OF NATIONAL INTEREST. By KARUNAKAR GUPTA. Calcutta: World Press, 1956, 109 p. Rs. 10.

An analysis of India's foreign policy between 1946 and 1954; of interest if not always sure-footed.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: A BIOGRAPHY. By FRANK MORAES. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 511 p. $6.75.

An informative, repetitious, occasionally critical narrative of Prime Minister Nehru's life, including comment on his personal and political activities and containing numerous anecdotes and sketches of important Indian personalities. The author is editor of *The Times of India,* the only important Indian English-language newspaper that from time to time allows itself to question the basic assumptions of present Indian foreign policy. His skeptical "Report on Mao's China" was noted here October 1953.

MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA. By JOHN H. KAUTSKY. Cambridge: Technology Press; and New York: Wiley, 1956, 220 p. $6.00.

An able study in which the author uses the Indian Communist Party as a case history of shifts in the international Communist line since 1945. Tracing the course of three strategies—"right," "left" and "neo-Maoist"—he concludes with an estimate of the extent and means of Moscow's control over local Communist Parties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STORY OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIAN STATES. By V. P. Menon. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 511 p. $7.00.

An extensive account, by the former Secretary to the Ministry of States, of the steps by which the 554 Princely States were integrated into the framework of the new republic in the years after independence.

INDIA: A REFERENCE ANNUAL, 1956. Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1956, 592 p. Rs. 7/8.

The fourth edition of this annual volume of factual and statistical information compiled from governmental and other sources.

THE PAKISTANI WAY OF LIFE. By Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi. New York: Praeger, 1956, 81 p. $4.00.

A most enlightening exposition of the dominant social, religious and political ideas and practices in Pakistan.

LAST AND FIRST IN BURMA (1941–1948). By Maurice Collis. New York: Macmillan, 1956, 303 p. $5.75.

A history of the troubled last years of British rule in Burma, and a defense of the policy of Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Governor from 1941 to 1946.

BURMA IN THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. By Maung Maung. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1956, 236 p.

Primarily a history of the development of Burma's constitutional and legal system, with particular emphasis on the rôle of international law in Burmese affairs.

INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. By W. F. Wertheim. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1956, 360 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $5.00.)

This scholarly volume—written under Institute of Pacific Relations auspices by the Professor of Modern History and Sociology of Southeast Asia at the University of Amsterdam—is an attempt to appraise the long-term social changes that took place in Indonesian society over the last 400 years. Dealing in large part with the impact of Western influence on that society, the author concerns himself with a multitude of problems involving social changes, political history, economic shifts, religious reform, cultural dynamics and the development of nationalism.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

CHINA AND SOVIET RUSSIA. By Henry Wei. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956, 379 p. $7.75.

A conscientious and able history of the relations between China and Soviet Russia over the last four decades.

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA, 1840–1928. By Li Chien-nung. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956, 545 p. $7.50.

A translation of a major work of Chinese historiography, which was originally published in Shanghai in 1948.

RED DRAGON OVER CHINA. By Harold H. Martinson. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1956, 328 p. $3.50.

An American Lutheran missionary's account, some of it firsthand, of the rise and establishment of Communist power in China.

SELECTED WORKS. VOLUME FOUR: 1941–1945. By Mao Tse-tung. New York: International Publishers, 1956, 348 p. $3.00.

The fourth in this projected five-volume series.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JAPANESE PEOPLE AND POLITICS. By Chitoshi Yanaga. New York: Wiley, 1956, 408 p. $7.50.

A solid and systematic study of postwar government and politics in Japan, and especially in their similarity to, or differences from, earlier Japanese history.

THE CAUSE OF JAPAN. By Tōgō Shigenori. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, 372 p. $5.00.

A posthumous review (first published in Japan in 1952), by the Japanese Foreign Minister from October 1941 to September 1942 and again in the spring of 1945, of Japan's foreign and military policy in those periods. Useful in filling out our picture of these critical months in recent diplomatic history.

KOREA'S HERITAGE: A REGIONAL AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY. By Shannon McCune. Rutland (Vt.): Tuttle (with the coöperation of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1956, 250 p. $5.00.

A useful regional, economic and social geography. The author, now Provost at the University of Massachusetts, has had much field experience in Korea.

DIE INTERNATIONALEN BEZIEHUNGEN IM FERNEN OSTEN (1870–1945). Edited by J. M. Shukow. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1955, 647 p. DM-Ost. 19.

A translation of an extensive Soviet work, published in Moscow in 1951.

NEW LIVES FOR OLD. By Margaret Mead. New York: Morrow, 1956, 548 p. $6.75.

A leading ethnologist who studied the Manus Islanders in 1928–29 now describes, on the basis of a new visit in 1953, the enormous and fantastically rapid transformations that have taken place in this quarter-century. Of great interest as an example of a primitive society's capacity to adapt itself to the accelerated change of the world today.

HAWAII AND ITS PEOPLE. By A. Grove Day. New York: Duell; and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 338 p. $5.00.

A romantic history of the islands. Little on the twentieth century.

Africa

AFRICA'S CHALLENGE TO AMERICA. By Chester Bowles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956, 134 p. $2.75.

A series of lectures concerning the rôle Mr. Bowles would like to see the United States play with respect to the growing political and economic ferment in Africa.

PAN-AFRICANISM OR COMMUNISM? By George Padmore. New York: Roy, 1956, 463 p. $5.00.

The author, described as an Afro-West Indian, makes an extensive study of the growth of the various contemporary African nationalist movements, including Garveyism and pan-Africanism. An important book.

AFRICA IN THE MODERN WORLD. Edited by Calvin W. Stillman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, 341 p. $6.00.

A symposium of pieces dealing with contemporary Africa, its place in international affairs, and its bearing on American foreign policy.

NORDAFRIKA: TUNESIEN, ALGERIEN, MAROKKO. By Margret and Eberhard Wohlfahrt. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1955, 771 p. DM. 16.80.

An extensive social and economic survey of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MA MISSION AU MAROC. By Gilbert Grandval. Paris: Plon, 1956, 273 p. Fr. 690.

A most revealing account of M. Grandval's brief but hectic term as Resident-General of Morocco, from June 20 to August 22, 1955. A valuable source.

ARGELIA Y SU DESTINO. By Carmen Martin de la Escalera. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1956, 289 p. Ptas. 125.

A Spanish history of Algeria, from the French conquest and pacification to the present.

LES CONVENTIONS FRANCO-TUNISIENNES DU 3 JUIN 1955. By Noë Ladhari. Tunis: Imprimerie du Nord, 1956, 186 p. Fr. 400.

An analysis, with the texts, of the French-Tunisian conventions of June 3, 1955.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN ETHIOPIA. By William E. H. Howard. Groningen: Wolters, 1956, 204 p. (New York: Lounz, $4.00.)

An examination, with some historical background, of the government and administration of Ethiopia.

HISTORY OF NIGERIA. By Sir Alan Burns. London: Allen and Unwin, 1955, 349 p. 25/. (New York: Macmillan, 1956, $6.75.)

A new and completely revised edition of a standard history, first published in 1929.

KENYA'S OPPORTUNITY. By Lord Altrincham. London: Faber, 1955, 308 p. 25/.

Political memoirs by the former Governor of Kenya from 1925 to 1931.

LES TENSIONS RACIALES DANS L'UNION SUD-AFRICAINE ET LEURS INCIDENCES INTERNATIONALES. By Franck L. Schoell. Geneva: Droz, 1956, 125 p. Swiss Fr. 8.

A brief survey of the racist question in South Africa and its consequences in the international field—at the U.N., at the Bandung Conference, etc.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE GROWTH AND CULTURE OF LATIN AMERICA. By Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, 963 p. $8.50.

A general history "suitable for beginning students."

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN GUATEMALA. By J. D. Martz. New York: Vantage Press, 1956, 125 p. $2.50.

A brief but thoughtful account, by a young American scholar, of the rise and fall of the Arbenz régime.

LA VIGENCIA TEMPORAL DE LA LEY EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURIDICO VENEZOLANO. By Joaquin Sanchez-Covisa Hernando. Caracas: Universidad Central, 1956, 255 p.

A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Law at the Central University of Venezuela.

PARAGUAY. By Philip Raine. New Brunswick (N.J.): Scarecrow Press, 1956, 443 p. $8.50.

A history of Paraguay together with a survey of contemporary economic, social and cultural conditions, by a former American Cultural Affairs officer in that country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service. 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community:* 220 Southern Bldg., Washington 5, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Report of the Special Study Mission to Africa, South and East of the Sahara, by Hon. Frances P. Bolton, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. Washington, 1956. 151 p. (Com. print.)

Relinquishment of consular jurisdiction in Morocco. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. J. Res. 165, Apr. 10–May 15, 1956. Washington, 1956. 31 p.

——. Report, Je. 19, 1956. Washington, 1956. 15 p. (S. Rept. 2274.)

——. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. J. Res. 657, Jl. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 12 p. (H. Rept. 2697.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 1, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1 p. (Public 856, 84th Cong.—S. J. Res. 165.)

East Africa Royal Commission, 1953–1955. Report. London, 1955. 482 p. (Cmd. 9475.) 17s. 6d.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi economic survey, 1954. 5th annual survey. Brussels, Ministry of Colonies, 1955. 422 p. Bg. Fr. 100.

Social implications of industrialization and urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara, by the International African Institute, 1956. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 743 p. (Tensions and Technology Series.)

Agriculture

Prospects of foreign disposal of domestic agricultural surpluses; a staff study, directed by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal. Washington, Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal, 1955. 112 p.

Agricultural policies in Europe and North America; first report of the Ministerial Committee for Agriculture and Food, May, 1956. Paris, OEEC, 1956. 371 p. $3.00.

Atomic Energy

Draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted by the Working Level Meeting at Washington, D.C., April 18, 1956. Washington, Dept. of State, 1956. 24 p.

Civilian atomic power acceleration program. Report from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 4146 and H. R. 12061, Je. 29, 1956. Washington, 1956. 20 p. (S. Rept. 2390.)

Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Report from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 4112, Je. 22, 1956. Washington, 1956. 21 p. (S. Rept. 2298.)

Development, growth and state of the atomic energy industry. Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 7–Mar. 6, 1956. Washington, 1956. 2 pts.

United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. Reports. London, 1955–56.

1st. 19th July 1954–31st March 1955. 35 p. 2s. *2d.* 1st April 1955–31st March 1956. 45 p. 2s. 6d.

Nuclear explosions and their effects. New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1956. 184 p. $1.00.

The Soviet Union and the atom: the early years, by M. J. Ruggles and A. Kramish. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1956. 100 p. (U.S. Air Force Project. Research Memorandum 1711.)

Claims

Claims of Vatican City for losses and damages caused by United States armed forces during World War II. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 10766, Je. 22, 1956. Washington, 1956. 6 p. (S. Rept. 2292.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Act, approved Jl. 3, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1 p. (Public 656, 84th Cong.—H. R. 10766.)

AUTHORIZING the Attorney General to dispose of the remaining assets seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act prior to December 18, 1941. Report from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 2226, Jl. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 13 p. (S. Rept. 2777.)

PAYMENT of war damage claims and return of vested assets. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. 4205, Jl. 26, 1956. Washington, 1956. 12 p. (S. Rept. 2809.)

WAR claims and return of enemy assets. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 30, Je. 6–Jl. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 489 p.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

CODE of liberalisation. New edition, 1st April, 1956. Paris, OEEC, 1956. 126 p. 75¢.

EXTENSION of export control act of 1949. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 3238, Apr. 19–30, 1956. Washington, 1956. 148 p.

——. Report, Je. 6, 1956. Washington, 1956. 7 p. (S. Rept. 2147.)

——. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 9052, Feb. 23–Mar. 6, 1956. Washington, 1956. 182 p.

——. Report, Apr. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 5 p. (H. Rept. 1998.)

IMPLEMENTATION of International Wheat Agreement, 1956. Report from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 4221, Jl. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 5 p. (S. Rept. 2623.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 3, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1 p. (Public 945, 84th Cong.–S. 4221.)

PROPOSALS to establish an international food bank and international raw materials reserve. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. Res. 85 and S. Res. 86. May 28–29, 1956. Washington, 1956. 154 p.

EAST-WEST trade. Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 26, 1956. Washington, 1956. Pt. 3.

——. Report, Jl. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 54 p. (S. Rept. 2621.)

INTERNATIONAL trade; theory of international trade, international trade policy, trade liberalisation, 1950–1955. Paris, OEEC, 1956. 85 p. (OEEC Bibliographies 2.) 75¢.

THE INTERNATIONAL Finance Corporation. Washington, IFC, 1956. 15 p.

GENERAL Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Schedule XX. United States of America; annotated to show countries with which concessions were initially negotiated at Geneva in 1956. Washington, 1956. 126 p. (Dept. of State. Commercial Policy Series 159.) 60¢.

COMMUNISM

THE COMMUNIST conspiracy; strategy and tactics of world communism. Committee on Un-American Activities, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., May 29, 1956. Washington, 1956.

Pt. 1a. Marxist classics. 202 p. (H. Rept. 2240.) *b.* The U.S.S.R. 528 p. (H. Rept. 2241.) *c.* The World Congresses of the Communist International. 372 p. (H. Rept. 2242.) *d.* Communist activities around the world. 553 p. (H. Rept. 2243.) *e.* The Comintern and the CPUSA. 343 p. (H. Rept. 2244.)

COMMUNIST interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation of American military and civilian prisoners. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 19–27, 1956. Washington, 1956. 210 p.

DISARMAMENT

CONTROL and reduction of armaments. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 93 and S. Res. 185, Je. 8–16, 1956. Washington, 1956. Pts. 8–9.

——. Second interim report of the Subcommittee on Disarmament. Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 7, 1956. Washington, 1956. 13 p. (S. Rept. 2829.)

STAFF studies, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. Washington, 1956.

3. A decade of negotiations, 1946–1953. 22 p. (Com. print.) *4.* Technical problems. 24 p. (Com. print.)

REPORT on the proceedings of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, London, Mar. 19–May 4, 1956. London, 1956. 63 p. (United Nations 7.) 2s. 6d.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eastern Europe

The National economy of the U.S.S.R.: a statistical compilation. Moscow, Central Statistical Administration, Council of Ministers, 1956. 271 p.

Rocznik Statystyczny, 1955. Washington, Polish Embassy, 1956. 287 p. Zl. 10.

European Integration

Western co-operation; a reference handbook. N. Y., British Information Services, 1955. 127 p.

Social aspects of European Economic Co-operation; report by a group of experts. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1956. 179 p. $1.50.

Towards European integration; first results for coal and steel. Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community, 1956. 28 p.

Les Investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l'acier de la Communauté; rapport sur l'enquête 1956. Luxembourg, European Coal and Steel Community, 1956. 80 p.

Far East and Asia

Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Pamphlets.] Tokyo, Author, 1956.

1. A review of Japan's defense strength, by Keikichi Masuhara. 22 p. *2.* Japan's agriculture: farming population, by Seiichi Tobata. 22 p. *3.* Japan's foreign trade, by Ryokichi Minobe. 19 p.

Vietnam and the Geneva agreements; documents concerning the discussions between Representatives of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held in London in April and May 1956. London, 1956. 11 p. (Cmd. 9763.) 6 d.

Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. "Chinese Documents Project." Research Memoranda. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command, 1955.

34. Chinese farm economy after agrarian reform, by Shao-er Ong. *37.* The propaganda machine in Communist China; with special reference to ideology, policy, and regulations, as of 1952, by F. T. C. Yu. 79 p. *38.* State and government in Communist China: their ideological basis and statutory pattern to the spring of 1953, by Henry Wei. 56 p. *39.* The strategy and tactics of Chinese Communist propaganda as of 1952, by F. T. C. Yu. 70 p. *40.* Mao Tse-tung's "lean-to-one-side" policy, by Henry Wei. 52 p. *41.* Agrarian reform in Communist China to 1952, by Shao-er Ong. 61 p.

General report of the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction for the year ending June 30, 1955. Taipei, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1956. 141 p.

Canada's army in Korea: the United Nations operations, 1950–53, and their aftermath; a short official account by the Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Ottawa. Ottawa, Cloutier, 1956. 108 p.

Germany

Die Wahle in der Sowjetzone; Dokumente und Materialien. Bonn, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1956. 102 p.

Die Betreuung. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Vertriebene und Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1955. 55 p.

Tatsachen zum Problem der Deutschen Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1956. n. p.

Great Britain

Overseas economic surveys. London, 1956.

Bolivia. 46 p. 2s. 6d. Argentina. 110 p. 5s. Guatemala. 19 p. 1s. 6d.

What is the Commonwealth. London, Central Office of Information, 1956. 16 p.

Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation held in London in February, 1956. London, 1956. 21 p. (Cmd. 9733.) 1s. 6d.

Industrial Conditions

European Productivity Agency. Projects. Paris, OEEC, 1956.

233. Bibliography on productivity. 250 p. $2.00. *247.* Titanium, zirconium and some other elements of growing industrial importance. 123 p. $1.50. *312.* Human relations in industry. Rome Conference (Jan.–Feb. 1956); papers presented at the Conference. 247 p. $3.00. *331.* Education for business leadership; report prepared by R.H.T. Dodson on the International Conference of Advanced Training Centers organized in Geneva from 24 to 26 June, 1955 by the Centre d'Etudes Industrielles. 143 p. $1.00.

Trends in economic sectors, 1955. Paris, OEEC, 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1. The engineering industries in Europe. 207 p. $1.50. *2.* The iron and steel industry in Europe. 120 p. $1.50. *3.* Maritime transport. 75 p. $1.50.

EUROPE'S growing needs of energy: how can they be met? Paris, OEEC, 1956. 120 p. $1.25.

STEEL and its alternatives. N. Y., 1956. 76 p. (E/ECE/258.) 60¢.

ADVANCES in steel technology in 1955. N. Y., 1956. 2 v. (E/ECE/238.)

LABOR AND MANPOWER

INTERNATIONAL comparisons of real wages; a study of methods. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1956. 89 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series 45.) $1.00.

DEMOGRAPHIC trends in Western Europe, 1951–1971; a report of the Manpower Committee. Paris, OEEC, 1956. 155 p. $1.50.

PROBLEMS of wage policy in Asian countries. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1956. 141 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series 43.) $1.25.

DIRECTORY of labor organizations: Europe. Washington, Dept. of Labor, 1955. 2 v.

NEAR EAST

THE SUEZ canal conference [selected documents] London, August 2–24, 1956. London, 1956. 18 p. (Cmd. 9853.) 1s.

EGYPT and the Suez Canal, 1948–1956; a record of lawlessness. Jerusalem, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1956. 19 p.

THE SUEZ Canal problem, July 26–September 22, 1956. Washington, 1956. 370 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series II. Near and Middle Eastern and African 1.) $1.25.

WHITE paper on the nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company. Cairo, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1956. 72 p.

THE CYPRUS question; negotiations, 4 October 1955 to 5 March 1956. Athens, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1956. 36 p.

COMPULSORY education in the Arab States; with special reference to the Cairo Conference, December 1954, by M. Hutasoit. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 83 p. (Studies on Compulsory Education XVI.) $1.00.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

TO AUTHORIZE participation by the United States in parliamentary conferences of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Act, approved July 11, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1 p. (Public 689, 84th Cong.—H. J. Res. 501.)

URGING the creation of an international juridical commission within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. J. Res. 668, Jl. 13, 1956. Washington, 1956. 4 p. (H. Rept. 2714.)

OPERATION of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Jl. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 12 p. (S. Rept. 2558.)

THE NORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization. Paris, NATO, 1956. 71 p.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

MUTUAL security act of 1956. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 13–May 31, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1083 p.

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 11356, Jl. 7, 1956. Washington, 1956. 28 p. (H. Rept. 2643.)

——. Act, approved Jl. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 12 p. (Public 726, 84th Cong.—H. R. 11356.)

MUTUAL security appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 12130, Je. 19–Jl. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 439 p.

——. Report, Jl. 14, 1956. Washington, 1956. 14 p. (S. Rept. 2579.)

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 12130, Jl. 25, 1956. Washington, 1956. 6 p. (H. Rept. 2931.)

——. Act, approved Jl. 31, 1956. Washington, 1956. 3 p. (Public 853, 84th Cong.—H. R. 12130.)

SOCIAL SCIENCES

BOOKS for all; a study of international book trade, by R. E. Barker. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 102 p. $3.00.

POLITICAL science in the United States of America; a trend report, by Dwight Waldo. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 84 p. $1.00.

SOCIOLOGY in the United States of America; a trend report, by H. L. Zetterberg. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 156 p. $2.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONVENTION on the political rights of women; history and commentary. New York, 1955. 46 p. (1955. IV. 17.) 25¢.

SPAIN

COLECCION de los tratados, convenios y otros documentos de caracter internacional firmados por España y de las leyes, decretos y ordenes que atañen a las relaciones exteriores, 1944–1945. Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1955. 459 p. Ptas. 150.

THE SITUATION of protestantism in Spain: (six studies of an anti-Spanish campaign of defamation). Madrid, Diplomatic Information Office, 2d ed., 1955. 165 p.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

ACTIVITIES of FAO under the expanded technical assistance program, 1954–55. Rome, FAO, 1955. 99 p. $1.00.

ASSISTANCE to the needy in less-developed areas; a survey of methods of administering assistance in various countries. N. Y., 1956. 227 p. (1956. IV. 2.) $1.50.

STAFF studies, Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 2, Jl. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956.

6. Economic development in India and Communist China. 51 p. (Com. print.) *7.* Soviet technical assistance. 62 p. (Com. print.)

WINGED world; five years of technical assistance through ICAO. Montreal, ICAO, 1956. 36 p.

TECHNICAL cooperation in health. Washington, International Cooperation Administration, 1956. 30 p.

UNITED NATIONS AND AGENCIES

INTERNATIONAL organizations in the social sciences; a summary description of the structure and activities of non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship with UNESCO and specialized in the social sciences. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 100 p. (Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences 5.) 50¢.

EXPRESSING the sense of Congress against admission of the Communist Regime in China as the representative of China in the United Nations. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. Con. Res. 265, Jl. 16, 1956. Washington, 1956. 7 p. (H. Rept. 2733.)

——. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. Con. Res. 265, Jl. 20, 1956. Washington, 1956. 2 p. (S. Rept. 2697.)

EVERYMAN'S United Nations, 1945–1955. N.Y., 1956. 444 p. $1.50.

INTERNATIONAL organizations and movements. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 20–Jl. 2, 1956. Washington, 1956. 807 p.

U. N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization . . . an American view. Washington, 1956. 35 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series IV. UNESCO 29.) 35¢.

UNESCO in brief. Paris, UNESCO, 1956. 30 p. 25¢.

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT of Defense appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 16–Apr. 16, 1956. Washington, 1956. 187 p.

——. Hearings, Feb. 21, 1956. Washington, 1956. 397 p.

——. Additional hearings, Apr. 18–20, 1956. Washington, 1956. 183 p.

——. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 10986, May 8–Je. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1301 p.

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 10986, Je. 28, 1956. Washington, 1956. 5 p. (H. Rept. 2529.)

——. Act, approved Jl. 2, 1956. Washington, 1956. 19 p. (Public 639, 84th Cong.—H. R. 10986.)

DEPARTMENT of the Air Force appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 28–Apr. 11, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1590 p.

DEPARTMENT of the Army appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 27–Apr. 19, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1627 p.

DEPARTMENT of the Navy appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 28–Mar. 21, 1956. Washington, 1956. 1199 p.

STUDY of airpower. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 16–Jl. 19, 1956. Washington, 1956. 23 pts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To PROVIDE for an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development for each of the three military departments within the Department of Defense. Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 11575, Je. 27, 1956. Washington, 1956. p. 8033–8065.

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 11575, Je. 28, 1956. Washington, 1956. 7 p.

DEFENSE essentiality and foreign economic policy. Case study: watch industry and precision skills. Report of the Joint Economic Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., July 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 2 pts. (S. Rept. 2629.)

SCIENTIFIC, professional, and administrative positions to promote the national defense. Hearings before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 11040, May 10–11, 1956, Washington, 1956. 43 p.

REGISTRATION of certain persons trained in foreign espionage systems. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 3882, Jl. 20, 1956. Washington, 1956. 4 p. (S. Rept. 2719.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 1, 1956. Washington, 1956. 3 p. (Public 893, 84th Cong.—H. R. 3882.)

REQUIRING international agreements other than treaties to be transmitted to the Senate within 60 days after execution thereof. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 147, Jl. 5, 1956. Washington, 1956. 3 p. (S. Rept. 2416.)

FOREIGN service act amendments of 1956. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 3481, Mar. 21, 1956. Washington, 1956. 42 p.

——. Report, Apr. 11, 1956. Washington, 1956. 22 p. (S. Rept. 1726.)

——. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 3481, Je. 27–29, 1956. Washington, 1956. 83 p.

——. Report, Jl. 12, 1956. Washington, 1956. 64 p. (H. Rept. 2696.)

——. Act, approved Jl. 28, 1956. Washington, 1956. 5 p. (Public 828, 84th Cong.—S. 3481.)

INTERMEDIATE reports of the Committee on Government Operations, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., May 16, Jl. 27, 1956. Washington, 1956.

16. Administrative management of the Department of State. 35 p. (H. Rept. 2172.) *24.* Civil defense for national survival. 103 p. (H. Rept. 2946.)

STRENGTHENING international relations through cultural and athletic exchanges and participation in international fairs and festivals. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 3116, Je. 28, 1956. Washington, 1956. 4 p. (H. Rept. 2509.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 1, 1956. Washington, 1956. 3 p. (Public 860, 84th Cong.—S. 3116.)

U. S. passports denial and review. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on the Judiciary, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 9991, May 10–28, 1956. Washington, 1956. 32 p.

FOREIGN trade in cotton textiles. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 4156, Jl. 16, 1956. Washington, 1956. 33 p.

IMPORTS of cotton textiles from Japan. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. on the Green amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1956 (H. R. 11356), Je. 16, 1956. Washington, 1956. 29 p.

METHODS of determining value of imported goods for duty purposes. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 6040, Je. 25–27, 1956. Washington, 1956. 286 p.

CUSTOMS simplification act of 1956. Report from the Committee on Finance, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 6040, Jl. 13, 1956. Washington, 1956. 28 p. (S. Rept. 2560.)

——. Act, approved Aug. 2, 1956. Washington, 1956. 7 p. (Public 927, 84th Cong.—H. R. 6040.)

Swiss watches—adjustments. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Je. 29–30, 1955, Jan. 10, 1956. Washington, 1956. 239 p.

——. Report, Je. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 12 p. (S. Rept. 2239.)

EXTENSION of sugar act of 1948. Report from the Committee on Agriculture, House, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. R. 7030, Jl. 22, 1955. Washington, 1955. 35 p. (H. Rept. 1348.)

——. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 7030, Jan. 16–17, 1956. Washington, 1956. 398 p.

——. Report, Jan. 26, 1956. Washington. 1956. 31 p. (S. Rept. 1461.)

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H. R. 7030, May 16, 1956. Washington, 1956. 9 p. (H. Rept. 2174.)

EXTENSION of Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Report from the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 3868, Jl. 11, 1956. Washington, 1956. 7 p. (S. Rept. 2487.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMENDMENT to refugee relief act of 1953. Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2248, Jan. 18, 1956. Washington, 1956. 35 p.

——. Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 3570 [and others], May 3, 1956. Washington, 1956. 106 p.

MERCHANT Marine legislation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 3113 [and others], Mar. 12–13, 1956. Washington, 1956. 124 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 3113, Jl. 23, 1956. Washington, 1956. 6 p. (S. Rept. 2877.)

AMENDMENT to cargo preference statutes. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2584, Apr. 19–26, 1956. Washington, 1956, 161 p.

FALSE swearing by government employees. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S. 374, Je. 5, 1956. Washington, 1956. 3 p. (S. Rept. 2112.)

THE EPISODE of the Russian seamen. Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . to the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., May 24, 1956. Washington, 1956. 21 p. (Com. print.)

MINERAL facts and problems. Washington, 1956. 1042 p. (Bureau of Mines Bulletin 556.) $5.75.

THE POWERS of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, House, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Je. 14, 1956. Washington, 1956. 145 p. (H. Doc. 443.)

II. PAMPHLETS

ALL ROADS LEAD TO FREEDOM: first report. Formosa, Asian People's Anti-Communist League, 1956. 136 p.

BONN. INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Finanz und Steuerreform. Bonn, Author, 1956.
14. Der Vorrang der finanziellen Ordnung. 10 p. *15.* Der Bundeshaushalt 1956; zu den Ausführungen von Ministerialdirektor, by F. K. Vialon. 12 p.

BONN, INSTITUT FINANZEN UND STEUERN. Schriftenreihe. Bonn, Author, 1956.
15. Pt. 5. Der Bundeshaushalt. 130 p. *38.* Das Problem der Rüstungsfinanzierung; ein Diskussionsbeitrag. 41 p. *39.* Die Warenumsatzbesteuerung in der Schweiz. 71 p. *41.* Der Staatshaushalt 1956 der UdSSR. 66 p.

BOOKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA: a select bibliography, by Bruno Lasker, N.Y., American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. 43 p. 50¢.

THE CHINESE IN MODERN MALAYA, by Victor Purcell. N.Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. 63 p. (Background to Malaya Series 9.)

COMMUNIST CHINA PROBLEM RESEARCH SERIES. Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1956.
12. Programs of Communist China for overseas Chinese, by Lu Yusun. 82 p. $1.50. *13.* Students in mainland China, by Chao Chung and Yang I-fan. 139 p. $2.00.

LES CONSEILS OUVRIERS EN YOUGOSLAVIE, by Desimir Tochitch. Paris, Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, 1955. pp. 406–444. (Vol. 33, no. 4.)

THE CRIMES OF THE STALIN ERA; special report of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, by Nikita S. Khrushchev, annotated by B. I. Nicolaevsky. N.Y., New Leader, 1956. 67 p.

CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN INSTITUTE IN EXILE. Studies. Chicago, Author, 1956.
1. Possibilities of dissolving the Soviet sphere of power, by V. Chalupa. 22 p.

DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY, by James P. Warburg. N.Y., Current Affairs Press, 1956. 63 p. 50¢.

DEVELOPMENT AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT; a note on the mechanism of national and international economic inequality, by Gunnar Myrdal. Cairo, National Bank of Egypt, 1956. 88 p.

EASTERN ECONOMIST PAMPHLETS. New Delhi, Eastern Economist, 1956.
36. India's capital requirements, by Colin Clark. 15 p. Rs. 8. *37.* Socialism tomorrow, by Odysseus. 51 p. R. 1.

THE ECONOMIC TEST IN LATIN AMERICA, by T. W. Schultz. Ithaca, Cornell University, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1956. 30 p. (Bulletin 35.) 25¢.

EGYPT AND THE WEST; the salient facts behind the Suez crisis, by E. V. Lawrence. N.Y., American Institute of International Information, 1956. 85 p.

DAS ENDE DES STALIN-MYTHOS; die Ergebnisse des 20. Parteikongresses der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion, Parteiführung—Parteiorganisation—Parteiideologie, by Boris Meissner. Frankfurt, Institut für Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956. 214 p. (Dokumente und Berichte des Europa-Archivs, Bd. 13.) DM. 19.50.

ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE. Princeton, Princeton Univ., International Finance Section, 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

26. Two approaches to the exchange-rate problem: the United Kingdom and Canada, by Samuel I. Katz. 19 p.

EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. Publications. Brussels, Author, 1956.
19. 1st supplement to publication no. 18: Declaration of E.L.E.C. on the creation of a Common Market. 19 p. *20.* The Common Market to promote social prosperity; introductory report for the IIId International Conference of E.L.E.C. (Brussels, June 20th, 21st and 22nd, 1956.) 93 p.

XIVe CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANCAIS, LE HAVRE, 18–21 JUILLET 1956; rapports, interventions et documents. Paris, Cahiers du Communisme, 1956. 420 p. (Numéro Special.) Fr. 250.

THE FUTURE OF EAST AFRICA: a summary of the report of the Royal Commission . . . London, Africa Bureau, 1956. 47 p. 3s.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, 1855–1955: a bibliography of works in western languages, comp. and ed. by Patrick Wilson. Berkeley, Institute of East Asiatic Studies, Univ. of California, 1956. 356 p.

HEADLINE SERIES. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1956. 35¢ each.
118. Mainsprings of world politics, by Brooks Emeny. 62 p. *119.* Underdeveloped lands; revolution of rising expectations, by F. D. Murden. 70 p.

INDIAN PRESS DIGESTS MONOGRAPH SERIES. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, Univ. of California, 1956.
2. Indian approaches to a socialist society, by M. W. Fisher and J. V. Bondurant. 105 p. $1.50.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: a select bibliography, compiled by G. P. Speeckaert. Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1956. 116 p. $2.00.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE. Reports. N.Y., 1956.
26. The International Atomic Energy Agency; origin and political developments. 44 p. *27.* Disarmament; negotiation and action, 1945–1956. 50 p.

KIELER VORTRÄGE. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, 1954–55.
5. Fragen der Zahlungsbilanz, des Geld und Kapitalmarktes in der Bundesrepublik, by H. J. Abs. 16 p. *6.* Entwicklungen in Konjunkturforschung und Konjunkturpolitik in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, by Gerhard Colm. 23 p. *7.* Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Indischen Union unter Berücksichtigung der deutschen Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten, by Wolf von Arnim. 19 p.

LABOUR PARTY. [Publications.] London, Labour Party, 1956.
1. Toward equality; labour's policy for social justice. 32 p. 9d. *2.* Homes of the future; a socialist policy for housing. 63 p. 9d. *3.* Labour's colonial policy; I: The plural society. 47 p. 6d. *4.* Personal freedom; labour's policy for the individual and society. 32 p. 9d.

LABOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE. [Publications.] N.Y., Author, 1956.
1. El nuevo amo: el estado Comunista. 33 p. *2.* El coloniaje Soviético (la expansión colonial Ruso-Soviética en la Europa centro-oriental.) 30 p. *3.* La paloma roja de la paz. 31 p. *4.* Discurso secreto, by Nikita Khruschev. 80 p. *5.* Europa oriental bajo el control policiaco. 43 p.

LAW IN COMMUNIST CHINA, by Andrè Bonnichon. The Hague, International Commission of Jurists, n. d. 35 p.

THE MALTA DIRECTORY AND TRADE INDEX. Valletta, Malta Publicity Services, 1956. 367 p.

MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER. Publications. N.Y., Author, 1956.
28. Current research on Central and Eastern Europe, edited by Dagmar Horna. 251 p.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE; a report of the Committee on Commercial Policy. N.Y., United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, 1956. 32 p. 30¢.

NEWS IN ASIA; a report from the International Press Institute incorporating the preliminary research and the proceedings of the Institute's Asian Conference in Tokyo, March 1956. Zurich, International Press Institute, 1956. 113 p.

OPEN DOORS; a report on five surveys: foreign students, foreign doctors, foreign faculty members in the United States, U.S. students, U.S. faculty members abroad. N.Y., Institute of International Education, 1956. 45 p.

PERSECUTION OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL. N.Y., Palestine Arab Refugee Office, 1956. 24 p.

PLANNING PAMPHLETS. Washington, National Planning Association, 1956.
96. The economic development of Burma, by E. E. Hagen. 88 p. $1.25. *97.* Land reform in Italy, by Lowry Nelson. 48 p. 75¢.

POLICY DECLARATIONS ON WORLD AFFAIRS; economic, political. Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 1956. 45 p.

PROPOSAL FOR A NEW UNITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, by M. F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow. Cambridge, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956. 132 p.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLETS. N.Y., Public Affairs Committee, 1956. 25¢ each.
240. Portrait of Israel, myth and reality, by Hal Lehrman. 28 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RENTA NACIONAL DEL PERU (Peruvian National Income) 1942–1954. Lima, Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, 1956. 140 p.

REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU TO THE XXth CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, BY N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, FIRST SECRETARY, C.C., CPSU. N.Y., New Century, 1956. 125 p.

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES ABROAD; background papers . . . Final Report of the Ninth American Assembly, May 3–6, 1956. N.Y., Columbia Univ., Graduate School of Business, The American Assembly, 1956. 217 p.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Memoranda. London and N.Y., Author, 1956.
1. The British Caribbean; a brief political and economic survey. 84 p. 75¢. *2.* The Colombo Plan: an economic survey, by Frederic Benham. 21 p. 30¢. *3.* Gibraltar, by C. E. Carrington. 36 p. 50¢. *4.* Malaya and Singapore, by C. E. Carrington and others. 21 p. 30¢. *5.* The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). 7 p. 15¢. *6.* SEATO: The Manila Treaty and western policy in South East Asia, by A. S. B. Olver. 23 p. 35¢. *7.* Libya; a brief political and economic survey. 30 p. 45¢. *8.* Venezuela; a brief political and economic survey. 18 p. 35¢. *9.* Britain and the Suez Canal, by D. C. Watt. 47 p. 40¢.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. Publications. Bonn, Author, 1956. 30 pf. each.
1. Wir brauchen eine neue Aussenpolitik; sozialdemokratische Vorschläge zur wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, by Erich Ollenhauer. 23 p. *2.* Mensch und Technik; die sozialen und kulturellen Probleme im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution, by Carlo Schmid. 26 p. *3.* An der Wende der deutschen Politik, by Erich Ollenhauer. 34 p. *4.* Die zweite industrielle Revolution, by Leo Brandt. 36 p. *5.* German politics at a turning point, by Erich Ollenhauer. 33 p.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, by Eric Stein, and Implications of Expanding Membership for United Nations administration and budget, by W. R. Sharp. N.Y., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. 77 p., 34 p.

SOVIET CRIMES AND KHRUSHCHEV'S CONFESSIONS; a factual report with a chronology of 72 citations in the 38-year criminal record. N.Y., Freedom House, 1956. 35 p. 20¢.

DIE SOWJETRUSSISCHE DEUTSCHLAND POLITIK: 1945–1955; eine studie zur Zeitgeschichte, by Werner Erfurt. Esslingen, Bechtle, 1956. 129 p.

DIE SOWJETUNION FINNLAND UND SKANDINAVIEN, 1945–1955; zwei Berichte zu den internationalen Beziehungen der Nachkriegszeit, by Werner von Harpe. Cologne, Höhlau, 1956. 66 p. (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 12.)

TOWARD A HEALTHIER FARM ECONOMY, by J. C. Thomson. N.Y., Committee for Economic Development, 1956. 16 p.

TRADE BARRIERS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, by C. P. Taft. Dallas, Southern Methodist Univ. Press, 1955. 101 pp. (Jno. E. Owens Memorial Lecture, 1955.) $1.50.

TUNISIA FACES THE FUTURE. Paris, Le Monde Économique, 1956. 205 p. ("World Documents" Series, Special Issue.)

UNDER FALSE COLOURS; a report on the character of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. The Hague, International Commission of Jurists, 1955. 31 p.

UNITED STATES AID TO THE WORLD 1945–55; a background information paper prepared for the Commonwealth—American Current Affairs Unit, by Philip Goodhart. London, English-Speaking Union, 1956. 24 p. 1s. 3d.

WHAT ABOUT GOA?, by Roldaumn. n. pl., n. pub., n. d. 112 p.

WILL TO PEACE, by M. H. Krumbine. N.Y., Church Peace Union, 1956. 69 p. 50¢.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED